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I. "NORMALIZING" THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
REGULATION OF WHALING: THE ST. KITTS
AND NEVIS DECLARATION
A. Introduction
The history of international institutional cooperation is sprinkled
with examples of the spasmodic emergence, from out of the swirling
stream of activities of the major treaty-based organizations, of particular
events, projects, or decisions which, in the fullness of time, can be ap-
preciated as being of truly pivotal significance--defining moments
which have the most profound effects in terms of shaping, galvanizing,
or redirecting the overall evolution of the regime. In the case of the 1946
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW),' there
can be no doubt that the adoption of the moratorium on commercial
whaling at the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the International Whal-
ing Commission (IWC) in 1982 was one such moment. More recently,
the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting offered the promise of another, this
time in the form of the St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, adopted as IWC
Resolution 2006-1. 2 The resolution was proposed by the Japanese dele-
gation, and accompanied by a brief position paper.
B. Resolution 2006-1 St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration
The resolution was adopted by the narrowest possible margin of
thirty-three votes to thirty-two, with one abstention. Subsequently, a
I. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW].
2. International Whaling Commission [IWC], St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, IWC
Res. 2006-1 (June 2006). The text of this Resolution is set out as an Appendix to this Article.
3. IWC, Normalizing the International Whaling Commission, IWC/58/12, Agenda
Item 19 (2006).
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number of States that had voted against the Declaration formally disso-
ciated themselves from it.4 Insofar as these statements may have been
intended to draw attention to particular deficiencies in the text, they may
be understandable, but if they were indicative of an outright refusal to
engage in the deliberative process which the Declaration envisages, it is
submitted that they were misguided. This is because the process in ques-
tion may in fact represent the best, and even possibly the last,
opportunity for the IWC to secure its own future, and, more importantly,
that of the great whale species of the planet. In order to substantiate this
point, it will be necessary first to advert briefly to some essential charac-
teristics of the ICRW regime, and then to examine and analyze the
Declaration in a little more detail.
As regards the IWC itself, it is hard to be sure whether it is truly on
the point of collapse, as the Declaration suggests, though it has certainly
seemed to be so at times throughout the last decade. Yet this observation
could equally, perhaps, have been applied from time to time to other in-
stitutions which have, after the fashion of long-distance athletes with
tortured and ungainly running styles, ultimately gone on to complete the
course against all expectations. On the other hand, there have undoubt-
edly been high-profile cases in recent years of marathon runners whose
evident discomfiture has ultimately led to collapse, and it would be un-
wise to discount this possibility in the case of the WC. In any event, it
would be difficult to dispute the assertion in the supporting paper that the
organization is "dysfunctional," 5 certainly when judged by comparison
with other major treaty institutions.
In the early years, this dysfunction took the form of a chronic failure
on the part of the whaling nations to commit themselves to the accep-
tance of effective restraints on exploitation, a point which may perhaps
be conceded by the euphemistic allusion in the Resolution to "historic
over-harvesting. 6 There is room for debate as to the extent to which the
IWC had succeeded in putting its own house in order in that regard by
the time it experienced a dramatic increase in membership during the
1970s. This was occasioned by an influx of States which lacked any
vested interest in whaling and whose primary concern was to avert the
perceived risk of extinction of cetacean species. It was as a consequence
of these developments that the moratorium was introduced . Since that
4. See Chair, IWC, Report of the 58th Annual Meeting of the IWC, 19.2.2 (Jan.
2007), available at http://www.iwc.office.org/ documents/meetings/stkitts/CHREP58.pdf.
5. IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
6. IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2, pmbl. (tenth recital).
7. Once again, opinions no doubt differ as to whether this was necessary. IWC Resolu-
tion 2006-1 notes that the moratorium was not adopted on the advice of the 1WC's own
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time, successive changes in membership have seen the pendulum of
opinion regarding a resumption of commercial whaling swing uncer-
tainly to and fro.
There is, of course, no adverse imputation for an international or-
ganization entailed in the fact that its members disagree sharply on key
policy questions: the ventilation and possible resolution of such differ-
ences may, after all, have been the very purpose that the organization
was intended to serve. Yet, in the case of the IWC, there is little indica-
tion of consensus even as to the issues over which States are entitled to
deliberate and disagree in that forum, or of the overall parameters within
which a resolution might be sought. While these controversies must turn
ultimately on the interpretation and application of relevant legal provi-
sions, the practice appears to the outsider to have been to address them
on a predominantly political basis, with little serious attention paid to
their essentially juridical nature. As a direct result, the organization has
seemed to be in a state of perpetual acrimony and turmoil. Whereas envi-
ronmental treaty regimes in general promote constructive and
progressive debate with a view to resolving issues of conservation con-
cern, the IWC largely provides a venue for the recurrent reiteration of
entrenched positions; while other institutions habitually conclude their
deliberations through consensus, the IWC conducts its business through
a sequence of bitterly contested votes; where other conventions have
harnessed the commitment, resources, and expertise of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to beneficial effect, the IWC still
appears to regard them with suspicion or outright hostility. Despite the
manifest dedication, expertise, and professionalism of its staff, the IWC
as an institution inspires little confidence. Consequently, the call to set
the organization to rights has considerable appeal. Furthermore, it is en-
couraging to note that there are at least traces in Resolution 2006-1 of
recognition of the need to address the specifically legal nature of the
problems involved. By the time of the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting in
2007, the underlying political dynamic in the IWC had altered yet again
as a result of further membership changes, which had tilted the balance
back in the direction of maintenance of the moratorium. Nevertheless,
there were signs that the normalization issue was not intended simply to
fall into abeyance, but rather that it might receive further consideration
through the medium of an inter-sessional meeting.' It is very much in the
interest of the international community that this opportunity be taken,
Scientific Committee. On the other hand, asserting that it is "no longer necessary" might be
taken as conceding that it was needed at the time.
8. See Press Release, Chair, IWC, Summary Report for the 59th Annual Meeting (May
29, 2007), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/meeting2007.htm#summary.
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and that the specifically legal dimensions of the problem be explored a
little more thoroughly than seems to have occurred in the past. It is with
that hope in mind that this preliminary analysis has been prepared, with
the possibility that others may be encouraged to pursue the matter fur-
ther. Given the desirability of increasing the emphasis on the legal
aspects, it will be helpful to begin by setting the Resolution itself into its
constitutional context.
C. The Legal Significance and Purport of the Declaration
The legal significance of the resolutions of any international organi-
zation is, of course, determined essentially by the provisions governing
the adoption, implementation, and effects of such measures in the con-
stituent instrument of the organization in question. In the case of the
IWC, provision is made in Article V for the formulation of regulations
amending the Schedule to the Convention, and, in accordance with Arti-
cle III, these require for their adoption a "three-fourths majority of those
members voting."9 Article V(3) establishes the modalities for the entry
into force of such amendments, and there is no doubt that they are in
principle legally binding. This point has on occasion been doubted by
certain commentators,' though their reasoning appears unconvincing.
The fact that IWC members may register objections to such amend-
ments, thereby excluding their effect, does not turn them into
recommendations. The correct analysis is that amendments create condi-
tional obligations, binding except with regard to States that exclude their
effect in accordance with established procedures: the vital difference
between the two characterizations would become evident in the event of
mere silence on the part of dissentient States, or of attempts to evade the
effect of the changes by other than the authorized means. In confirmation
of the argument above, separate provision is made for measures which
are properly regarded as recommendations in Article VI, which stipulates
that "[t]he Commission may from time to time make recommendations
to any or all Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to
9. See ICRW, supra note 1, art. Il.
10. WILLIAM BURKE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES: UNCLOS 1982
AND BEYOND 294 (1994). Burke noted that
[a]lthough the ICRW refers to schedule amendments as regulations, they are more
like recommendations. This is because the schedule amendments do not take effect
simply on their adoption by the commission. Even if a proposal receives approval
by three-fourths of the members it may be subject to objection by members within
ninety days.
Michigan Journal of International Law
whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Conven-
tion."'
Such decisions may be adopted by simple majority, but do not be-
come binding on Member States. It is clear that the St. Kitts and Nevis
Declaration falls within this latter category of measure. That being so, it
might perhaps be argued that it cannot in any sense be regarded as piv-
otal, since members of the Commission remain free simply to disregard
it if they choose. Certainly, there would appear to be a long-established
tradition of disregarding recommendations within the IWC as a whole.'2
Yet a central purpose of this study is to suggest that, whether the matter
is viewed from a legal or a political perspective, this is not the appropri-
ate response for States to adopt. The reason is that all such instruments
represent the considered outcome of a formal process of deliberation by
sovereign States, and relate to the performance of legal obligations
which they are obliged to carry out in good faith. Consequently, it can be
argued even from the purely legal point of view that there must at least
be an obligation to give genuine and serious consideration to compliance
with the recommendations in question, even if actual compliance itself is
not ultimately mandatory. 3 In addition, this particular measure touches
on fundamental issues regarding the very future of the institution itself,
reinforcing still further the importance of this reflective process. In order
that due consideration may be given to the measure in question, it will
plainly be necessary to conduct a closer analysis of its meaning and pur-
port.
Regrettably, this task of analysis is not facilitated by the wording of
the Declaration, the drafting of which gives rise to certain difficulties. Its
operative provisions are extremely brief, and assert first that the IWC
itself has "failed to meet its obligations under the terms of the ICRW."'
' 4
Unfortunately, neither the failures in question, nor the obligations to
which they relate, are specified, but are left to be surmised from the Dec-
laration as a whole, and from the supporting position paper. 5 In contrast
to the array of obligations arising "under the terms of the ICRW" for its
parties, there appear to be only two provisions which directly impose
obligations on the Commission itself: namely, Article 111(2), which re-
quires it to elect officers and determine its own Rules of Procedure, and
11. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VI.
12. A good example can be found in the various recommendations that have been
adopted with regard to the issue of scientific whaling, the legality of which has often been
challenged by States to whom they were unwelcome. See Kazuo Sumi, The Whale War be-
tween Japan and the United States: Problems and Prospects, 17 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
317, 336-40 (1989).
13. See infra text accompanying note 69.
14. IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2, I1.
15. See IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
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Article IV(2), which requires it to publish reports of its activities.' 6 Yet
full compliance with these obligations is evident from the record of IWC
proceedings.
Presumably, therefore, the reference to "the Commission" is in-
tended to connote the parties themselves, in a collective sense, though
the particular complaints raised do not seem to relate to a breach of any
specific duty created for the parties by the provisions of the treaty itself.
17
There are certainly a number of other functions for which the ICRW
makes provision, whether with regard to the parties or to the Commis-
sion, but these are seemingly couched in the form of powers. Thus, the
Commission "may," for example, appoint its own Secretary and staff,
and set up appropriate committees. No doubt the most crucial of these
functions concerns the power of the Commission "to amend from time to
time the provisions of the Schedule."' 9 It is, of course, possible to claim
in appropriate circumstances that the exercise of powers is unlawful as
being ultra vires, although it is unclear that that will necessarily involve
a breach of duty as well, unless the duty in question is the implied obli-
gation to act within one's powers.
Presumably, however, the crucial passage in the Resolution is the
one found in the ninth recital of the preamble, which asserts that the "po-
sition of ... members that are opposed to the resumption of commercial
whaling on a sustainable basis irrespective of the status of whale stocks
is contrary to the object and purpose" of the ICRW.20 This suggests that
the relevant "failure to meet ... obligations" is seen to lie not in the
breach of any specific provision, but rather in the general frustration of
the Convention's objectives as a whole. This is a serious charge, and one
which is unlikely to prove easy to establish in accordance with accepted
legal criteria. In the first place, the very existence of a legal duty to avoid
such effects has been the subject of some controversy in recent times,
and one may recall in that context the view expressed in the Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua) case by the Japanese judge on the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), Judge Shigeru Oda, that
[t]he "undermining of the whole spirit" of a treaty or "violation
of the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of' a treaty
is not tantamount to specific breach of the treaty obligations ....
16. ICRW, supra note 1, arts. 111(2), IV(2).
17. See id. arts. 111(5), V[I, VIII(I)-(4), IX; see also IWC, The Schedule to the Conven-
tion, available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/commission/schedule.htm. In accordance with
Article I(l), the Schedule forms an integral part of the Convention. Certain other obligations
were imposed under the terms of Article III(5) and (6), but the force of these is long spent.
18. See ICRW, supra note 1, arts. III(3)-(4), IV(l)(a)-(c), V(I), VI.
19. Id. art. V.
20. IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2, pmbl. (ninth recital).
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There is no suggestion [in Article 60 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties2' (the Vienna Convention)] that the un-
dermining of the object and/or purpose of a treaty is an
obligation implicit in the principle pacta sunt servanda .... I
would like to take this opportunity of indicating my own under-
standing of this principle, which to my mind requires
compliance with the letter of obligations subscribed to, and not
necessarily the avoidance of conduct not expressly precluded by
the terms of the treaty.22
Even though this view would seem ultimately to have been rejected
by the Court as a whole, the problem undeniably remains of determining
precisely what constitutes the "object and purpose of the treaty" in any
given case. For, although this may commonly be supposed to be obvious,
experience suggests that this impression is extremely deceptive, and that
the concept of object-and-purpose is, in fact, a surprisingly elusive one.
As Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read, and Hsu Mo observed in their joint
opinion in the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case,
[w]hat is the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention? To
repress genocide? Of course: but is it more than that? Does it
contain any or all of the enforcement articles of the Convention?
That is the heart of the matter.23
Finally, even if the object and purpose can be established with any
certainty in a given case, there is the further complex question of
whether, and to what extent, it can be said to have been undermined or
defeated as a consequence of particular actions. In the Nicaragua case,
the majority of the Court, having decided that there was indeed a general
duty to refrain from defeating the object and purpose of a treaty, felt
bound to recognize the difficulty in determining when that duty had been
violated.24 In the case of a treaty of friendship, for example, it was neces-
sary to distinguish between the broad category of acts which were
unfriendly in a generalized sense, and those that related to the specific
fields in which friendship was addressed in the treaty itself. Even then,
distinctions would have to be drawn between "acts calculated to deprive
the treaty of its object and purpose," which would give rise to legal
21. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
22. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 75 (June 27)
(separate opinion of Judge Oda).
23. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 24 (May 28).
24. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
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liability on this basis, and those "less flagrantly in contradiction with the
purpose of the treaty," which apparently would not. 5
These observations strongly suggest that there are ample grounds on
which governments may, in perfect good faith, disagree over the correct
conclusions to be drawn at each and every one of the various states of
the argument raised by the "normalization" resolution. In the case of the
ICRW, indeed, the question of how it is properly to be interpreted is a
matter of considerable legal complexity. In such circumstances, baldly to
assert, without the support of detailed legal analysis, that one particular
interpretation is correct and that any contrasting interpretation is mani-
festly advanced in bad faith simply invites reciprocation by the opposing
camp.
Regrettably, the drafting of the normalization documents themselves
shows every sign of perpetuating this cycle. Thus, Document 58/12,
while calling for the exercise of good faith in the implementation and
reorienting of the ICRW, seems itself to fall short of acceptable standards
in that regard.26 This is particularly evident in its characterization of the
arguments of those who oppose the resumption of commercial whaling
as essentially "emotional" in character. 7 In reality, no one who has made
a genuine attempt to engage with the evolution of this debate could fail
to be aware of the broad array of serious arguments-whether legal,
ethical, cultural, or economic in character-which have been deployed in
support of continuation of the moratorium. Whether these are ultimately
found convincing or not, their essentially rational character can scarcely
be doubted. Consequently, this description can only be regarded as a cal-
culated attempt at denigration of the views of those with whom the pro-
whaling lobby is demonstrably obliged to enter into meaningful and con-
structive negotiations. Naturally enough, prohibitionist arguments in
relation to whaling may for many people be underpinned by emotional
considerations of one sort or another, but precisely the same could be
said of attachments to the rule of law, to national sovereignty, to the
avoidance of human suffering, or to the maintenance of cultural tradi-
tions. Indeed, almost all legal and moral norms are likely to find
reflection in the emotions at some level, yet it would be surprising to
25. See id. at 270-82 (emphasis added).
26. See IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
27. The opening paragraph of the document asserts that the IWC "has become a mere
stage for emotional and political conflicts," IWC/58/12, supra note 3, 1, while IWC Resolu-
tion 2006-1 deprecates the displacement, "for emotional reasons," of the exploitation of
whales from globally accepted norms of resource management, IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note
2, pmbl. (first recital). See also Sumi, supra note 12, at 347 (noting that "[it seems that the
strongest anti-whaling sentiments are founded on emotions rather than science and logic").
Michigan Journal of International Law
find expressions of concern for national sovereignty or human rights
dismissed on that account as purely "emotional" responses.
In any event, even if arguments against commercial whaling were
exclusively emotional in character, that could hardly be a ground for
complaint for any State that had invoked the Universal Declaration on
Cultural Diversity, as Japan and its supporters have done, since culture is
defined for the purposes of that very instrument as "the set of distinctive
spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features of society or a
social group. 28 Under Article 3, cultural diversity is seen as "a means to
achieve a more satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral, and spiritual
existence.,, 29 Self-evidently, demanding respect for cultural diversity-
which embraces, inter alia, tolerance of a plurality of emotional val-
ues-while at the same time dismissing the values of others on the
grounds that they are purely emotional, is not a position that anyone
could expect to defend without some sacrifice of his or her own moral
and intellectual reputation. Accordingly, the whole argument about emo-
tion is probably best put quietly to one side as an isolated and regrettable
aberration.
A preferable approach would surely be to break free from the cycle
of recrimination over past conduct, and to embark instead on a process
of constructive dialogue whereby the object-and-purpose of the ICRW
may be identified and elaborated in a more sophisticated fashion for the
future. It would, of course, be naive in the extreme to believe that this
process could possibly eliminate all differences of perspective, but it
might at least serve to narrow the gulf between them, or create a better
understanding of alternative viewpoints, and thereby pave the way for
some more satisfactory accommodation of interests for the future. Ide-
ally, that would have been the purpose of the inter-sessional meeting
proposed in Document 58/12, but it is a further indication of the dys-
functional state of the organization that this seems to have produced a
characteristically polarized response.30 It is surely the case that all parties
would wish to "respect the ICRW," "act in accordance with its provi-
28. U.N. Educ., Scientific & Cultural Org. [UNESCO], Universal Declaration on Cul-
tural Diversity pmbl., Nov. 2, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 57 [hereinafter UNESCO Universal Declaration
on Cultural Diversity] (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 59.
30. The meeting, which was not convened under IWC auspices, was not attended by
most of the anti-whaling delegations. Additional meetings were organized in New York by the
Pew Foundation and in Buenos Aires by certain Latin American countries. See Symposium on
the State of Conservation of Whales in the 21 st Century, Apr. 12-13, 2007, New York, Chair's
Summary Report, IWC/59/11 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/
commission/future/fWC-M08-INFO3.pdf (providing reports of their deliberations); The Sec-
ond Pew Whale Symposium, Tokyo, Jan. 30-31, 2008, Declaration by Argentina and the
Netherlands, IWC/59/28 (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/
commission/future/1WC-M08-INFO9.pdf (same).
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sions," and "implement it in a responsible manner,"3' but this is certain to
require that much closer attention be paid to the complexities of the legal
issues involved than hitherto appears to have been the case. Obviously,
the treatment of such questions in a brief position paper like Document
58/12 itself can barely be expected even to scratch the surface.
Accordingly, if there is to be any question of getting the organization
"back on track,' 32 as the Japanese government proposes, a renewed focus
on legal interpretation will surely be required. To pursue the railway
analogy further, this process will entail reviewing the entire journey from
its origins, but with a view to avoiding, rather than reenacting, the
missed connections of the past. And, since the journey commenced so
many years ago, in a completely different era, the very means of trans-
portation may require an overhaul. Indeed, as so many railway
operations have already discovered, contemporary expectations demand
a fully effective process of integration with other transport systems, and
even, perhaps, the modification of the old narrow gauge that was origi-
nally employed for the track.
Happily, there are some signs of recognition of these points in Reso-
lution 2006-1, which looks beyond the ICRW itself to embrace "other
relevant" principles of international law, including a number which have
emerged or been the subject of refinement in the decades since the
ICRW was drafted-respect for cultural diversity, the fundamental prin-
ciples of sustainable utilization and the conservation of biological
diversity, and the need to implement an "ecosystem" approach (which is
seen by Resolution 2006-1 to require redirection of the focus of regula-
tion to incorporate considerations which almost certainly were not in the
minds of those who drafted and negotiated the ICRW).33 This suggests
that the proponents of "normalization" are fully cognizant and suppor-
tive of the need to ensure the application of the ICRW in full light of
current circumstances and legal requirements. Some encouragement may
possibly also be drawn from the conclusions of the Normalization Con-
ference itself to establish Working Groups on, inter alia, the Building of
Trust and Consensus and the Interpretation of the ICRW.34 Consequently,
the task can be approached with a degree of optimism, if not outright
confidence. It must begin with an identification of the specific norms of
which account must be taken as part of the implementation process.
31. See IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
32. Id.
33. That is, the taking of whales not for direct consumption, but as a form of "culling,"
in order to avoid adverse impacts on the fish resources of the oceans.
34. See Conference for the Normalization of the International Whaling Commission,
Tokyo, Feb. 13-15, 2007, IWC/59/7 (Feb. 2007).
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II. THE IDENTIFICATION OF RELEVANT NORMS
This task of identifying the full range of norms that are relevant to
the process of "normalization" referred to in Resolution 2006-1 is by no
means as simple as may be supposed. As a preliminary step, it is impor-
tant to recall that legal norms may be created by means of a number of
distinct law-generating processes.
A. Sources of Legal Norms
The principal sources of international obligations are conveniently
catalogued in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of• 31
Justice, which provides:
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with inter-
national law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting States;
(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
(d) ... judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.36
The essential nature and significance of these various mechanisms are
too well known to require detailed explanation, and it will be sufficient
to emphasize here only those aspects which would otherwise be in dan-
ger of being overlooked, or are of particular significance to the present
controversy.
1. The Principal Formal Sources
Foremost amongst the principal formal sources are treaties and in-
ternational custom, unquestionably the most prominent and well
understood mechanisms for the creation of international norms of con-
duct. In the modem context, treaties represent perhaps the most prolific
35. See MALCOM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2003) (offering a general dis-
cussion); see also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, I INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (3d ed. 1957),
reprinted in CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 18-19 (David Harris ed., 6th ed.
2004) (1973). See generally G.J.H. VAN HOOF, RETHINKING THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1983) (detailing the main sources of international law).
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3
Bevans 1179.
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and versatile source, serving virtually as a form of "substitute legisla-
tion, 37 while custom provides a less flexible and sophisticated, but
nonetheless time-honored, device for the generation of legal norms,
based on the practice of States as actuated by the appropriate psycho-
logical motivation.3 ' These two elements interact in complex fashion, in
the sense that treaties may codify existing customary norms, crystallize
emerging norms, or form the historical source of customs which evolve
subsequently, 9 while custom may modify or supplement treaty arrange-
ments, or in some cases even nullify them or bring about their
termination. 0
Of particular importance for the purposes of the present study will
be the practice of States insofar as it bears on the interpretation of the
ICRW, since this represents the focus of the normalization proposal. The
question of what constitutes state practice for such purposes has not re-
mained entirely free of controversy, but Michael Akehurst's assertion
that it "covers any act or statements by a State from which views about
customary law may be inferred"4' can probably be taken to represent an
accurate statement of the law.42 On the other hand, it should also be noted
that "not all elements of practice are equal in weight and the value to be
given to such conduct will depend on its nature and provenance. '43 In
relation to statements in particular, one important factor concerns the
extent to which they reflect an objective, disinterested, and dispassionate
view of the law, as opposed to assertions of a political character, espe-
cially those that represent attempts to protect or advance a State's own
position in an ongoing dispute. This notion of weighting is reflected, for
example, in the views of the arbitrator in Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank
of Canada (Tinoco Arbitration) regarding the significance, for the
37. SHAW, supra note 35, at 89.
38. This is the element known as opiniojuris, which is a sense of legal obligation, or, in
the case of a permissive rule, entitlement. See id. at 80-84.
39. North Sea Continental Shelf (ER.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 38-39
(Feb. 20).
40. Notably, in the case of customary jus cogens principles. See generally NANCY
KONTOU, THE TERMINATION AND REVISION OF TREATIES IN LIGHT OF NEW CUSTOMARY IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW (1994) (detailing the problem of a rule of customary law conflicting with
an existing treaty provision).
41. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
1,2-3 (1977).
42. SHAW, supra note 35, at 80 (quoting Akehurst, supra note 41, at 2-3). Some schol-
ars argue that mere claims-as opposed to actual enforcement action-cannot amount to state
practice. See ANTHONY D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-
51, 88 (1971). However, this appears to be a minority view. See Akehurst, supra note 41, at I-
2; SHAW, supra note 35, at 79; H.W.A. THIRLWAY, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW AND
CODIFICATION 58 (1972).
43. SHAW, supra note 35, at 80.
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purpose of identifying the sovereign government of a country, of recog-
nition by other States:
The non-recognition by other nations of a government claiming
to be a national personality is usually appropriate evidence that
it has not attained the independence and control entitling it by
international law to be classed as such. But when recognition vel
non of a government is by such nations determined by inquiry
not into its defacto sovereignty and complete governmental con-
trol, but into its illegitimacy or irregularity of origin, their non-
recognition loses something of evidential weight on the issue
with which those applying the rules of international law are
alone concerned."
Exactly the same considerations underlie the concept of the critical
date, commonly presented as an aspect of the law governing territorial
acquisition, but perhaps more accurately understood as a rule of evi-
dence designed to exclude from the tribunal's purview certain self-
serving pronouncements of the parties to litigation. As the International
Court of Justice explained in Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau
Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan, it was unable to
take into consideration acts having taken place after the date on
which the dispute between the parties crystallized unless such
acts are a normal continuation of prior acts and are not under-
taken for the purpose of improving the position of the Party
which relies on them.45
This led to the marginalization of evidence relating to activities on
the part of the litigant States during a full thirty years prior to the institu-
tion of the claim, in view of its compromised quality. Although this
approach is unlikely to be applied in its full rigor beyond the context of a
bilateral territorial dispute, the tendency to give greater weight to disin-
terested, and guile-free pronouncements is of quite general application.
2. General Principles of Law
More easily overlooked in the quest for relevant legal norms are the
"general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" referred to in
44. Aguilar-Amory and Royal Bank of Canada (Gr. Brit. v. Costa Rica), I R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 369, 381 (1923). The arbitrator was W.H. Taft, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court.
45. Sovereignty over Palau Litigan and Palau Sipadan (Indon. v. Malay.), 2002 I.C.J.
625, 9 135 (Dec. 17); see also Argentina/Chile Frontier Case [The Palena Case] (Chile v.
Arg.), 38 I.L.R. 10, 79-80 (1966).
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Article 38(1)(c) of the IC Statute. 46 The underlying idea here is that
there are certain axioms that are encountered in every legal system
(some of them, indeed, as elements indispensable to its functioning) and
which may, accordingly, be treated as forming part of international law
also. Such principles come in various guises. Whereas custom and trea-
ties are generally concerned with specifying particular rules of conduct,
47
this is not necessarily the case with general principles, which, as exem-
plified by such concepts as reciprocity or proportionality, often function
48
as meta-principles, shaping and amplifying the content of more fully
elaborated legal norms. Beyond that, general principles embrace also
"the fundamental legal concepts of which the legal norms are composed
such as person, right, duty, property, juristic act, contract, tort, succes-
sion, etc."4 9 At that level, they represent basic "juridical truths"50 which
are commonly presupposed by those engaged in the generation of spe-
cific norms through treaty or custom.
It has therefore been suggested that, as a matter of legal theory, gen-
eral principles precede the other sources and should in that sense be seen
as the primary normative category.' While this proposition is open to
debate, it is clear that even those who prefer to downplay the importance
of general principles can scarcely deny their role as a supplementary
source of law, since there are many areas into which treaties and custom
tend not to intrude (particularly those which govern aspects of the judi-
cial, as opposed to the political, process), and the need to avoid any
instance of non liquet is well appreciated.52 At the very least, therefore,
Article 38(1)(c) authorizes recourse to principles of the kind that would
be recognized by jurists everywhere, regardless of their personal legal
background, in order to fill any lacunae that might otherwise exist.
There can be no doubt of the relevance for present purposes of general
46. See generally BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNA-
TIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (1953); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-210 (1964); Humphrey Waldock, General Course
on Public International Law, 1962-II RECUIL DES COURs 54, 54-69.
47. But see, e.g., Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933,
49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 195 (specifying the criteria of statehood in international law).
48. Cf Vaughn Lowe, Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 19 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone
eds., 1999) (arguing that sustainable development is a contestable concept that modifies estab-
lished legal norms).
49. South West Africa, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Aft.), 1966 I.C.J. 6,
295 (July 18) (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND SOME CON-
TEMPORARY PROBLEMS 14 (1983). See generally Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (arguing that principles of international
humanitarian law apply to nuclear weapons).
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principles of law in the eyes of the proponents of normalization, because
the principle of good faith, on which the Resolution 2006-1 and Docu-
ment 58/12 heavily rely, is itself a conspicuous example of a norm
deriving from this source.53
Since the significance of general principles is not infrequently mis-
understood or overlooked entirely by those less familiar with the
international legal system, it may be helpful to recapitulate briefly the
process by which they are to be identified. Aside from the general con-
ceptions of the international legal order (such as good faith, reciprocity,
and proportionality), which have been mentioned above, general princi-
ples of law may also be gleaned from domestic legal systems. In view of
the very considerable number of such systems which currently exist in
the world, the quest for principles common to all of them might seem to
demand a research effort which could only be described as prohibitive,
but the approach to this problem routinely adopted by international
courts and tribunals has reflected a recognition that these systems can be
grouped into several major families-most notably, the common law,
civil law, and Islamic law systems 5 -and judges have tended to search
for evidence of the principles in question at that level of generality,
5
rather than attempting to conduct an exhaustive survey of some 200 na-
tional legal orders.
Considerable enlightenment as to the nature and role of general
principles of law in the modern international legal order can be gained
from a sequence of individual opinions delivered over the course of time
in the World Court, and in particular that of the Japanese judge, Judge
Tanaka, in the South West Africa case,56 which represents arguably the
most comprehensive judicial treatment of this question in the modem
era. Amongst the key points that Judge Tanaka made were the following.
First, there was no inherent limitation on the subject-matter which fell
within this category of norms: subject only to their relevance to the con-
53. See infra Part II.B.1.
54. See generally RENt DAVID & JOHN BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE
WORLD TODAY (John Brierly trans., 2d ed. 1978); H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF
THE WORLD (2000).
55. See Waldock, supra note 46.
56. South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. at 248, 294-301 (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka).
It should be noted that, while this is technically characterized as a dissenting opinion, its value
and authority regarding the issues relevant to the present discussion are in no way diminished
on that account. This conclusion rests on the fact that the issue on which the Court was di-
vided concerned whether the claims submitted by Ethiopia and Liberia should be entertained
by the Court at all. Since the majority thought that these claims should not be entertained, only
the minority opinions had occasion to explore the substantive principles of law which were
applicable, and the sources from which they derived. Further, the majority decision on the
admissibility point provoked intense controversy and was largely rejected by the international
community.
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troversy in question, general principles might legitimately be derived
from any branch of law, "including municipal law, public law, constitu-
tional and administrative law, private law, commercial law, substantive
and procedural law, etc. 57 Secondly, however, the analogies to be drawn
from such principles should not be made mechanically, but advisedly: in
particular, the emphasis should be placed on the broad flavor of the prin-
ciple, rather than the intricate detail." Thirdly, although this category of
norms, like any other, depends on consent and recognition by the inter-
national community, "this recognition is of a very elastic nature" and
does not require to be expressed through such formal official mecha-
nisms as legislative acts. 9 Nor is consent required on an individual basis,
so that "States which do not recognize [the] principle or even deny its
validity are nevertheless subject to its rule."' He therefore saw Article
38(1)(c), if not as an antidote, at least as a partial palliative to the con-
straints of positivism, which are such that, without recourse to certain
societal norms of a fundamental and universal character, the remit of
international law would inevitably be restricted to those matters which
formed the daily diet of foreign offices and similar governmental agen-
cies.6' This would scarcely have been conducive to such crucial global
objectives as, for example, the protection of human rights (with which
the South West Africa case was itself concerned), at least if the govern-
mental practices of the pre-war era were under the spotlight. It was for
this reason that general principles of law were deemed especially rele-
vant to issues of a humanitarian character, and indeed all those which
62
touched "the conscience of mankind" as a whole. In a very similar vein,
Judge Weeramantry in the more recent Case Concerning the Gabeikovo-
Nagymaros Project (Gaba'kovo-Nagymaros Project)63 treated general
principles of law as incorporating certain "pristine and universal values"
which had been embraced by all major cultures and civilizations
57. Id.
58. See Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 70,
76-77 (June 28) (separate opinion of Judge Hudson); International Status of South-West Af-
rica, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 148 (July 11) (separate opinion of Sir Arnold McNair).
59. South West Africa, 1966 I.C.J. at 297 (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka).
60. Id. at 296; see also Gabdfkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7,
88-119, 95 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
61. This point was also reflected in the opinion of Judge Weeramantry which character-
ized general principles as a vehicle for overcoming the inherent formalism of the law. Id. at
108-10.
62. Note further that in Corfu Channel, "elementary considerations of humanity" were
listed amongst a number of "general and well-recognized principles" in accordance with
which international obligations might be generated. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J.
4, 22 (Apr. 9).
63. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 108-09.
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throughout history.M Thus, the rather anachronistic65 and supercilious
ring of the phrase "general principles of law recognized by civilized na-
tions" has been discreetly re-tuned, by transferring the epithet "civilized"
to the principles themselves rather than applying it to the nations which
espouse them, at least in circumstances in which the interests of interna-
tional justice so require.
3. Material Sources
Treaties, custom, and general principles accordingly represent the
formal sources of international law. It will be remembered, however, that
Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute refers also to judicial decisions and the
writings of leading publicists as "subsidiary means for the determination
of rules of law."6 These, then, are the material sources of the system,
which do not themselves create law, but provide potentially authoritative
evidence of the norms generated by the range of formal mechanisms de-
scribed above. At a practical level, they are likely to represent the first
resort of those who wish to be informed of the nature and scope of rele-
vant principles, and frequent reference has, indeed, already been made to
examples of such materials in the course of this study. Although it is
natural to treat the judgments and opinions of the World Court itself as
possessing special authority amongst judicial decisions generally, the
permissibility of reference to the determinations of other international
courts and tribunals, and indeed of those established within national le-
61gal systems, is beyond dispute.
4. "Soft" Law
In addition to these traditional sources, it will also be necessary to
have regard to one further category of normative standards-namely that
diverse assortment of principles known collectively as "soft" law. 6 Soft
law is characteristically expressed in written form, and is manifest in the
64. Id.
65. The explanation of this regrettable choice of terminology is largely historical, the
phrase having been imported unchanged from the Statute of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, which was drafted in 1920.
66. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 36, art. 38(1).
67. Even the World Court itself occasionally refers to the jurisprudence of other tribu-
nals. See, e.g., Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Den. v.
Nor.), 1993 I.C.J. 38, 67 (June 14); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v.
Hond.), 1992 I.C.J. 351, 563 (Sept. I1).
68. See generally COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Michael Bothe,
Legal and Non-Legal Norms-A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?, II NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 65 (1980); Christine Chinkin, The Challence of Soft Law: Development and
Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 850 (1989).
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vast array of declarations, resolutions, recommendations, charters, and
codes of practice that are generated by the processes of international in-
tercourse. It differs somewhat from the formal sources discussed above
in the sense that its norms do not operate as binding legal rules, yet at the
same time they are far from being devoid of legal significance. In many
areas of international relations, it plays a crucial role in the supplementa-
tion, amplification, and development of hard law norms and the
implementation of legal policy. At the very least, by virtue of the formal-
ity and intensity of focus surrounding their creation, soft law principles
exert a strong persuasive influence on States and other legal actors; in
addition, it may be possible to argue that they commonly import at least
one legally binding element, namely the duty to give serious considera-
tion to their implementation. 9 Once again, it is clear that the proponents
of normalization accept the legitimacy, indeed necessity, of resort to soft
law in the application of this process to the ICRW, since they refer ex-
plicitly to the importance in that context of the 2001 Universal
Declaration on Cultural Diversity, which is not a legally binding instru-
ment. In addition, Resolution 2006-1 itself, which is designed to launch
the process, is plainly of soft law status. There is no doubt that they are
correct to adopt this stance, though naturally the norms in this category
cannot, in the event of incompatibility, prevail over rules of legally bind-
ing effect.
Having identified the various categories of legal sources from which
relevant norms might derive, it is necessary to consider the potential
range and scope of those norms, and the subject-matter to which they
might relate.
B. Subject-Matter of Relevant Norms
For convenience of exposition, and without seeking to place
particular reliance on the wider analytical significance of these
distinctions, it will be helpful to divide the relevant norms into three
broad categories: foundational, substantive, and adjectival. Foundational
norms are those which might be said to underpin the structure of the
international legal system generally, such as those governing
international personality and the sovereign equality of States. The key
69. This would seem to represent the minimal implication of the general duty of
good faith in relation to soft law, to which it is commonly treated as applicable. See Hart-
mut Hillgenberg, A Fresh Look at Soft Law, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499 (1999). Some
commentators are inclined to put the case more strongly, suggesting that soft law comprises
"normative commitments, in which the actors involved intended to make genuine efforts to
comply." Dinah Shelton, Commitment and Compliance: What Role for International
Soft Law?, Presentation Before Carnegie Endowment (Nov. 22, 1999), available at http://
www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index..cfmfa=event/Detail&id=478&.
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norm in this category that requires exploration for present purposes is the
principle of good faith. By substantive norms is meant those principles
that bear directly on the conduct of States and determine their respective
rights and obligations at the primary level-for example, the rules
governing the exploitation and use of natural resources, the exercise of
maritime jurisdiction, and the promotion of cultural diversity. Finally, the
expression "adjectival norms" refers to those secondary principles which
govern the operation and determine the implications of the primary,
substantive norms-in particular, those concerning state responsibility,
the peaceful settlement of disputes, the law of treaties, and the law of
international institutions. It will be helpful for present purposes,
however, to leave the discussion of substantive norms until last.
1. Foundational Norms-The Principle of Good Faith
The foundational character of the good faith principle is beyond dis-
pute," since it has been in evidence since the very dawn of the modem
legal system and has subsequently achieved universal recognition;" in-
deed, it provides the underlying justification for treating the solemnly
declared commitments of States as legally binding in the first place 2
Accordingly, it pervades all aspects of the processes whereby such
commitments are to be interpreted and applied," and has also attracted
specific formal endorsement in the field of sustainable development,74
into which treaties concerned with the conservation and management of
natural resources must plainly be classified. Although it is undoubtedly a
normative principle, good faith is "not in itself a source of obligation
70. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1945-
1986 ch. 3 (1989); Elisabeth Zoller, La Bonne Foi en Droit International Public, 28 REVUE
GtNtRALE DE DROIT INT'L PUB. 1 (1977) (Fr.).
71. The preamble to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties so describes it,
along with the principle of free consent and the pacta sunt servanda rule. Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, pmbl. It was, accordingly, one of the seven fundamental
principles of international law identified in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18,
U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970).
72. CHENG, supra note 46, at 105; Nuclear Tests Case (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253,
268 (Dec. 20).
73. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 2; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra
note 21, pmbl., arts. 26, 31(1); see also id. arts. 46, para. 2, 69, para. 2(b); Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Organizations or Between Interna-
tional Organizations, Mar. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 543.
74. U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev. (UNCED), June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development, princs. 19, 27, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992).
75. ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 135.
[Vol. 29:293
Spring 2008] "Normalizing" the International Convention 313
where none would otherwise exist. 7 6 Rather, it represents a general stan-
dard against which action taken in pursuance of obligations generated by
other means may be measured.77
Perhaps surprisingly, the precise implications of the concept have
been rather little explored in international jurisprudence, 78 though some
points are clear. At the very least, it requires that the interpretation and
implementation of treaty commitments be undertaken honestly and
without duplicity.79 While mere negligence does not of itself amount to
bad faith, attempts to excuse impugned conduct on the grounds of lack
of knowledge or expertise may appear less persuasive in the mouths of
States than of private actors. Perhaps for that reason, good faith in inter-
national relations has on occasion been linked, or even assimilated, to
reasonable or equitable behavior.80 This view, indeed, appears to have
prevailed among IWC members themselves, since Resolution 2001-1
asserts that good faith "requires fairness, reasonableness, integrity and
honesty in international behavior."'"
From any viewpoint, no State may seek to take advantage of its own823
wrong; 2 knowingly disregard agreed limitations on its own powers;
proffer conflicting interpretations of a legal rule to suit the vagaries of itsS 84
own convenience; seek to take the benefit of a particular obligation
without being prepared to shoulder any concomitant burden; 85 or demand
76. Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicar. v Hond.), 1988 I.C.J. 69, 105 (Dec.
20).
77. See, e.g., Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materials in International Law, 43
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 615, 707-08 (1992).
78. For an overview of the earlier case law, see ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 166-73.
The International Law Commission deliberately decided to leave the term undefined. See
Summary Records of the 772d Meeting, [1964] 1 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 326, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1964.
79. Sapphire Int'l Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat'l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136, 137 (1963)
(Cavin, Arb.).
80. See, e.g., Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties, [1959] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 37,
U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/120. For examples from case law, see Gab~fkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 79 (Sept. 29); Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of
Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 305 (Oct. 12); Rights of Nationals of the United
States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176 (Aug. 27); Conditions of Admis-
sion of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1948 I.C.J. 57, 63
(May 28); N. At. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 167, 186-88 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 1910).
81. IWC, Resolution on Transparency Within the International Whaling Commission,
IWC Res. 2001-1 (2001).
82. Factory at Chorzow (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1927 RC.I.J. 9, 31 (July 26).
83. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 392 (June 27).
84. Allegans contraria non audiendus est is the principle that also formed the basis of
what became Article 45 of the Vienna Convention. See 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Trea-
ties, [1966] 2 Y.B. OF INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 239, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, and accompanying
commentary [hereinafter ILC Commentary].
85. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 36(2).
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of another state performance of a shared obligation unless it is itself will-
ing to perform.s6 Good faith may also on occasion preclude reliance on
an obvious error by another party,8' or on the strict letter of a State's enti-
tlement where that would amount to an abuse of right.8 In many cases,
the exercise of rights and responsibilities pursuant to international
agreements involves the ongoing maintenance of dialogue and consulta-
tions with other States, and in such situations it is established that they
"are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations
are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists on
its own position without contemplating any modification of it."89 This
would seem to be a point which is of particular relevance to the normali-
zation debate.
Imputations of lack of good faith in international affairs are not to be
made or accepted lightly, and any State that advances such an allegation
would be well advised to ensure that its own conduct is beyond reproach
in that regard.
2. Adjectival Norms
As noted above, a number of important principles falling within the
category of adjectival norms are of fundamental importance in the pre-
sent context.
a. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
It is clear that the issue of normalization has arisen out of a profound
and long-standing disagreement among ICRW parties regarding the
proper interpretation and implementation of the treaty in question. It is
axiomatic that all such disputes are to be resolved peacefully, and
86. Diversion of Water from Meuse (Neth. v. Belg.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 70, 76-77
(June 28).
87. This is as in Article 46 of the Vienna Convention. See ILC Commentary, supra note
84, at 240.
88. See ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 140; G.D.S. Taylor, The Content of the Rule
Against Abuse of Rights in International Law, 46 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 322, 333-34 (1972-73);
see also United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 300, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (offering a specific example of the international com-
munity's recognition of the concept of abuse of rights); see also United Nations Conference
on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stock, July 24-Aug. 4, 1995, Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, art. 34, U.N. Doc A/CONE164/37 (Sept. 8, 1995)
[hereinafter Straddling Stocks Agreement].
89. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 47
(Feb. 20); see also Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 264-67 (July 8) (holding that the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons have an obligation to pursue in good faith negotiations that will lead to
nuclear disarmament).
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through resort to the various mechanisms that international law has at its
disposal, which include "negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrange-
ments or other peaceful means... ,9o The selection from amongst these
mechanisms rests with the States concerned and depends on their as-
sessment of which mechanism is likely to prove most appropriate, given
the nature and circumstances of the dispute. In any situation in which
deeply entrenched attitudes have developed over the course of time, it is
prudent always to be mindful of the advantages that may lie in resorting
to mechanisms that offer the prospect of objective, dispassionate input,
or even the possibility of full-scale, third-party determination of the dis-
pute.
b. The Law of Treaties
Since the ICRW is a legally binding, written agreement among
States, all aspects of its conclusion, application, performance, interpreta-
tion, amendment, termination, and suspension are governed by the law
of treaties, which for almost all practical purposes may be regarded as
those principles which are elaborated in the Vienna Convention.9' It is no
obstacle to this conclusion that the ICRW might represent the constituent
instrument of an international organization (the IWC), since the Vienna
Convention expressly provides that the regime thereby established ex-
tends in principle to treaties of this type.92 The fact that the ICRW was
adopted almost thirty-five years before this regime became operative 93
precludes the applicability of the Vienna Convention in a formal sense,
since the latter does not have retrospective effect.94 Nonetheless, the lack
of retrospectivity makes relatively little practical difference since the
1969 instrument represents, in large part, a codification of previously
established customary principles. 9 Furthermore, following over a quarter
90. See G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 71.
91. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21; see, e.g., ANTHONY
AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE (2000) (offering a general discussion of this area
of the law); see also SUZANNE BASTID, LES TRAIT9S DANS LA VIE INTERNATIONALE; CON-
CLUSION ET EFFECTS (Economica 1985); TASLIM 0. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES
(1974); JAN KLABBERS, THE CONCEPT OF TREATY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); ARNOLD
D. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1961); PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF TREATIES (2d rev. ed. 1995); ROSENNE, supra note 70; IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (2d ed. 1984).
92. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 5; see infra Part
II.B.2.c.
93. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) did not enter
into force until January 27, 1980. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21.
94. Id. art. 4.
95. Article 4 excludes only the formal retrospective effect of the Vienna Convention. Id.
The possibility of applying any of the Vienna Convention's rules to which treaties would be
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of a century of actual operation of the Vienna Convention, formal accep-
tance by approximately 100 States,9 routine implementation in inter-
governmental relations not only by those States but by many others, 97
and recognition and application in innumerable cases by many courts
and tribunals, the Vienna Convention may now effectively be regarded as
the prime material source of contemporary custom, though possibly with
the occasional slight gloss here and there to take account of develop-
ments in state practice since 1969. The rules it contains should therefore
be treated as prima facie applicable to any legal problem concerning the
adoption, interpretation, implementation, or termination of treaties, ex-
cept to the extent that the contrary can be demonstrated, either in relation
to the particular problem in question or with respect to the particular
States involved.
Of all the many rules enunciated in the Vienna Convention, some are
especially pertinent to the issues raised by Document 58/12. Article 26
of the Vienna Convention confirms the basic principle that every treaty
must be performed in good faith, while the approved approach to treaty
interpretation is set out in Articles 31 and 32.98 These particular provi-
sions are those that have most frequently been confirmed to reflect pre-
existing customary principles, and they have regularly been applied by
international courts and tribunals to treaties that (like the ICRW) were
concluded long before the Vienna Convention itself entered into force. 99
subject to on some other basis, such as customary international law, is expressly preserved by
the opening clause of Article 4. Id. This is a point which seems to have been overlooked by
certain commentators. See, e.g., Jos6 Truda Palazzo, Jr., Whose Whales? Developing Countries
and the Right to use Whales by Non-Lethal Means, 2 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 69, 70 n.6
(1999).
96. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21. Included among these
States is Japan, a proponent of Document 58/12. IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
97. See AUST, supra note 91, at 10-11. Aust noted that
[w]hen law of treaties questions arise during negotiations ... the rules set forth in
the Convention are invariably relied upon even when the States are not parties to it.
This author can recall at least three bilateral treaty negotiations when he had to re-
spond to arguments of the other side which relied heavily on specific articles of the
Convention, even though the other side had not ratified it.
Id.
98. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 26, 31-32. Luckily,
the ICRW was concluded only in English. ICRW, supra note 1, art. XL. Thus, the Vienna Con-
vention's rules of interpretation for multilingual texts are not implicated. Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 33.
99. See, e.g., Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots. v. Namib.), 1999 I.C.J. 1045, 1059-60 (Dec.
13); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), 1995 I.C.J. 6, 18 (Feb. 15); Territorial Dispute (Libya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6, 21-22
(Feb. 3); Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1975); Beagle Channel
Arb. (Arg. v. Chile), 52 I.L.R. 98, 124 (1977).
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Before embarking on an examination of the relevant principles,
however, it is important that one crucial preliminary point be understood.
This is, specifically, that, while it is often asserted that the aim of inter-
pretation is to ascertain the "intentions of the parties,"' ° this is only true
in a highly specialized, almost figurative, sense. For any quest to dis-
cover such intentions comprehended literally would be doomed to failure
from the outset, for a number of reasons.'' First of all, the parties to in-
ternational treaties are States, and States do not in and of themselves
constitute the kind of entities that are capable of entertaining intentions,
which represent the cognitive attributes of natural persons. States are, of
course, represented by natural persons for these purposes, but even
within a single delegation to a given round of treaty negotiations, a con-
siderable divergence of understandings regarding the meaning and
objectives of the instrument in question may be apparent, rendering the
"intentions" of the delegation as a whole an elusive commodity. Sec-
ondly, when the further fact is taken into account that it is not the
intentions of any single delegation, but rather those of the various dele-
gations taken collectively that must be identified and understood, some
sense begins to dawn on the extraordinary difficulty involved in the task
in hand. It follows from this focus on consensus, however, that the em-
phasis must inevitably be placed on objective appearances and ostensible
intentions, and that the undeclared aims or secret aspirations of the par-
ties cannot be allowed to dictate the instrument's meaning. Finally, it is
readily evident to all who have studied international relations that the
issues that ultimately come to form the subject-matter of disputes are all
too frequently issues to which no one gave serious attention during the
negotiations, or which were specifically foreseen but left unresolved in
the confident expectation or vain hope that they would never arise in
practice. In light of all these considerations, even the most ardent enthu-
siasts for the so-called "subjective" approach to interpretation have
tended to recognize that "however conscientious and far-ranging the
search for a common intention, there would be many and varied situa-
tions in which it could not be found."'
0 2
Not surprisingly, however, such considerations tended to lead the In-
ternational Law Commission (ILC), like the Institute of International
100. This quest is particularly associated with the so-called "subjective" or "founding
fathers" approach to interpretation. See Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
International Court of Justice: Treaty Interpretation and Certain Other Treaty Points, 28 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1951) (discussing this and other main approaches); see also Francis G. Ja-
cobs, Varieties of Approach to Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft
Convention on the Law of Treaties Before the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, 18 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 318 (1969).
101. See Jacobs, supra note 100, at 318-22.
102. Id. at 321.
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Law before it, away from such an approach entirely. Rather, it was the
Commission's firm view that
the text must be presumed to be the authentic expression of the
intentions of the parties; and that, in consequence, the starting
point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the
text, not an investigation ab initio into the intentions of the par-
ties.' 3
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention accordingly sets out the general
rule, which is that treaties are to be interpreted in good faith and in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context, and in light of its object and purpose."4 This confirms the
fundamental importance for interpretational purposes of two factors that
are heavily stressed in Document 58/12, namely good faith and the under-
lying objectives of the treaty. As regards those objectives, however, it is to
be noted that the interpreter's task is not so much to give effect to the
treaty's object and purpose, but rather to give effect to its terms in light of
that objective and purpose.0 5 This can be regarded as an attempt to strike a
balance between the "textual" and "teleological" approaches to interpreta-
tion,' 6 while according a degree of primacy to the former.'7 Part of the
reason for this doctrinal preference no doubt lies in the fact that the "ob-
ject and purpose" of a treaty, which features as a constituent element of a
number of the rules in the Vienna Convention,'0 8 is also by no means a
straightforward or easily identifiable item. Indeed, the many descriptions
of this notion offered by legal commentators differ primarily in the exact
degree of imprecision they attribute to it, which varies from its having "a
certain vagueness about it,"" to being "rather flexible," "open-textured" or
"indeterminate" '"0 or, indeed, "virtually impossible to identify" in the case
of a complex treaty. ' It cannot even be assumed, it seems, that the con-
103. ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at 220.
104. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 31(2), 31(4).
105. Thus, Geoffrey Marston stated, "Reference to the object and purpose is a secondary
or ancillary process in the application of the general rule of interpretation." Marston, supra
note 77, at 709.
106. These represent the two other principal, traditional approaches. See Fitzmaurice,
supra note 100; Jacobs, supra note 100.
107. Note, however, the discussion in Part I.B.2.e, infra, of conduct that tends to defeat
the object and purpose of the treaty entirely.
108. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 18, 19(c),
20(2), 31(1), 33(4), 41 (l)(b)(ii), 58(l)(b)(ii), 60(3)(b).
109. FRANK HORN, RESERVATIONS AND DECLARATIONS TO MULTILATERAL TREATIES
115 (1988).
110. Jan Klabbers, Some Problems Regarding the Object and Purpose of Treaties, 8 FIN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 138, 139-42 (1997).
111. See AosT, supranote91,at I11.
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cept has a uniform meaning across the various contexts in which it is em-
ployed in the Vienna Convention."2 Furthermore, it has been claimed that
regrettably little enlightenment can be gleaned from the existing litera-
ture or the case law on the subject,"' while a review of state practice
might cause some to conclude that the "object and purpose" of a treaty
means whatever States say it means.'"4 One distinguished ILC rapporteur
has gone so far as to question whether multilateral treaties can truly be
said to have an object and purpose of their own at all."5
It may be that there is an element of exaggerated pessimism in all of
this, though these observations should certainly be sufficient to guard
against too facile an approach to the task of identifying the object and
purpose of a treaty such as the ICRW. At the heart of the difficulty lies
the fact that any complex treaty is bound to have a wide range of aims,
objectives, purposes, and aspirations, to each of which the parties may
have attached highly divergent degrees of attention, emphasis, and com-
mitment. Objects and purposes may be vague or specific, general or
particular, immediate or long-term, dominant or subsidiary, express or
implied; they may be identified in the body of the treaty text, alluded to
in the recitals of the preamble, or implicit in the detail of the substantive
provisions, and none of these possibilities necessarily excludes any of
the others. There may well be a degree of tension, conceivably even out-
right incompatibility, ' 6 between the various objectives. Consequently,
great caution needs to be exercised before accepting at face value any
claim which seeks to rely on the concept for any purpose.
How, then, is the identification of the object and purpose to be un-
dertaken? There is little reason to dispute the view implicit in both
Resolution 2006-1 and Document 58/12 that the preamble is the obvious
place to start. As one eminent authority puts it:
112. Klabbers, supra note 110, at 148-50.
113. Id. at 139-44. The following observation in the joint dissenting opinion of Judges
Guerrero, McNair, Read, and Hsu Mo in Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, has already been noted in Part I, where they asked,
"What is the 'object and purpose' of the Genocide Convention? To repress genocide? Of
course; but is it more than that? Does it comprise any or all of the enforcement articles of the
Convention? That is the heart of the matter." 1951 I.C.J. 15, 44 (May 28) (separate opinion of
Judges Guerrero, McNair, Read, and Hsu Mo).
114. Klabbers, supra note 110, at 139-44.
115. See ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 83; Preliminary Report on the Content, Forms and
Degrees of International Responsibility, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 107, 120, U.N. Doc.
A./CN.4/330; see also Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections
on the Enforcement of the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 123, 127 (1992).
116. Although such incompatibility is not altogether inconceivable, it is not lightly to be
inferred, since such a conclusion would infringe the principle of effectiveness just as surely as the
denial of meaning to a particular provision where some alternative interpretation is possible.
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Although the objects of a treaty may be gathered from its opera-
tive clauses as a whole, the preamble is the normal place in
which to embody, and the natural place in which to look for, an
express or explicit general statement of the treaty's objects and
purposes. Where these are stated in the preamble, the latter will,
to that extent, govern the whole treaty."7
Given that this view is so widely accepted,"8 it may be helpful to re-
hearse some basic points that must always be kept in mind in addressing
this element of the treaty. The first is that there is no requirement that the
preamble disclose anything at all regarding objectives, its only necessary
content being an indication that what follows reflects the subject-matter
of agreement amongst the parties." 9 Nevertheless, it is customary to in-
clude some further information by way of explanation, and in some
cases this is quite extensive. The Biodiversity Convention,'2 ° for exam-
ple, contains some twenty-three recitals in all, some of which are
expressed at considerable length. Inevitably, the interpretative value of
some of this material may be relatively limited. One, perhaps overly
cynical, view is that "the preamble is a convenient repository for the
remnants of causes, large and small, which were lost during the negotiat-
ing process."'2'
On balance, however, it is preferable to adopt a less dismissive ap-
proach to the value of the preamble. In particular, the fact that a
preamble is often described as lacking binding force should not be al-
lowed to misrepresent its true significance. Crucially, it must be
understood that any difference in terms of legal significance between the
preamble and the main body of the text results not from the fact that the
former is any less important, but only from the fact that it is not intended
to be dispositive. For the purposes the preamble is intended to serve-
typically, to provide some background detail regarding the motivations
117. Gerald C. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice
1951-4; Treaty Interpretation and Other Points, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 203, 228 (1957).
118. That is, by various courts and tribunals, including the International Court of Justice
and the European Court of Human Rights. See, e.g., Rights of Nationals of the United States
of American in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176, 196; Reservation to Convention on
Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. at 23; Diversion of Water from
Meuse (Neth. v. Beig.), 1937 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) 70, 9 (June 28); Golder v. United Kingdom, 18
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), at 14, '[ 34 (1975); see GYORGY HARASZTI, SOME FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS OF THE LAW OF TREATIES 106-07 (J6zsef Decsfnyi trans., Akadfmiai Kiad6 1973);
Jacobs, supra note 100, at 336; Klabbers, supra note I10, at 155-59. The point is conceded
even by Aust, who, as seen above, takes a generally skeptical view regarding the significance
of the preamble. See AUST, supra note 91, at 337.
119. AUST, supra note 91, at 336.
120. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter
CBD].
121. AuST, supra note 91, at 337.
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underlying the treaty's adoption and the objectives it seeks to advance-
it is no less authoritative than any other aspect of the treaty.'22 That being
so, it may be useful to highlight the kind of features that are commonly
incorporated, which fall into several categories. It is not to be expected
that these features will necessarily be sharply distinguished in the draft-
ing or presented in any logical order, and they may sometimes have to be
unraveled from a jumble of inter-related clauses.
First, without wishing to cast doubt on the idea of the "object and
purpose" as a unitary concept, ' there is value (if only because so many
treaties themselves adopt this approach) in distinguishing the ultimate
policy objectives which the parties intended to advance from the more
specific legal purposes that the treaty is designed to fulfill in pursuit of
those objectives. In the case of the European Convention on Human
Rights,' 24 for example, the preamble recapitulates the political aim of the
Council of Europe to achieve greater unity amongst its Member States,
especially with respect to the maintenance and further realization of hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms, but adds that the Convention
itself is intended only "to take the first steps toward collective enforce-
ment of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration" of
Human Rights. 125 Thus, while the legal purposes must inevitably be
shaped by the underlying policy objectives, this particular Convention
was evidently designed to effectuate a relatively limited advance in that
direction.
126
Secondly, the stated aims in either category, legal or political, may
be refined or elucidated by statements of a narrative or descriptive char-
acter, which serve to outline, for example, the particular factual
circumstances which have caused the policy objectives to be formulated,
or the legal situation prior to negotiation of the current instrument, which
it is now seeking to develop, modify, or resolve. As to statements con-
cerning the factual background, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights attributes its own genesis to various "barbarous acts which have
122. Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, indeed, describes it as "conclusive," and even as "binding"
in that particular sense, unless contradicted elsewhere in the operative part of the text. Fitz-
maurice, supra note 100, at 229.
123. See generally Klabbers, supra note 110, at 145-46. Note, however, that Article
60(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention does speak in terms of provisions "essential to the accom-
plishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 21, art. 60(3)(b) (emphasis added).
124. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
125. Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
126. Further advances have, of course, been achieved by a series of later protocols add-
ing additional substantive rights.
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outraged the conscience of mankind."' 27 As regards the legal antecedents,
it is common to identify earlier treaties or other instruments that bear
some particular significance to the project in hand, as exemplified by the
reference to the Universal Declaration in the European Convention, as
noted above. Where appropriate, reference may be made more specifi-
cally either to the letter or to the spirit of earlier regimes: the former is








or, indeed, to individually specified provisions "' of those instruments,
and the latter by invoking the "purposes" or "principles" which the treaty
embodies or reflects.'3' In some cases, a combination of all these tech-
niques has been employed.
132
Finally, there may be some element of commentary or evaluation of
the previously mentioned features, expanding on the reasons why the
avowed policy objectives are judged feasible or desirable, or why the
proposed convention offers an appropriate solution. In this vein, the
2000 Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts'33
notes, inter alia, the overwhelming support attracted by its parent in-
strument, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 34 the recent
recognition of the enlistment of children below the age of fifteen as ac-
127. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (I1), at 71, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
128. Note, for example, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and In-
human or Degrading Treatment, in which the reference is to the "provisions" of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. European Con-
vention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, Nov. 26, 1987,
Europ. T.S. No. 126.
129. Thus, the preamble to the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement begins by "[r]ecalling
the relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of Dec. 10,
1982." Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 88, pmbl.
130. Thus, the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment specifically invokes Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, Article 5 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; cf U.N. Charter art. 55; Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 127, art. 5; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
131. Most commonly, this formula is employed with regard to the U.N. Charter. See,
e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, pmbl.
132. Thus, the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and
Child Pornography begins, "in order further to achieve the purposes of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and the implementation of its provisions, especially articles 1, 11, 21, 32,
33, 34, 35 and 36...." Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and
Child Pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex 11, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263/Annex II (Mar. 16,
2001).
133. Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts G.A. Res. 54/263,
Annex I, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263/Annex I (May 25, 2000).
134. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
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tive participants in hostilities as a war crime,'35 and the conviction that a
legal move to raise that age can only serve to enhance implementation of
the principle that the best interests of the child represent the paramount
consideration in all matters that concern them. It is only through a struc-
tured combination of analysis and synthesis of these various elements of
the preamble-teleological, descriptive, and evaluative-that a clearer
view of the composite object and purpose of the convention in question
can be expected to emerge.
Before leaving this brief survey of interpretational rules, one further
provision which is likely to prove significant in the present context
should be mentioned. Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention provides
that there shall also be taken into account, together with the context,
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its in-
terpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the rela-
tions between the parties.
3 6
All three of these elements are indisputably relevant in the sense that
they may be capable of shedding light on the original intentions of the
parties in concluding the agreement in question. There will be a strong
presumption that they have not intended, by entering into the treaty, to
undermine their commitment to other legal obligations existing inde-
pendently of it, and sub-paragraph (c) confirms that this is a factor to be
taken into account in the interpretation process. 137 Although this provi-
sion attracted rather little attention for some time, its importance has
recently been highlighted as a means of preserving "systemic integrity"
in the face of growing fears regarding the fragmentation of international
law, 38 a matter of sufficiently pressing concern to have been included in
the work program of the International Law Commission since 2002.'39
It would seem to be of preeminent, yet hitherto largely unrecognized,
135. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8 (xxvi), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90.
136. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(3).
137. Id. art. 31(3)(c).
138. See, e.g., Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous
Legal Rules, 55 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 281 (2006); Campbell McLachlan, The Principle of
Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 INT'L & COmP. L.Q.
279, 280 (2005).
139. Int'l Law Comm., Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.702 (July 18, 2006).
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importance in relation to the ICRW. Resolution 2006-1 represents some-
thing of a step forward in this regard through its recognition of the
relevance of principles deriving from the Biodiversity Convention and
elsewhere, though the implications are in reality far more extensive than
the Resolution suggests. The question of systemic integration is there-
fore discussed more fully below.
As regards subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, or
agreement as to how it should be interpreted or applied, these phenom-
ena, too, may have considerable evidential value regarding the intentions
of the parties at the time the treaty was concluded. Some judicial dicta
might seem to suggest that the clarification of the parties' original inten-
tions is the only legitimate function to be served by resort to such
materials, 40 but these dicta must be read within the context of the par-
ticular treaty provisions which were under examination in the case in
question, in respect of which the need for closure on lengthy and unpro-
ductive past political wranglings over territorial boundaries was
paramount.1 41 More generally, it seems clear that recourse to subsequent
conduct may be permissible for a wider array of purposes, which will be
considered shortly.
A difficult question arising in the case of all three categories of ma-
terials specified in Article 31(3)-subsequent agreement, subsequent
practice and relevant external rules-is whether these modifiers have to
be applicable to all the parties to the treaty before they become relevant
to its interpretation, or whether it will suffice that they are applicable
only amongst some of their number. The Vienna Convention itself is
non-committal on this point, and the matter is not addressed in the ILC's
Commentary except with respect to sub-paragraph (b) (subsequent prac-
tice). 42 Here, somewhat confusingly, the Commission states that its
decision to delete a reference to "all" the parties from an earlier draft
should not be taken to imply that the practice need not be that of the par-
ties as a whole. The deletion was simply to avoid any misapprehension
that active engagement of all the parties in the practice was required,
140. See, e.g., Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Tur-
key and Iraq), Advisory Opinion, 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12, at 24 (Nov. 21) (noting that
"[t]he facts subsequent to the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne can only concern the Court
in so far as they are calculated to throw light on the intention of the Parties at the time of the
conclusion of that Treaty").
141. The Treaty of Lausanne was the peace treaty concluded with Turkey following
World War I. Id. at 10. Article 3 was concerned with establishing the borders of its territory
and, failing agreement on that question, a decisive method by which this could be determined.
Id. at 18-19. Therefore, it was fully understandable that the Court thought it inappropriate to
permit the effective reopening of the earlier negotiations considering the subsequent conduct.
Id. at 19-22.
142. ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at 221-22.
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since the mere acquiescence of some in the practice of others would suf-
fice.
143
The whole question has produced much agonizing in the literature,14
but it is submitted that this is to some extent misplaced. The crucial point
is surely that Article 31(3) requires only that these materials "be taken
into account," and therefore everything depends on the precise purpose
for which they are to be deployed, and the exact weight they are to be
given, in the interpretational process. As the ILC itself pointed out in
relation to subsequent practice, the value of such material "varies ac-
cording as it shows the common understanding of the parties as to the
meaning of the terms.' '4' External rules or norms that are applicable to
only some of the parties to a treaty plainly cannot be treated as being in
themselves conclusive for all of the parties for all interpretational pur-
poses, but there are nevertheless innumerable circumstances in which
they may prove capable of shedding some light on the matter. If, for ex-
ample, it is claimed that a particular usage or meaning of a term
contained in the instant treaty was unknown at the time the treaty was
adopted, that claim may be refuted by producing an earlier treaty that
used or defined the term in precisely that sense. The exact weight to be
given to that evidence in relation to interpretation of the instant treaty
will then obviously vary in accordance with various factors, including
the proportion of the parties to the present treaty that are also bound by
the former. In each case, therefore, such material should be accorded a
weight commensurate with its true significance in the circumstances.
To conclude this preliminary treatment of questions of interpretation,
it should also be noted that Article 32 of the Vienna Convention permits
recourse to supplementary sources, including the travaux prparatoires,
in order to confirm the meaning determined on the basis of Article 31, or
to resolve any ambiguities or absurdities that may result from its
application. This underlines the essentially subordinate role of the
"founding fathers" in the overall process of interpretation. Part of the
contemporary justification for the view that the actual text of the treaty
must be regarded as the most authentic indication of the parties'
intentions '6 lies in the fact that a significant proportion of the current
143. See, e.g., Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246, 304-05 (Oct. 12) (offering general information on the questions of acquies-
cence and estoppel); see also Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 6, 23,
31-32 (June 15).
144. E.g., French, supra note 138, at 305-07; McLachlan, supra note 138, at 313-15.
145. ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at 222.
146. See id. at 220, 223. Other considerations include the fact that the reference to the
travaux pr~paratoires is not only time-consuming but, as noted above, often ultimately fruit-
less, because the issue in question was never envisaged by anyone in the course of the
negotiations, or was deliberately left unresolved.
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parties to many multilateral treaties may comprise States that did not
participate in the original negotiations, and may lack ready access to the
preparatory materials. Furthermore, in the modem world, treaties are
commonly of wide-ranging and decisive effect for entities far beyond the
States that are to participate-these may include commercial
corporations, NGOs, and even ordinary private individuals. 4 1 Whatever
the prospect of States themselves, by one means or other, being able to
acquire access to the preparatory materials, there is no guarantee that
other entities will share that advantage. The text at least is more than
likely publicly available.
The principles governing interpretation are by no means the only as-
pects of the law of treaties which are relevant to the present controversy,
though it will be convenient to defer consideration of other significant
rules until a later stage in the discussion.
c. The Law of International Organizations
Since the ICRW established an international organization-the
IWC-it is natural that attention will also have to be paid to the legal
regime that governs the creation, operation, development, and dissolu-
tion of such bodies.4 4 This regime regulates such matters as the structure
and legal personality of the organization, including the creation of sub-
ordinate agencies, the question of membership, the exercise of functions
and powers, and the interpretation of the constitution generally. Most
international organizations are created by treaty, and it has already been
noted that the Vienna Convention regime is in principle applicable to
such instruments. An important qualification, however, is that it operates
without prejudice to any relevant rules of the organization.' 49 One spe-
cific instance of such deference can be found in Article 20(3) of the
Vienna Convention, which provides that a reservation to a treaty that is
the constituent instrument of an international organization requires ac-
ceptance by a competent organ of that institution.
More generally, these "rules of the organization" are understood to
embrace "the constituent instruments, decisions and resolutions adopted
147. Human rights treaties represent the most obvious category, but there are many oth-
ers.
148. See generally C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2005); PHILLIPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT'S
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (5th ed. 2001); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M.
BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th rev. ed. 2004); NIGEL D. WHITE, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (2d ed. 2005).
149. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 5. The ILC noted that
this reference replaced a series of individual qualifications and exceptions to the operation of
particular provisions which had appeared in earlier drafts. ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at
191.
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in accordance with them, and established practice of the organization."'50
It is essential that they be taken into consideration since, as Shabtai
Rosenne has explained, 5' the undeniably contractual basis of constituent
instruments really represents more of an initial presupposition of the or-
ganization than the ongoing determinant of its activities. These
characteristically unfold in an essentially organic fashion, based on deci-
sion-making processes that are very seldom dependent on securing
absolute unanimity. Thus, processes may be set in motion that take the
participants ever further away from the original conception of the or-
ganization as entertained by those who created it. For striking examples,
one need only look to the Charter of the United Nations, which has been
developed and augmented by the recognition of various additional pow-
ers and principles, while particular provisions have been side-stepped,
disregarded, or effectively rewritten.1 2 There is certainly nothing illicit or
irregular about this process, which has, indeed, received the endorsement
of the International Court of Justice on several occasions.'
5 3
In the view of Rosenne, these cases demonstrate a "constitutionalist"
approach to interpretation of constituent instruments, the key characteris-
tics of which are:
(i) lack of interest in the intentions of the original members with
corresponding disinterest in the travaux preparatoires;
(ii) analysis of the function of the provision in question in the
context of the constituent instrument as a whole, with particular
stress on the relations between the different organs of the or-
ganization according to the constituent instrument, and on the
practice of those different organs; and (iii) a powerful-yet po-
litically highly controversial-teleological approach which
reflects more the "ought" than the "is" of the constituent instru-
ment.'54
150. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Between States and International Or-
ganizations or Between Organizations, supra note 73, art. 2(l)(j) (borrowing from the
definition in the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in their Relations
with International Organizations of a Universal Character).
151. ROSENNE, supra note 70, ch. 4.
152. See, e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 12, 27, 43-45.
153. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article
17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20); Effect of
Awards of Compensation Made by the United National Administrative Tribunal, Advisory
Opinion, 1954 I.C.J. 47 (July 13); Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. 174 (Apr. 11).
154. ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 237.
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To Rosenne himself, writing some twenty years ago and drawing on
the experience of a distinguished professional career that extended back
to the very dawn of the postwar era, this methodology marked a sharp
and potentially troublesome departure from traditional approaches to
treaty interpretation. Furthermore, it highlighted the constituent instru-
ment of an international organization as something radically different
from "the multilateral treaty as moulded by the Vienna Convention."'55
He explained:
There is more than a formal distinction between a legal institu-
tion, the application of the detailed rules of which depends upon
an individualistic appreciation by the State or States concerned
(as in the case of reservations to a multilateral treaty) and a legal
institution the application of the detailed rules of which depends
upon a collective dispositive decision binding on all parties. The
difference is one of kind, not of degree, for it will be seen that in
the ultimate analysis there is a conceptual difference between the
two types of legal institution, requiring the application of an en-
tirely different system of legal regulation.
5 6
It is doubtful that many would be greatly troubled by these consid-
erations today. In fact, Rosenne's concerns regarding the dangers
supposedly inherent in collective and evolutionary approaches to inter-
pretation may have been largely outmoded even by the time they were
expressed. Although particular States may occasionally dissent from the
proposition in circumstances in which their own individual interests are
judged to be at serious risk, there is widespread agreement, at least in
principle, that the constituent instruments of international organizations
must be interpreted in a purposive and dynamic manner.157 The explana-
tion for this consensus is simple: there is no alternative. The complexity
of international affairs and the accelerated pace of change in the modern
world is such that it is quite impossible to plan in advance for every con-
tingency, or even for every category of contingency.' 58 Thus, as Henry G.
Schermers and Niels M. Blokker pointed out,
155. Id. at 252.
156. Id.
157. See SHAW, supra note 35, at 843 (explaining that "[t]his programmatic interpreta-
tion doctrine ... is now well established and especially relevant to the United Nations, where
[sixty] years of practice related to the principles of the organization by nearly [200] States is
manifest," where the figures actually cited, 40 and 160, appear to be an unamended relic from
an earlier edition).
158. Id. at 1193-98; see also Legality of Use by State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed
Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66, 74-75 (July 8) (elaborating further on this point).
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[i]t is never possible to lay down an exhaustive list of powers of
the organization in a constitution, inter alia because any organi-
zation needs to respond to developments in practice which
cannot be foreseen when it is created. Therefore, other founda-
tions for the organization's activities exist, such as customary
and implied powers. 5 9
The implications of collective decision-making may on occasion
prove troublesome for individual States. However, the risk of being out-
voted on particular issues is balanced by the chance of benefiting from
favorable votes on other matters. While, in certain circumstances, there
is the possibility of preserving formal vetoes for certain States, history
shows that when this technique is employed, it is as likely to prove unac-
ceptably disruptive of progress as to protect essential interests.'
The recognition of "opt-out" powers represents an alternative
mechanism for preserving individual sovereignty. 61 Yet, even here, there
is much to be said for the State in question reviewing its policies in order
to ensure that they have not become unreasonably or unnecessarily en-
trenched. The ultimate defense for individuality-withdrawal from the
organization entirely-is almost always available, but is seldom produc-
tive and not infrequently results in an application to rejoin the
organization at a later date, as the history of the IWC itself graphically
demonstrates.' 62 In reality, it may well prove preferable for States to tol-
erate the occasional reverse, which, in the long run, may even come to
offer unexpected advantages: history certainly reveals no shortage of
instances in which a State, which had at one time vehemently opposed
the assumption by international organs of novel powers for which no
express constitutional authorization could be found, subsequently en-
dorsed the use of those same powers when it appeared expedient.'
63
As Judge Tanaka of the ICJ so perceptively pointed out in South West
Africa, the emergence of international organizations, which are sustained
and reinforced by "highly developed techniques of communication and
information" and the "growth of experience and increasing knowledge in
political and social science," has facilitated a new form of "parliamentary
diplomacy," whereby the old laborious and individualistic methods of
159. SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 148, at 175-76 (footnote omitted).
160. Consider, for example, the use of the veto in the U.N. Security Council, which has
from time to time prompted calls for its restriction or elimination. See, e.g., Press Release,
General Assembly, More Delegates Urge Restriction of Security Council Veto, U.N. Doc.
GA/9945 (Nov. 1, 2001).
161. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(3).
162. See MICHAEL J. BOWMAN & DAVID J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX
AND CURRENT STATUS T. 200 (1984 & Supp. 1995).
163. See, e.g., ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 193.
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norm creation have given way to accelerated processes of a "collective,
cumulative, and organic" character.' 6 This development was, moreover,
as welcome as it was inevitable. As pointed out by Tetsuo Sato,
[i]nternational organizations have been created because their
purposes and functions cannot be achieved by the creation of
simple norms of conduct by means of treaties, including multi-
lateral law-making treaties. Their purposes and functions can be
achieved only by the permanent operation of organizational enti-
ties. This implies that constituent instruments will always need
to be adapted to the changing circumstances for the purpose of
the efficient functioning and effective activities of international
organizations.'
65
Moreover, it was only through the adoption of a teleological and
evolutionary approach to the interpretation of constituent instruments,
through which ongoing functions and purposes were determined by the
"unilateral" decisions of its authorized organs, rather than by the consent
of States expressed individually, that the dynamism inherent in interna-
tional organizations could be fully realized.' 66
That is not to say, however, that the powers of international organiza-
tions are necessarily unlimited. As the ICJ concluded in Legality of the
Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, an organization's
powers must be determined in light of a purposive interpretation of the
organization's constitution, as developed by subsequent practice and/or
formal amendment, and allowing for the implication of unspecified func-
tions where necessary.167 On the other hand, the principle of specialty,
which sets limits to the powers of an organization by reference to the
"common interests whose promotion [the members] entrust to them,'" is
also applicable. In seeking to balance these considerations, the ICJ,
while recognizing that the World Health Organization's (WHO) compe-
tence included addressing the adverse consequences of a use of nuclear
weapons, ruled that the WHO's competence did not extend to issues re-
garding the legality of such use and, as a result, the WHO lacked the
164. South West Africa, Second Phase (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1996 I.C.J. 6,
291-92 (July 18) (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka).
165. See TETSUO SATO, EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUENT INSTRUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 230 (1996).
166. Id.
167. Legality of Use by State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 66, 75 (July 8).
168. Id. at 78.
[Vol. 29:293
Spring 2008] "Normalizing" the International Convention 331
authority to ask it for an advisory opinion on the matter.169 However, the
ICJ's conclusion that it could not entertain the WHO's request for an
advisory opinion was not based on a consideration of the WHO's Consti-
tution in isolation. Rather, the ICJ went on to explain that since the
WHO was "an international organization of a particular kind," namely
one created pursuant to the U.N. Charter and operating within a coherent
framework of specialized agencies, ' it was necessary to pay attention to
"the logic of the overall system" and avoid any unnecessary overlap or
duplication of function. 7' Based on this holding, it could be expected
that an organization that was not subject to such inherent institutional
constraints would have a much freer hand in determining the scope of its
own competence.
These observations lead conveniently back to Rosenne's second key
concern: the apparent gulf that these principles may be opening up be-
tween constituent instruments and all other treaties. Although similar
concerns are still occasionally reasserted by other authors,'7 2 there are in
fact good reasons to doubt the current existence of any simple, sharply-
drawn dichotomy. First, international organizations themselves are of
such variety that they virtually defy conjugation under any single, uni-
versally applicable definition. Thus, the scope for collective decision-
making and the need for a dynamic and flexible approach to the interpre-
tation of their powers may differ from case to case. In that context,
distinctions are sometimes drawn between entities that, through possess-
ing organs and a secretariat of their own, may be regarded as
international organizations in fact and those that, through possessing a
personality and legal will of their own, may be regarded as organizations
in law.
173
Felice Morgenstern notes that the IWC itself has been treated as an
example of the former category for the purposes of Swiss law,' 74 though,
even in organizations of this type, there may, of course, be circumstances
in which majority decisions become binding on individual members.
Indeed, when it comes to drawing lines between these various categories,
169. Id. at 76. Additionally, the ICJ stated that the WHO's power to seek advisory opin-
ions was specifically constrained by the terms of its own statutes. Id. at 80.
170. Id. at 80.
171. Id. at 79-81. But see Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) (acceding to the U.N. General Assembly's request for an
advisory opinion on a very similar question).
172. See Catherine Brolmann, The Institutional Veil in Public International Law: Interna-
tional Organizations and the Law of Treaties 144 (Apr. 22, 2005) (unpublished doctoral thesis,
University of Amsterdam) (on file with University of Amsterdam) (offering a recent example).
173. See, e.g., FELICE MORGENSTERN, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
ZATIONS 22-23 (1986).
174. Id.
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it is impossible not to be struck by "the fineness of the distinctions in-
volved and the circular nature of relevant arguments.' ' 75 The problem is
further compounded by the recent proliferation of multilateral standard-
setting instruments that, without seeking to establish international or-
ganizations as such, nevertheless create elaborate institutional machinery
for their own implementation. 7 6 Such treaties, now especially common
in the environmental field, undeniably display many of the "living in-
strument" characteristics that might once have been associated
exclusively with the constituent instruments of international organiza-
tions strictly so called.
Additionally, Rosenne himself recognized the existence of a "hy-
brid" arrangement, one in which the creation of an organization was
merely one aspect of the regime in question, rather than its sole pur-
pose.'77 Since this category is broad enough to include such treaties as
the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (Law of the Sea Con-
vention), 7 1 the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (by
which, inter alia, the International Civil Aviation Organization was cre-
ated), 179 and the 1919 Peace Treaty with Germany (which incorporated
both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Constitution of the
International Labor Organization),'80 it is evident that this form of ar-
rangement is one of no little practical significance. While Rosenne did
not fully explore the principles appropriate to govern the interpretation
of such instruments, it seems plausible to suggest that some elements, at
least of the dynamic and evolutionary approach, might be needed in or-
der to reflect their constitutionalist aspect. Yet another significant
category in which the "living instrument" approach has caught hold
comprises treaties, most notably in the human rights field, that establish
judicial, rather than political or administrative, machinery for their im-
plementation." ' Finally, there are grounds for supposing that the
evolutionary approach to implementation may sometimes be relevant
even in relation to bilateral, contractual-style arrangements. For exam-
ple, in Gabcfkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ, after upholding the
continued existence in force of a treaty negotiated during the Communist
175. Id. at 22.
176. See generally Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Ar-
rangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in
International Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 623 (2000).
177. ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 204.
178. UNCLOS, supra note 88.
179. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295.
180. Treaty of Peace with Germany [Treaty of Versailles], June 28, 1919, 225 Consol.
T.S. 188.
181. SHAW, supra note 35, at 843-44.
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era for the development and exploitation of water resources (despite the
fact that one party had effectively repudiated the agreement and the other
had attempted to implement it in a fashion far removed from that antici-
pated), went on to stipulate that the parties must "look afresh" at the
agreement, and the institutional arrangements established thereunder,
and take account of the many changes in factual and legal circumstances
that had occurred since its conclusion. 8 2 The ICJ also stated that they
should negotiate an agreed solution within the cooperative context of the
treaty, which should take account not only of the agreement's own objec-
tives, but also of the wider norms of international environmental law,
sustainable development, and the law of international watercourses.'83
While there were some slender threads within the treaty itself from
which these requirements could conceivably be hung,' 84 there can be lit-
tle doubt that the framework of implementation of the treaty that the ICJ
was prescribing was of an entirely different character from anything the
parties could plausibly be taken to have intended during their original
negotiation.
These examples demonstrate that what is emerging is not so much a
sharp dichotomy between constituent instruments and all other treaties,
but rather a continuum of possibilities that range all the way from the con-
stituent instrument of a "full-blown" international organization, through
various intermediate forms, to the traditional, short-term, bilateral, con-
tractual-style treaty incorporating no institutional arrangements or
evolutionary aspects whatsoever. Furthermore, it seems clear that both the
need for, and the scope of, an evolutionary and dynamic approach to inter-
pretation will vary according to the precise position of any particular treaty
along this spectrum, which itself will be determined by the complexity,
sophistication, and longevity both of the problems to be confronted and of
the institutional arrangements established for that purpose.
d. The Law of Treaties Revisited-"Living Instruments"
In light of the considerations emphasized above, it will be apparent
that it is a grave mistake to perceive the treaty as some kind of fossil that
must be extracted intact from the sedimentary strata of jurisprudential
history and viewed essentially as an intriguing relic of a bygone era.
Rather, treaties must be envisaged as living instruments engaged in a
182. Gabdlkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78-79 (Sept. 25);
see also Iron Rhine Ry. Arb. (Beig. v. Neth.), 27 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 41 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2005).
183. Gabi[kovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. at 75-80.
184. Id. at 22-23 (referring, in particular, to Articles 15, 19, and 20, which dealt with the
maintenance of water quality and the protection of nature and of fishing interests, but did not
contain any specific obligations of performance).
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continuous process of evolution and development, constantly interacting
with other such entities, and constructing an adaptive niche for them-
selves in the wider juridical environment. These phenomena have
implications for every aspect of the legal regime governing the practical
implementation of treaties, ranging from the moment of their conception
to that of their ultimate demise.
i. Termination
Given that the one certainty that biological life offers is eventual
death, it is fitting to commence with the principles that circumscribe the
"mortality," or duration, of treaties themselves. The relevant rules can be
found in Part V of the Vienna Convention, particularly in Articles 54-7 1.
The first point to note is that there is no general principle concerning the
extinction of treaties as a simple consequence of the effluxion of time.
Though the parties may certainly choose to set a temporal limit to the
operation of treaties they negotiate,' in the absence of such a determina-
tion, there is no reason why they may not endure forever.'86 To the
layman, it may seem entirely extraordinary that an area of human activ-
ity as complex, controversial, and liable to dramatic shifts of policy as
the conservation of marine resources is still governed by a treaty, the
ICRW, that was concluded half way through the previous century, a pe-
riod when the state of ecological awareness and the social, political, and
legal climate generally bore very little resemblance to that of today.
From this perspective, it might be assumed that such an instrument, con-
ceived in a different age, would almost inevitably fail to measure up to
the requirements of the present. The truth of the matter, though, is that
the international law of treaties makes allowance for such considerations
to be addressed through a variety of mechanisms and provisions.1
8
1
An example of one such mechanism can be found in Article 62 of
the Vienna Convention. Article 62 states that a treaty may be terminated
on the grounds that a fundamental change of circumstances has occurred
since the time of its conclusion.' However, this provision is hedged
185. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 54 (stating that
temporal limits may be set either through the provisions of the treaty itself or subsequently
through agreement).
186. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpil-
ing and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. XVI, opened for signature
Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21, 32 I.L.M. 800; Treaty on Open Skies art. XV,
Mar. 24, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-37, http://www.osce.org/documents/doclib/1992/03/
13764_en.pdf; Treaty on European Union art. Q, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1.
187. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 60 (stating
that, in appropriate circumstances, treaties may be terminated on account of breach by one or
more parties); see also infra Part ll.B.2.e.
188. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 62.
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around with stringent qualifications, and the ICJ has made it clear on
more than one occasion that the rebus sic stantibus principle it embodies
is of extremely limited applicability. 8 9 Indeed, Anthony Aust notes that
while it is universally accepted as a matter of theory, and is quite com-
monly invoked in argument by States, it has yet to actually be applied by
any tribunal to bring a given treaty to an end.'9° In particular, in any case
in which the treaty offers the possibility of adjustment to change-and
the existence of institutional arrangements through which the parties
may negotiate a solution presents the clearest possible instance-the
strong preference is to uphold the treaty's continued existence and to
allow the parties to retune its implementation in order to meet the needs
of the present. Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project is a good example of this
point. There, the ICJ pressed the pacta sunt servanda principle to its ul-
timate conclusion by rejecting a series of arguments to the effect that the
agreement had come to an end and instructing the parties to negotiate a
solution within the existing institutional framework. This holding left the
impression that the ICJ was intent on preserving the treaty at almost any
cost.
The approach adopted by the ICJ in Gabclkovo-Nagymaros Project
is no doubt illustrative of how problems arising under other treaties, such
as the ICRW, should be resolved. Naturally, if, at anytime, all cetacean
species were found to have actually become extinct, then the Convention
would most certainly be liable to termination on the grounds of impossi-
bility of performance.' 9' However, barring such a cataclysm, it will
simply be a matter of continually adjusting the implementation of the
treaty in order to meet contemporary needs.
In considering the respective potential of the various mechanisms
that are available to foster this process of progressive accommodation, it
is worthy of note that the kinds of circumstantial changes that may need
to be addressed can be either factual or legal and may be generated either
from within the confines of the treaty itself or from beyond.
ii. Amendment
The most obvious mechanism for facilitating adjustment to change
is, of course, formal amendment of the treaty. 92 Amendment of a treaty
189. See e.g., Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25);
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
190. AUST, supra note 91, at 241.
191. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 61. Even then,
though, by virtue of paragraph 2, no party whose breach was responsible for bringing about
the impossibility would be entitled to invoke it as a ground for termination. Id.
192. See id. arts. 39-40 (making provision for the treaty amendment process). Note also
the provisions in Article 41 that concern modification of a treaty amongst certain parties only.
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may be achieved either through activation of a procedure established for
that purpose under the terms of the treaty itself, or, alternatively, by
means of a separate amending agreement. Both possibilities are fre-
quently encountered in practice. In fact, as is evident from its history, the
ICRW is quite familiar with both mechanisms: Article V established a
procedure, which has been regularly deployed, for the amendment of the
detailed regulatory provisions found in the Schedule, while amendment
of other provisions must be achieved through a separate agreement, as
exemplified by the 1956 Protocol to the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling.'93 As shown by experience under the 1971 Ram-
sar Wetlands Convention,194 the process of adjustment to change can be
seriously handicapped in circumstances in which the original text of a
treaty makes no provision for its own amendment. In such circum-
stances, the most efficient solution undoubtedly lies in the adoption of a
supplementary protocol to the treaty designed to establish a suitable
amendment procedure. In the case of Ramsar, a Protocol of Amendment
was duly adopted in 1982.'9 Once the protocol entered into force, the
procedure that it created was promptly deployed in 1987 in order to gen-
erate further amendments to Ramsar that modified its internal
institutional arrangements.'
96
These relatively formal procedures, though, have their drawbacks.
They can often be cumbersome and time-consuming to implement. For
example, in the case of the Ramsar Convention, it took more than twenty
years from its original conclusion for its members to formally correct
certain weaknesses in the institutional arrangements it established, de-
spite the fact that these weaknesses were apparent to all concerned
virtually from the outset.'97
Fortunately, these procedures by no means exhaust the mechanisms
by which treaty amendments may be effected. In rejecting the argument
that a treaty can only be terminated or amended by an instrument of the
Id. art. 41. Of course, procedures for the amendment or modification of treaties are available
not only for the purpose of addressing changes in external circumstances, but also for correct-
ing simple failures in the original version of the text.
193. See Protocol to the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Nov.
19, 1956, 10 U.S.T. 952, 338 U.N.T.S. 366 [hereinafter 1956 Protocol] (amending arts. 11(3)
and V(l)).
194. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habi-
tat, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No. 11,804, 996 U.N.T.S. 246 [hereinafter Ramsar Wetlands
Convention].
195. Protocol to Amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Espe-
cially as Waterfowl Habitat, Dec. 3, 1982, 22 I.L.M. 698.
196. See Michael J. Bowman, The Multilateral Treaty Amendment Process-A Case
Study, 44 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 540 (1995) (offering a discussion of these developments).
197. Id. at 544-45.
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same form, or equivalent formality, as that in which it was concluded,'90
the ILC was of the view that an amending agreement "may take what-
ever form the parties to the original treaty may choose. [In fact], the
Commission recognized that a treaty may sometimes be modified even
by a tacit agreement evidenced by the conduct of the parties in the appli-
cation of the treaty."' 99 This possibility of amending a treaty informally
by means of the actual practice of the parties in the course of its imple-
mentation has already been referred to above in the context of
constituent instruments and is exemplified extensively in relation to the
U.N. Charter. It is clear that it is equally applicable in the case of treaties
generally. In that context, it is noteworthy that an original proposal by
the ILC, which would have specifically provided for the amendment of
treaties through the practice of the parties,2 00 attracted critical comment
on the part of one or two States and was ultimately not included in the
Vienna Convention in those terms.20' However, it appears that the princi-
pal reason for its omission was that it was judged superfluous in light of
what became sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 31(3), concerning the
role of subsequent practice or agreement in the process of treaty inter-
202pretation. As noted above, the primary purpose of that provision was to
admit evidence of subsequent developments as a means of shedding light
retrospectively on the original intentions of the parties at the time of the
treaty's adoption. Yet, it is clear that it may also be used as a means of
198. The theory of acte contraire is known to some municipal legal systems, but, accord-
ing to the Commission, it forms no part of international law. ILC Commentary, supra note 84,
at 232-33,249.
199. Id. at 233.
200. See id. at 236 (providing the draft text of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties and discussing Article 38 of the 1966 draft, formerly Article 68(b) of the 1964 draft).
201. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION 247-49 (1970); THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES: TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRE 304-09 (Ralf G. Wetzel & Dietrich Raushning
eds., 1978). Note also the comments of the ILC Rapporteur in 1966 that the proposed provi-
sion regarding amendment by subsequent practice had been
endorsed by the United States Government as reflecting long-standing and widely
accepted practice, and again no Government has questioned its correctness. The
Government of Israel, however, thinks it to be indistinguishable in its practical ef-
fect from ... article 69, paragraph 3(b), [ultimately Article 31(3)(b)] and for that
reason redundant .... The Commission ... recognized that "the line may some-
times be blurred between interpretation and amendment of a treaty through
subsequent practice."
But, it concluded that "legally the processes are quite distinct and should be dealt with sepa-
rately. Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 51, 89, U.N. Doc.
AICN.4/186 & Add.1, 2/Rev.1, 3-7 (discussing draft Article 68). This final point, though
broadly persuasive as a matter of strict principle, seems ultimately to have yielded to consid-
erations of streamlining and convenience.
202. See, e.g., ELIAS, supra note 52, at 98-100.
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shaping the ongoing development of the instrument based on the modifi-
cation of those intentions, regardless of whether it is expressed in the
form of clarification, amplification, or even outright transformation. As the
Permanent Court of Arbitration stated in its Decision on Delimination of
the Border Between Eritrea and Ethiopia, "[lthe effect of subsequent con-
duct may be so clear in relation to matters that appear to be the subject of
a given treaty that the application of an otherwise pertinent treaty provi-
sion may be varied, or even cease to control the situation, regardless of its
original meaning. 20 3 This avenue to change is unlikely to pose a serious
threat to the stability of treaty relations because it is clear, as explained
above, that practice may only be treated as conclusive if it is that of the
parties "as a whole." In the contemporary context, it might have to be con-
sidered whether this criterion should be deemed to be satisfied in a
situation unlikely to have been specifically in the minds of Commission
members in the circumstances of 1966, namely, the manifestation of col-
lective practice through an authoritative resolution of a body such as a
Conference of the Parties. Where such measures are intended to go beyond
211
mere recommendations and are accepted by consensus, or by such ma-
jority as would be sufficient for the adoption of a formal amendment, a
case can be made for according them decisive effect.
It is beyond doubt that informal amendments are, indeed, the princi-
pal way in which many treaties adapt themselves to the evolving
requirements of their subject matter. Take, for example, Article 1 (1)(e) of
the 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild
Amimals (CMS or Bonn Convention), which defined the term "endan-
gered"-a concept of critical importance to the overall operation of the
Convention-to refer to a species "in danger of extinction throughout all
or a significant proportion of its range. 20 5 At the Second Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties, it was resolved simply to treat this require-
ment as satisfied if the species was listed as "endangered" by the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources (IUCN) in its well-known Red Data Lists of threatened
species,20 despite the fact that the precise wording of the IUCN criterion
203. Decision on Delimination of the Border Between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Ert. v. Eth.),
25 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 83, 110-11 (Eri.-Eth. Boundary Comm'n 2002); see also Payment of
Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (Fr. v. Serb.), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20 (July 12)
(offering a much earlier illustration of this point).
204. Or, perhaps, where any dissentients do not expressly dissociate themselves from the
proposition after its adoption.
205. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 23,
1979, 1651 U.N.T.S. 356 [hereinafter Bonn Convention].
206. Convention on Migratory Species [CMS], Guidelines for the Application of Certain
Terms of the Convention, Res. 2.2 (Oct. 1998), available at http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/
COP2/English/Res2.2_E.pdf [hereinafter CMS Res. 2.2].
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was not identical. Furthermore, at the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of
Parties in 1997, following an extensive overhaul of the IUCN criteria
resulting in a much more elaborate formulation, it was resolved that the
term would mean "facing a very high risk of extinction in the wild in the
near future" and that application of the term would be guided by either
the findings of the IUCN or by an independent assessment performed by
the CMS's own Scientific Council based on the best available data.
20 7
The preamble to the resolution suggested that this would achieve maxi-
mum compatibility with the IUCN's "Categories of Threat," "whilst still
keeping within the definition" given in Article l(1)(e) of the CMS. How-
ever, it might have been more accurate to suggest that the Conference of
the Parties had attempted to honor the spirit of that provision while sub-
tly adjusting its wording to reflect the latest scientific thinking on the
subject. This process also, of course, succeeded in avoiding all the time,
trouble, and expense involved in activating the formal amendment pro-
cedure under Article 10 of the CMS,28 thereby maximizing both the
effectiveness and the efficiency of the process of change.
Numerous examples can be found of the adoption of a similar ap-
proach in relation to other treaties.2 9 Thus, there is little room for doubt
that Malcom Shaw was correct in his observation that "[s]ubsequent
practice may indeed have a dual role: it may act as an instrument of in-
terpretation and it may also mark an alteration in the legal relations
between the parties established by the treaty in question."2
Having established that there are a number of distinct procedures in
accordance with which amendments may be made, we may also note
that the subject matter of amendments is infinitely variable, in the sense
207. CMS, Interpretation of Certain Terms of the Convention, Res. 5.3 (Apr. 1997),
available at http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop5/English/Res5.3-E.pdf [hereinafter CMS
Res. 5.3]. CMS Resolution 5.3 was adopted "without amendment." Fifth Meeting of the Conf.
of the Parties, Geneva, Switz., Apr. 10-16, 1997, Report of the Fifth Meeting of the Conf. of
the Parties, at 22, available at http://www.cms.int/bodies/COP/cop5/English/cop5_report.pdf.
208. In fact, the process is less problematic under the CMS because amendments may be
effected at ordinary meetings of the Conference of Parties, unlike many other treaties where
an extraordinary meeting must be convened for that purpose. Bonn Convention, supra note
205, art 10.
209. See Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES] (offering an evolv-
ing approach to the interpretation of the concepts of "artificially propagated" and "captive
bred" specimens under Article 7(4)-(5)); see also WILLEM WIJNSTEKERS, THE EVOLUTION OF
CITES (8th ed. 2005) (discussing the creation of a new, related exception known as "ranch-
ing," for which no provision is found in the text at all). Note also the apparent conflation in the
practice of the Ramsar Convention of the notions of "conservation" and "wise use," ostensibly
envisaged by the drafters of the Convention as divergent standards for the management of
listed and unlisted wetlands respectively. See Michael J. Bowman, The Ramsar Convention
Comes ofAge, 42 NETHS INT'L L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1995).
210. SHAW, supra note 35, at 841.
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that they may relate to any aspect of the original version of the instru-
ment in question. Even in this brief overview, it has been shown that
amendments may be affected by one or other means in relation to (i) the
definition of key terms adopted for the purposes of an agreement; (ii) the
principal substantive obligations created; (iii) the various categories of
exceptions to those obligations; (iv) the institutional arrangements
adopted; and (v) the final clauses of the agreement. There is equally no
doubt that they may relate even to something as fundamental as the object
and purpose of the agreement-once again, the Ramsar Wetlands Conven-
tion provides a convenient example. While the preamble noted in general
terms that wetlands constituted "a resource of great economic, cultural,
scientific, and recreational value, the loss of which would be irreplace-
able" and affirmed the parties' desire "to stem the progressive
encroachment on and loss of wetlands now and in the future," it is clear
from other preambular recitals, 2 ' the wording of various substantive pro-
visions, 2 and the Convention's very title,213 that the predominant
motivation underlying this convention was the protection of habitat for
waterfowl. Indeed, ornithological organizations, such as the International
Wildfowl Research Bureau (IWRB), were particularly active in promot-
ing the need for the Ramsar Wetlands Convention, preparing early drafts
and providing technical and scientific data and services. While the ap-
proach to conservation was always intended to be holistic, the principal
underlying objective was clear.24 Yet over the years, the clear trend has
been progressively to downplay this aspect with a view to maximizing
the Convention's potential impact and to focus increasing attention on
the importance of wetlands as habitat for fish and other creatures, regula-
tors of flood and drought, locations for recreational activities and sources
of water supply. These changes have been effected through a range of
means, including an extension of the habitat types thought to merit pro-
tection as wetlands (so as to include, for example, underground karst
systems); revised criteria to govern the process of designation for the
List of Wetlands of International Importance (so as to place a heavier
emphasis on both general biological considerations and habitat for non-
avian species); the development of guidelines on wise use (so as to em-
brace all aspects of water allocation, as well as wetland inventory,
211. Ramsar Wetlands Convention, supra note 194, pmbl. Note in particular the second
and fifth recitals.
212. Id. Note in particular Articles 1(2), 2(1), 2(2), 2(6), 4(1), 4(2), 4(4), 6(1), 7(1).
213. The Convention's full title is the Convention on Wetlands of International Impor-
tance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat.
214. See PROCEEDINGS, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CONSERVATION OF WET-
LANDS AND WATERFOWL, RAMSAR, IRAN, 30 JANUARY-3 FEBRUARY 1971 (E. Carp ed.,
Slimbridge 1972), reprinted in Final Act of the International Conference on the Conservation
of Wetlands and Waterfowl, available at http://www.ramsar.org/key-finalact_1971 .htm.
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management, and regulation); and the systematic confrontation of prob-
lem cases, regardless of whether ornithological interests are involved or
not.25 In this way, the overall orientation of the Convention has been
subtly, but significantly, adjusted.
As one might expect, these considerations apply with equal force to
the constituent instruments of international organizations. We may note,
as an illustration, one of the less well-known examples of its kind, but an
institution that has nevertheless performed sterling service on behalf of
the international community for over three-quarters of a century, the
World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).26 The OIE was established
in Paris on the basis of an international agreement that was concluded in
1924 in the wake of a disastrous outbreak of rinderpest in Europe.2 7 Ac-
cording to its Statutes, the "main objects" of the OIE are
the promotion and coordination of experimental research work
concerning the pathology or prophylaxis of contagious diseases
of livestock for which international collaboration is desirable,
the collection and dissemination of data concerning the spread
of such diseases and the means to control them, and the exami-
nation of international agreements regarding animal sanitary
measures and the provision of assistance in supervising their en-
211forcement.
Pursuant to a mandate created under the World Trade Organization's
(WTO) Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures (SPS), the
OIE publishes health standards for international commerce in animals
and animal products, thereby helping to safeguard international trade.
Despite the fact that the SPS does not per se address issues of animal
welfare, the OIE did acknowledge the close connection of such questions
with animal health and identified them as a priority in its Strategic Plan
for 2001-2005. Following the unanimous acceptance at the OIE's 70th
General Session of the recommendations of an ad hoc group convened to
examine these questions, a permanent Working Group on animal welfare
was established. At a later session, in May 2005, various welfare stan-
dards were agreed on for inclusion in the Organization's Terrestrial
Animal Health Code, and work on aquatic animal welfare was
215. See generally The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, http://ramsar.org (last visited
Aug. 25, 2008) (providing information regarding all of these issues and developments).
216. The acronym OIE derives from the French name for the organization, l'Office In-
ternational des Epizooties.
217. International Agreement for the Creation of an International Office for Epizootics in
Paris, Jan. 25, 1924, 57 L.N.T.S. 135. The outbreak originated from a consignment of zebus
that docked at the port of Antwerp en route from India to Brazil.
218. Id. app. art. 4.
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subsequently initiated. This quiet revolution in the functional priorities
of what was previously an essentially anthropocentric program of activi-
ties, which was designed to protect the economic interests of livestock
owners, seems to have occurred with a minimum of fuss or legal formal-
ity,2'9 demonstrating once again the extreme flexibility of international
institutional arrangements.
Such possibilities were, indeed, presaged long ago even by that most
conservative of international lawyers, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, through
his notion of "emergent purpose,' 2  which Rosenne declares to have
been vindicated by the decisions of the ICJ.22 ' As Sato approvingly ex-
plains,
[a]ccording to this theory, the notion of object and purpose is it-
self not a fixed and static one, but is liable to change, or rather
develop, as experience is gained in the operation and working of
the convention. At any given moment, the convention is to be in-
terpreted not so much, or not merely, with reference to what its
object was when entered into, but with reference to what that ob-
ject has since become and now appears to be.222
The potential effect of the provisions in Article 31(l)(a)-(b) of the Vi-
enna Convention can therefore be seen to be very extensive indeed.
iii. Systemic Integration
As in the case of biological entities, treaties exist not in isolation but
in the context of a wider "ecosystem," which, in the juridical context,
can be understood to refer to the legal system as a whole. Indications of
"life" in a treaty may accordingly be found not only in the fact of mere
persistence or development over time, but in the process of interaction
with this broader environment. This point is reflected in a provision of
the Vienna Convention to which reference has already been made-
Article 31 (3)(c). This article requires that the process of interpretation of
a treaty provision must take into account, "together with the context[,]
... any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
219. It is not clear that any amendment of either the Agreement or its Organic Statutes
has been thought necessary. The Agreement itself contains little by way of explanation of its
object and purpose, other than a reference to the desire to create the organization. Under Arti-
cle 5 of the Agreement, the parties reserve the right to make, by common consent, any changes
that are deemed desirable in light of their experience. While superfluous from a legal point of
view, this provision might be interpreted to allow for a relaxed approach to the attendant legal
formalities.
220. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, supra note 100, at 8 n.2.
221. ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 240.
222. SATO, supra note 165.
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between the parties. 223 It is quite clear that the external principles to be
considered in this process may derive from any of the recognized
sources of international obligation, namely treaties, custom, or general
principles of law.224 What is required is that the interpretation of each
individual provision must be woven into the broader fabric not only of
the treaty as a whole, but of the wider legal system. Therefore, "when
several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible,
be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obliga-
tions.' '225 This is referred to as the principle of harmonization.
There are, however, significant limitations as to what can be
achieved by this means. First, it is above all designed to foster consis-
tency with extraneous rules through a process of interpretation. There
can be no question of effectively reconstructing or "redrafting" the treaty
in question to achieve a fit with these extraneous rules.226 Secondly, such
a "redraft" might not always be appropriate because some agreements
are predicated on a deliberate and wholly legitimate desire to depart
from existing rules. Such is the case in regards to treaty-based exceptions
to customary norms, to which there can be no valid objection unless the
norms in question represent jus cogens. Finally, even though there is no
specific requirement either in the Convention itself or in the ILC Com-
mentary that the external rules be applicable to all the parties to the
present treaty, the extent of their applicability amongst them is obviously
an important consideration. Clearly, any attempt to steer interpretation of
the treaty toward consistency with the extraneous commitments of only a
small group of parties has the potential to undermine the consistency of
the treaty itself with putatively contrasting external obligations of other
groups. Everything, therefore, as explained above, depends on the pre-
cise interpretative purpose for which the external rule or principle is to
be used. In the last resort, should the instant treaty contain obligations
which plainly are inconsistent with others to which any particular State
may be subject, that State must be left to answer for the consequences
itself. Indeed, with that possibility specifically in mind, Article 30 of the
Vienna Convention addresses the question of prioritization of potentially
227inconsistent treaty obligations.
In view of the early date of adoption of the ICRW and the relatively
under-developed state of international law (especially with regard to
223. See generally French, supra note 138, at 284 (quoting the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(3)(c)).
224. Int'l Law Comm., Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 139,$ 18.
225. Id. % 4.
226. Naturally, it is open to the parties to take this more drastic step if they choose, but it
is theoretically distinct from the process of interpretation.
227. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 30 (emphasis added).
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conservation issues) at the time, the corpus of pre-existing substantive
norms which will bear on its interpretation is likely to be relatively
small. It is clear, however, that such norms are not the only ones that are
relevant. This is evident from the fact that the phrase "any relevant rules"
in Article 31(3)(c) replaced a decidedly more restrictive reference in an
earlier draft to "general rules of international law in force at the time of
its conclusion.,22 This confirms that it is necessary to apply the process
of interpretational harmonization not only to pre-existing external norms
but on an ongoing basis to any that may subsequently emerge.229 Resolu-
tion 2006-1 plainly accepts this point through its reference to the
Biodiversity Convention of 1992. This takes the process of interpretation
into the realms of "intertemporal law."
iv. Intertemporal Law
The "intertemporal law" doctrine dictates that the legality, and in-
deed legal implications generally, of any fact, act, or state of affairs, is to
be determined in accordance with the law in force at the time of its oc-
currence. The principle is not merely one of the law of treaties, but of
international law generally, and is most commonly encountered in con-
nection with the law of territory. In one of the most well-known and
informative forensic determinations of territorial sovereignty issues, the
arbitrator, Max Huber, stated:
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevail-
ing at successive periods is to be applied in a particular case (the
so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be made be-
tween the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The
same principle which subjects the act creative of a right to the
law in force at the time the right arises, demands that the exis-
tence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation,
shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of the
law.23'
228. See ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at 183.
229. See id. (noting the deliberate effect of the change in wording); see also KONTOU,
supra note 40.
230. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 126-28
(5th ed. Oxford 1998) (1966); D.W. GREIG, INTERTEMPORALITY AND THE LAW OF TREATIES
(2001); ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 76-80 (noting the various resolutions of the Institute of
International Law); SHAW, supra note 35, at 429-30; Taslim 0. Elias, The Doctrine of In-
tertemporal Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 285 (1980); Rosalyn Higgins, Time and Law:
International Perspectives on an Old Problem, 46 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 501 (1997).
231. Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 821, 845 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1928).
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The principle is one of elementary common sense, though its appli-
cation is not always straightforward. Some commentators have
concluded that the second limb-the principle governing the continued
manifestation of the right-somehow undermines the first. Properly ap-
plied, it should not.232 The key to the conundrum is to identify correctly
the fact, act, or state of affairs the legal implications of which have to be
determined in each instance. For example, in the case of territory ac-
quired by conquest in 1850, a valid title might be acquired, since
international law did not preclude the use of force at that time. This de-
termination reflects the intertemporal law governing the initial creation
of the right, and subsequent changes in the law cannot affect it. The con-
tinued manifestation of that right-the retention of title-must be
evaluated on an ongoing basis founded on the law in force in relation to
that question at any given moment, most notably that at which the dis-
pute arises. In fact, the legal regime throughout the modern era has
remained unchanged, stipulating that title to territory validly acquired is
automatically retained in the absence of an intention to abandon it (ani-
mus derelictionis),233 an intention which is, furthermore, not lightly to be
presumed. In the face of a competing claim involving an actual display of
sovereign functions by another State, however, sufficient evidence of the
recent exercise of sovereign authority by the first State would generally be
232. See Phillip C. Jessup, The Palmas Island Arbitration, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 735
(1928). Some of the arbitrator's comments are admittedly highly equivocal. See, e.g., Island of
Palmas Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 846. Max Huber stated,
It seems therefore incompatible with this rule of positive law [that occupation must
be effective in order to generate a claim for sovereignty] that there should be re-
gions which are neither under the effective sovereignty of a State, nor without a
master, but which are reserved for the exclusive influence of one State, in virtue
solely of a title of acquisition which is no longer recognized by existing law.
Id. (emphasis added). These statements should, however, be read as being restricted to the
specific context in which they were uttered, namely one of extreme, unresolved doubts con-
cerning the capacity of mere discovery, at any epoch in history, to generate more than an
inchoate title which had to be perfected by effective occupation within a reasonable time.
They arguably do not need to be read to refer to the case of a title definitively established in
accordance with the law in force at the time.
233. Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law: France-Mexico: Arbi-
tral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty Over Clipperton Island,
26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390, 395 (1932). It might, of course, theoretically be possible for the law
governing continued manifestation of title to evolve in such a way that title to territories acquired
by means which subsequently became unlawful was lost, and had somehow to be re-established.
This evolution was the scenario questionably assumed by Jessup to be the consequence of appli-
cation of Huber's intertemporal principle. See Jessup, supra note 232. However, such an
evolution would scarcely be conducive to stability in international relations and has never
actually been the law.
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required in order to negate any suggestion of acquiescence in the rival
234
claim.
This aspect of the law of territory has been considered at greater
length than might at first sight seem appropriate because it bears directly
on the application of the same principle for the purpose of the law of
treaties. In that regard, it is noteworthy that Humphrey Waldock, in his
capacity as ILC Rapporteur on the Law of Treaties, proposed the inclu-
sion of a provision intended directly to reflect Huber's intertemporal
233principle. It ran:
1. A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the law in force at
the time when the treaty was drawn up.
2. Subject to paragraph 1, the application of a treaty shall be
governed by the rules of international law in force at the time
when the treaty is to be applied.236
This provision was ultimately excluded from the draft treaty, how-
ever, on account of concerns over whether it captured the full richness of
the intertemporal principle.237 In particular, there is an obvious element
of tension between the two paragraphs, arising out of the uncertain rela-
tionship between the concepts of interpretation and application.
Furthermore, it was noted that the intentions of the parties form a key
aspect of the principles governing both of these elements, but that the
proposed wording did not give sufficient, indeed any, guidance on the
complexities of its effects. It was eventually decided, given the wide-
spread recognition and pervasive significance of the concept of
intertemporality in international law, that it might be treated as imported
by reference to the requirement that every treaty be interpreted in good
faith and in light of "any relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties. 239 Intertemporality is, in any event,
reflected in certain more specific aspects of the codified law of treaties.
Notable examples include the rule of non-retroactivity of the Vienna
Convention 24 and the principles governing the conflict of treaties with
234. See Island of Palmas Case, 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 869.
235. Third Report on the Law of Treaties, [1964] 2 YB. INT'L L. COMM'N 8, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/167 & Add. 1-3.
236. Id.
237. See ROSENNE, supra note 70, at 76-80; ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at 222.
238. That is, they are conceptually less distinct than the notions of acquisition and reten-
tion of title in the territorial context. Cf Maarten Bos, Theory and Practice of Treaty
Interpretation, 27 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 3, 11-13 (1980) (exploring the complexities of the
relationship between interpretation and application).
239. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(3)(c).
240. See id. art. 4.
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jus cogens.24 ' As regards the latter, it will be remembered that a treaty
that fails to respect a peremptory norm already established at the time of
its conclusion is void ab initio, with the consequence that the parties
must bring their relations into conformity with this norm, as far as possi-
ble eliminating the consequences of any acts already performed in
reliance on the offending provision(s).242 By contrast, a treaty which
proves inconsistent with a peremptory norm that does not emerge until
after its adoption becomes void and terminates only from the time of
emergence of that norm, releasing the parties from further obligations
but leaving unaffected any rights, obligations, or legal situations already
created (though these may only be maintained in the future to the extent
that they do not involve any conflict with the norm in question).243
There is, therefore, little room for doubt that the principle of in-
tertemporal law must be confronted in the interpretation of treaties and
that the significance of intention in this context must be specifically ad-
dressed. Perhaps the crucial point to grasp is that, since both law and
intentions may evolve over time, intertemporality is relevant to both. As
discussed, Waldock's first point was that each treaty is to be interpreted
in light of the law in force at the time it was created, which is correct,
although regrettably uninformative as to the precise role of intention in
this process. One necessary clarification would be that it is the intention
of the parties at that same time that is relevant for this purpose, at least in
the first instance.' 4 Thus, for the purposes of interpreting the treaty, the
parties cannot be credited with knowledge, aims, or motivations which
they did not possess during the negotiating process and which only sub-
sequently emerged.
There are, however, various considerations which combine to pre-
vent this principle of "contemporaneity" operating as an unwarranted
impediment to the process of adjustment of ongoing treaty relations to
meet the needs of the moment. The first is that it must, of course, be ap-
plied not only in the case of the original treaty, but also in relation to
each and every subsequent amendment. Thus, the original intentions of
the parties must be regarded as having been modified from the date when
241. See id. arts. 53, 64, 71.
242. Id. art. 71(1). Note that this rule departs from the general rule for invalid treaties
that "acts performed in good faith before the invalidity was invoked are not rendered unlawful
by reason only of the invalidity." Id. art. 69(2)(b). Presumably, acts in defiance of peremptory
norms cannot ex hypothesi be performed in good faith.
243. Id. art. 71(2). This final stipulation operates as a gloss on the usual rule for termina-
tion established by article 70(l)(b). Id. 70(l)(b).
244. Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Eq. Guinea inter-
vening), 2002 I.C.J. 303, 59 (Oct. 10); see, e.g., Decision on Delimination of the Border
Between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Efn. v. Eth.), 25 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 83, 3.5 (Eri.-Eth.
Boundary Comm'n 2002) (discussing the principle of "contemporaneity").
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the amendment takes effect, at least with regard to the issues that form
the subject-matter of that amendment. This is a simple question of com-
mon sense, for the object and purpose of many amendments could
obviously be defeated if they were interpreted by reference to the inten-
tions of the parties at an earlier time than that at which the amendments
themselves were actually conceived. In the case of any treaty that is
regularly amended, like the ICRW, it is accordingly plain that the rules
of treaty interpretation require that the intentions of the parties be treated
as essentially fluid.
Moreover, in certain respects, this may be true even in the absence of
any question of formal amendment. Given that the parties to treaties are
governmental entities well-versed in the need for creating regulatory
mechanisms that are as far as possible proof against the gathering pace
of change in social, political, economic, and scientific affairs, it is rea-
sonable to suppose that any such mechanisms that they choose to create
at the international level would aim to incorporate some measure of
adaptability from the outset. In other words, even the original intentions
of the parties may have recognized that the terminology, substantive pro-
visions, and even underlying objectives of the treaties they have
negotiated should contain an element of flexibility. This point was
clearly recognized in the ICJ's following observation in its Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) advisory opinion:
Mindful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an in-
strument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the
time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account
the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant
[of the League of Nations]-"the strenuous conditions of the
modem world" and "the well-being and development" of the
peoples concerned-were not static, but were by definition evo-
lutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the "sacred
trust." The parties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed
to have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institu-
tions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the
changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century,
and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subse-
quent development of the law, through the Charter of the United
Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, an interna-
tional instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the
interpretation. In the domain to which the present proceedings
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relate, the last fifty years, as indicated above, have brought im-
portant developments . 5
A very similar approach, as noted above, was taken in the Gabjik-
ovo-Nagymaros Project case.24 6 In addition, valuable guidance as to the
implications of this notion of evolutionary intention can be gleaned from
a further decision of the ICJ, the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case.4 7 In
the course of determining the question of its possible jurisdiction over
the dispute, the Court was required to consider the effect of Greek acces-
sion, in 1931, to the 1928 General Act for the Pacific Settlement of
International Disputes, and in particular of its reservation regarding dis-
putes "relating to the territorial status of Greece. 248 In response to a
claim presented by Greece against Turkey concerning delimitation of the
continental shelf, the latter sought to rely on this reservation by virtue of
the principle of reciprocity, so as to exclude the Court's jurisdiction.
Greece argued that the concept of the continental shelf was unknown in
1931, and that its reservation consequently could not be interpreted, in
accordance with the state of knowledge at the time, to cover such dis-
putes. The Court disagreed, holding that
[o]nce it is established that the expression "the territorial status
of Greece" was used ... as a generic term denoting any matters
comprised within the concept of territorial status under general
international law, the presumption necessarily arises that its
meaning was intended to follow the evolution of the law and to
correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the
law in force at any given time. This presumption, in the view of
the Court, is even more compelling when it is recalled that the
1928 Act was a convention for the pacific settlement of disputes
designed to be of the most general kind and of continuing dura-
tion, for it hardly seems conceivable that in such a convention
terms like "domestic jurisdiction" and "territorial status" were
intended to have a fixed content regardless of the subsequent
evolution of the law. 9
Accordingly, the ICJ was "of the opinion that the expression in reserva-
tion (b) "disputes relating to the territorial status of Greece" must be
245. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Na-
mibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory
Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 1 53 (June 21).
246. Gabdikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25).
247. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. 3 (Dec. 19).
248. General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Sept. 26, 1928, 93
L.N.T.S. 342.
249. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf, 1978 I.C.J. at 33.
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interpreted in accordance with the rules of international law as they exist
today, and not as they existed in 1931. ,250 The jurisdiction of the Court
was therefore excluded.
This body of jurisprudence confirms the essential role of the princi-
ple of intertemporal law in ensuring the ongoing effectiveness and
adaptability of treaties in light of the changing demands that circum-
stances may place on them.25 ' The overall effect of the principles referred
to is conveniently summarized in the observations of the ICJ in the Gab-
6ikovo-Nagymaros Project case:
In this regard it is of cardinal importance that the Court has
found that the 1977 Treaty is still in force and consequently gov-
erns the relationship between the Parties. That relationship is
determined by the rules of the relevant conventions to which the
two States are party, by the rules of general international law
and, in this particular case, by the rules of state responsibility
What is essential, therefore, is that the factual situation as it has
developed since 1989 shall be placed within the context of the
preserved and developing treaty relationship, in order to achieve
its object and purpose in so far as it is feasible. What might have
been a correct application of the law in 1989 or 1992, if the case
had been before the Court then, could be a miscarriage of justice
if prescribed in 1997.252
These considerations are certain to apply with even greater force to
the ICRW, given the much longer time-span between the conclusion of
the treaty and the current dispute, and the correspondingly profound
changes which have taken place in the factual and legal background dur-
ing that period.2 3 This conclusion is unlikely to come as a surprise to
IWC members because it was presaged long ago in the legal opinion
provided by Derek Bowett in the following terms:
Where, as in the 1946 Convention, a treaty establishes a continu-
ing regime with international organs, such as the [ILC],
250. Id. at 34.
251. Cf ELIAs, supra note 52, at 17 (discussing the necessity of rigorous application of
the doctrine of intertemporal law to dispute resolution).
252. See Gab(kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 9 132-34
(Sept. 25).
253. See id. at 114 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry) ("It matters little that an
undertaking has been commenced under a treaty of 1950 if in fact that undertaking continues
in operation in the year 2000. The relevant environmental standards that will be applicable
will be those of the year 2000.").
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performing continuing functions under that regime, there is
marked tendency to regard such a treaty as a "dynamic" instru-
ment, akin to a Constitution in a State, capable of adaptation to
changing circumstances by a process of interpretation rather
than as a static statement of rights and duties the content of
which is fixed and unchangeable. 4
Bowett regarded the reasons for this approach as being "obvious," and it
is to be hoped that the proposition can by now be taken as uncontrover-
sial in relation to the ICRW. Certainly, the need to have regard to
temporal effects in the application of legal instruments appears to be im-
plicit in Document 58/12 and, indeed, to have been fully recognized by
its principal proponent, Japan, in other international fora.255
e. State Responsibility and Other Consequences of Breach
Given that the dispute involves the proper approach to the perform-
ance of treaty obligations, it inevitably impinges on the province of state
responsibility. It is clear that a breach of treaty, like that of any interna-
tional obligation, gives rise to responsibility on the part of the State
21concerned. 56 Such responsibility does not itself affect the continuing
duty of that State to perform the obligation in question, 57 but entails sec-
ondary obligations to desist from the wrongful act, to offer assurances of
non-repetition if circumstances so require, and to make appropriate repa-
ration.258 The internal law of a State may never be relied on to justify or
254. Legal Opinion on Two Questions Concerning the Interpretation of the 1946 Con-
vention (Apr. 28, 1979) (on file with author).
255. See Erik Franckx, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, Ap-
plication of the Term "Introduction for the Sea," http://www.cites.orgleng/news/meetings/ifs-
05/termIFS.pdf. In the course of discussions at the Eleventh CITES Council of Parties of
CITES Resolution Conf. 11.4,
Japan stressed that new scientific findings with respect to cetaceans were not taken
into account, and therefore rendered the proposed resolution obsolete. Together
with Australia, it furthermore had difficulties with recital 19, which implied the ac-
ceptance by the conference of the parties in 2000 of a text adopted by the IWC in
1978.
Id. at 8.
256. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res 56/83, art. I,
2, U.N. Doc A/56/49 (Vol. I)/Corr.4 (Dec. 12, 2001); see JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (2002) (discussing this
draft); see also IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY,
PART 1 (1983); CLYDE EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1928) (discussing state responsibility generally).
257. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 256, art. 29
(noting that the obligation may, however, effectively be brought to an end by the State to
which it is owed terminating the treaty in question).
258. Id. arts. 30-31, 34-39.
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excuse a breach of treaty, since States are obliged to ensure that their
internal law is brought into conformity with their international obliga-
tions.26° In the case of the ICRW itself, this principle is effected through
Article IX, which requires each party to take appropriate measures to
261
ensure the application of the provisions of the Convention.
The illicit or excessive use of a power may also be amenable to legal
process, but does not entail state responsibility as such, except to the ex-
tent that some concomitant right of another State has been incidentally
infringed. This is because responsibility is concerned only with breaches
of duty. Nevertheless, as indicated in the previous Part, the essence of the
complaint expressed in Resolution 2006-1 appears to be that the conduct
of IWC members who persistently oppose the resumption of commercial
whaling is calculated, in one sense or another of that word, to undermine
or frustrate the object and purpose of the ICRW, and the decision in the
Nicaragua case does appear to confirm, notwithstanding the reservations
of the British and Japanese judges, that there is a general duty of the par-
ties to any given treaty not to engage in such conduct. 262 Although it was
perhaps surprising to see the duty in question characterized as one aris-
ing under customary international law rather than by virtue of the treaty
itself (one would have thought it was an implied obligation of every
treaty to avoid defeating its object and purpose), it is difficult to disagree
with the conclusion that such a duty may exist. Certainly, the arguments
advanced to the contrary do not ultimately appear convincing.
To elaborate, Judge Oda suggests that the concept of object and pur-
pose "is referred to several times in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, but only" in certain specified contexts, namely Articles
263
19 (reservations), 41 (modification), and 60 (material breach). In rela-
tion to the last of these contexts, he suggests that a material breach of a
treaty, according to Article 60(3)(b), consists in "the violation of a provi-
sion essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the
treaty" and concludes that conduct which tends to defeat the object and
purpose without amounting to a breach of a specific provision cannot
give rise to responsibility. With respect, however, this overlooks the ef-
fect of various other provisions, most notably Articles 18 and 60(3)(a).
The former establishes a specific duty "to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty" that a State has signed (unless
259. Id. art. 32; Alabama Claims Arbitration (U.S. v. U.K.), 1 Int. Arb. (Moore) 495, 656
(1871).
260. Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations case (Greece v. Turk.), 1925 P.C.I.J.
(ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 20).
261. ICRW, supra note 1, art. IX.
262. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
263. Id. at 239 (separate opinion of Judge Oda).
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and until it makes clear its intention not to become a party), or by which
it has expressed its consent to be bound, pending entry into force of the
treaty (and provided this is not unduly delayed).26 If such a duty can ex-
ist prior to the treaty as a whole becoming binding on the State
concerned, it is extremely difficult to understand why it should not re-
main effective once the treaty does become binding. It might perhaps be
argued that, at the moment when the treaty becomes binding on the party
in question, the specific duties that it establishes somehow supplant the
duty not to defeat the object and purpose, but it is surely more convinc-
ing to argue that these various duties simply co-exist. It would certainly
be an extraordinary consequence if the effect of a treaty becoming opera-
tive for a particular State were to nullify the most fundamental element
of its commitment to the entire regime.
The significance of Article 60(3)(a) for present purposes is that it
provides an alternative justification for termination of the treaty to that
mentioned by Judge Oda, specifically "a repudiation of the treaty," and it
is difficult to see why conduct calculated to defeat the very purpose of a
treaty should not be regarded as a repudiation . Consequently, the par-
ties that were able to substantiate the claim that they were the victims of
such conduct would in principle be entitled to suspend or terminate the
treaty, either for all parties or as against the defaulting States, although
under the Vienna Convention this would entail following the procedures
set out in Articles 65-68 to govern that eventuality. The existing juris-
prudence on this issue suggests that it is extremely difficult to persuade a
court or tribunal that such a right has accrued. The claim that a large
proportion, perhaps even a majority, of the parties to a multilateral treaty
has conspired to defeat its object and purpose may be so inherently im-
plausible as to beg a variety of questions, both factual and legal.
In practice, the power of withdrawal from the organization estab-
lished by Article XI of the ICRW offers an alternative course of action
for any IWC Member State that feels aggrieved. This power, however,
must now be read in light of such provisions as Article 65 of the Law of
the Sea Convention and Article 5 of the Biodiversity Convention. Much
more importantly, the break-up of the IWC would reflect so poorly on all
of the parties in a political sense and doubtless result in such severe re-
percussions from civil society, that every effort should now be made to
resolve the matter through negotiation. This will, in particular, require
that much closer and more serious attention be paid to the specific legal
aspects of the controversy than has ever been thought appropriate in the
past.
264. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 18, 60(3)(a).
265. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 14.
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3. Substantive Norms
Having considered the complex question of the adjectival norms
which must be taken into account in the process of normalization of the
ICRW, it is now necessary to turn to the question of substantive norms,
which is scarcely more straightforward. The activity of whaling falls at
the intersection of various substantive areas of legal regulation, of which
the prime examples are the law governing the conservation and sustain-
able use of biological diversity and the law of the sea. In both contexts,
moreover, it may be necessary to bear in mind certain broader principles
concerning man's relations with the natural world. Document 58/12 sug-
gests that principles governing the recognition and advancement of
cultural diversity and food security may also require consideration.266
a. Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity
Since whaling of any description inevitably impacts the conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity, it would seem inevitable that
regard would have to be paid to the major conventions that address such
issues, in particular, because they, in large part, post-date the Whaling
Convention. Therefore, in principle, they take priority over it in the event
of any clear incompatibility.267 Specifically, the Biodiversity Convention,
which has been accepted by virtually every member of the international
community, provides an overarching framework for the conservation
activities of the international community generally. Its relevance is ex-
268pressly acknowledged by Document 58/12.
In many cases, however, a clear intention has been manifested in
later treaties not to trespass into the domain of the IWC, but to leave the
question of whaling to be regulated under the ICRW. Article 6 of the
1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
sources, 269 for example, provides quite specifically that "nothing in this
Convention shall derogate from the rights and obligations of the Con-
tracting Parties under the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, 270 while Article 12(2) of the 1979 Bonn Convention on Migra-
266. IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
267. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 30.
268. IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
269. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources art. 6, May
20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476.
270. Id. Nevertheless, the benefits of reciprocal advancement of observer status by the
two organizations were recognized at an early stage. See, e.g., IWC, Resolution to Consider
the Implications for Whales of Management Regimes for Other Marine Resources, IWC Res.
1979-2 (1979), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/meetings/resolutions/IWCRES31_
1979.pdf.; see also IWC, Resolution on Cooperation and Coordination Between the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission and the Proposed Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic
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tory Species27' indicates more generally that the "provisions of this Con-
vention shall in no way affect the rights or obligations of any Party
deriving from any existing treaty, convention or agreement. 272
In other cases, however, the position is less clear cut. The Conven-
tion on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) 273 is
potentially relevant to the normalization process envisaged by Document
58/12. It establishes a regime for regulating trade in wildlife and wildlife
products based on the issue of permits and certificates, to be granted by
reference to criteria formulated with regard to the conservation status of
listed species. Crucially, Article I defines "trade" extremely widely, to
embrace "export, re-export, import, and introduction from the sea," the
last of which is itself defined as "transportation into a State of specimens
of any species which were taken in the marine environment not under the
jurisdiction of any State. 274 Essentially, therefore, virtually all move-
275ments across international boundaries are covered. In the case of the
endangered species listed in Appendix I, no such transactions are permit-
ted if the specimens are to be used "for primarily commercial
purposes, 276 but commercial trade is allowed, subject to bureaucratic
controls, for the less vulnerable Appendix II species.277
The question of CITES' relationship with other legal measures is ex-
pressly addressed in Article XIV. The second paragraph of this article
asserts that the
provisions of the present Convention shall in no way affect the
... obligations of Parties deriving from any treaty, convention,
or international agreement relating to other aspects of trade, tak-
ing or possession or transport of specimens which is in force or
Marine Living Resources, IWC Res. 1980-5 (1980), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/
meetings/resolutions/IWCRES32_1980.pdf.
271. Bonn Convention, supra note 205, art. 12(12).
272. Id. Nevertheless, the involvement of both conventions in cetacean conservation led
to the adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding between the two Secretariats in 2000. See
Memorandum of Understanding Between the Secretariat of the International Whaling Com-
mission and the Secretariat of the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of
Wild Animals (CMS), July 25, 2000, reprinted in CMS, Cooperation with Other Bodies,
UNEP/CMS/Conf.7.11, Annex 1 (Aug. 21, 2002), available at http://www.cms.int/
bodies/COP/cop7/list of.docs/pdf/en/CP7CF7 11 Cooperation.Other Bodies.pdf.
273. CITES, supra note 209; see also D.S. FAVRE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES (1989); SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1985);
WIJNSTEKERS, supra note 209; Joni E. Baker, A Substantive Theory of the Relative Efficiency
of Environmental Treaty Compliance: The Case of CITES, 2 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL' Y 1,
9 (1999); Peter H. Sand, Whither CITES?, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 29, 29 (1997).
274. See CITES, supra note 209, art. I.
275. See id. arts. VII, XV(3), XXIII(2) (discussing the exemptions and exclusions pro-
vided for in Articles VII, XV(3), and XXIH(2)).
276. Id. app. I.
277. Id. app. II.
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subsequently may enter into force for any Party including any
measure pertaining to the Customs, public health, veterinary or
plant quarantine fields.78
It is implausible, however, to suggest that the category envisaged
here includes the ICRW, because the latter does not concern any "other"
aspects of trade, etc., but the very aspects that CITES itself addresses,
specifically the introduction from the sea of specimens listed in the vari-
ous appendices. Accordingly, the more relevant provisions may be found
in the fourth and fifth paragraphs of Article XIV, which provide:
4. A State Party to the present Convention, which is also a Party
to any other treaty, convention, or international agreement which
is in force at the time of the coming into force of the present
Convention and under the provisions of which protection is af-
forded to marine species included in Appendix II, shall be
relieved of the obligations imposed on it under the provisions of
the present Convention with respect to trade in specimens of
species included in Appendix II that are taken by ships regis-
tered in that State and in accordance with the provisions of such
other treaty, convention, or international agreement.
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles III, IV, and V, any
export of a specimen taken in accordance with paragraph 4 of
this Article shall only require a certificate from a Management
Authority of the State of introduction to the effect that the
specimen was taken in accordance with the provisions of the
other treaty, convention, or international agreement in ques-
279
tion.
The meaning of these provisions, and especially the relationship be-
tween them, is not particularly easy to unravel. They are plainly
applicable, inter alia, to States engaged in whaling, and the aim of para-
graph four is clearly to exempt certain of their activities from the
purview of CITES entirely. The more difficult question is to identify
those exempted activities with precision. First, it should be noted that the
obligations excluded in relation to these marine species are those in re-
spect of "trade," which is defined to include, export, re-export, import, or
introduction from the sea. It therefore seems curious for paragraph five
to create a specific obligation regarding export, since that falls squarely
within the category of duties the effect of which has already been ex-
278. Id. art. XIV(2).
279. Id. art. XIV(4)-(5).
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cluded by the previous paragraph. ° Consequently, although the drafting
is scarcely ideal, paragraph five, as a matter of common sense, must be
interpreted as creating an exception to paragraph four, so as to avoid be-
ing deprived of all effect. 8 ' The key practical result appears to be that the
introduction from the sea of specimens of the marine species in question
is to be treated as exempt from CITES formalities, whereas any subse-
quent export of those specimens requires the certificate of lawful taking,
which serves in lieu of any other CITES documentation. More impor
tantly, however, this exemption is stated to apply only to CITES
Appendix II species, and not to Appendix I, to which all the usual bu-
reaucratic formalities must accordingly apply. Since almost all the
ICRW-protected great whale taxa are in fact listed in Appendix I, the
exemption is virtually without effect in this context.83 Uniquely, how-
ever, the West Greenland population of the minke whale is included in
Appendix II, and all takings from this stock, if in accordance with the
ICRW, therefore fall within the relaxed documentary regime described
above . CITES Resolution 11.4, a consolidating measure, aspects of
which derive from earlier resolutions agreed on since 1979, and which
was itself revised at the Twelfth Conference of Parties to CITES, rec-
ommends that the Parties pay particular attention to these documentary
requirements. In practice, however, the significance of all of these
measures is marginalized by the fact that various Parties, including the
major whaling nations, have formulated reservations with respect to
those cetacean species that they have any interests in explo . 28 6thoe taeanspeie t eyhav  terstsinexploiting . Under
280. Id. art. XIV(4) (noting that the party in question would be relieved of its obligations
under paragraph 5 along with all the other "obligations imposed on it under the provisions of
the present Convention").
281. This outcome can be achieved by combined application of the principle of effec-
tiveness and the maxim specialia generalibus derogant, but it would have been preferable for
paragraph 4 to have made this relationship explicit, by beginning "[s]ubject to the provisions
of the following paragraph..."). Id.
282. See WUNSTEKERS, supra note 209 (discussing a broadly similar effect, though
seemingly without regarding the issue as in any way problematic and noting further that the
reference in paragraph 5 to Articles III, IV, and V is, strictly speaking, incorrect, since it is
only Article IV which addresses species listed in Appendix H1).
283. In this sense, CITES reinforces the ICRW, since no commercial trade is permitted
under the former in respect of those cetacean species for which zero quotas have been estab-
lished by the latter. See LWC, Resolution on Cooperation between the IWC and CITES, IWC
Res. 1998-8 (1998); see also IWC, Resolution on Cooperation between the IWC and CITES,
IWC Res. 1999-6 (1999).
284. Plainly if other cetacean taxa were at any time transferred from Appendix I to Ap-
pendix II, they too would be brought within the scope of this regime.
285. CITES, supra note 209.
286. Viz., (where I, J, N, P, SVG indicate reservations formulated by Iceland, Japan,
Norway, Palau, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, respectively): Baird's beaked whale
(Berardius bairdii) (J); Northern bottlenose (Hyperodon ampullatus) (I); sperm whale
(Physeter catodon) (I, J, N, P); minke whale (Balaenoptera acutorostrata), except W.
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Article XXIII(3) of CITES, the effect of a reservation is that the State in
question is treated as not a party to the Convention at all, and therefore
exempt from any obligation, as far as the particular species in question
are concerned. 87 While the relationship between CITES and the ICRW is
therefore theoretically fairly complex, it is currently unlikely to have a
significant bearing in practice as far as the call for normalization is con-
cerned.
Of potentially much greater significance for present purposes
amongst conservation treaties of global application, however, is the 1992
Biodiversity Convention.2 8  Biological diversity is defined for the pur-
poses of the Convention as "the variability among living organisms from
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine, and other aquatic
ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are part: this
includes diversity within species, between species, and of ecosystems. 289
It goes without saying that whales, and indeed all cetaceans, repre-
sent manifestations of this diversity. The CBD was opened for signature
at the Rio Earth Summit, following several years of intensive negotia-
tions, and has attracted near-universal participation, with only the United
States and a handful of other nations choosing to remain outside of it. It
may, in certain respects, have reflected customary international law at
the time of its adoption, and is certainly likely to have served to crystal-
lize emerging customary rules in the subsequent decade and a half,
290
along the lines envisaged by the ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf
Cases.9 ' A number of its key provisions, indeed, would be likely to
Greenland population (I, J, N, P); Antarctic minke whale (B. bonaerensis) (I, J, N); sei whale
(B. borealis) (I and, with exclusion of certain populations, J, N); Bryde's whale (B. edeni) (J);
blue whale (B. musculus) (I); fin whale (B. physalus) (I, J, and, for certain populations, N);
humpback (Megaptera novaeangliae) (I, SVG). Japan also maintains a reservation regarding
the Irawaddy dolphin (Orcaella brevirostris). No reservations appear to have been formulated
regarding other CITES Appendix I-listed cetaceans, such as the Grey whale (Eschrichtius
robustus), bowhead (Baleana mysticetus), right whales (Eubalaena spp.), and pygmy right
whale (Caparea marginata).
287. CITES, supra note 209, art. XXII(3).
288. CBD, supra note 120; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (Michael J. Bowman & Catherine J. Redgwell eds., 1996); FIONA
MCCONNELL, THE BIODIVERSITY CONVENTION: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (Kluwer Law Int'l
1996); TIMOTHY SWANSON, GLOBAL ACTION FOR BIODIVERSITY: AN INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (1997); Fran-
qoise Burhenne-Guilmin & Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, The New Law of Biodiversity, 3 Y.B.
INT'L ENVTL. L. 43 (1992); Lyle Glowka et al., A Guide to the Convention on Biological Di-
versity IUCN Envtl. L. & Pol'y Paper No. 30, 1994; Cyrille de Klemm & Clare Shine,
Biological Diversity Conservation and the Law IUCN Envtl. L. & Pol'y Paper No. 29, 1993.
289. CBD, supra note 120.
290. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 636-38 (Patricia W. Birnie &
Alan E. Boyle eds., 2d ed. 2002) (advancing a relatively cautious view on this question).
291. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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receive the endorsement even of States which have remained outside the
system.
The CBD recognizes a wide range of values in biological diversity
and treats its conservation as a matter of common concern for all man-
292
kind, emphasizing the merits of the precautionary approach. Although
Document 58/12 refers to its emphasis on sustainable utilization, the
CBD's fundamental objectives are in reality three-fold, namely the con-
servation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components,
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utili-
zation of genetic resources.2 93 The obligations imposed on States under
the CBD apply not merely to areas within their national jurisdiction but
also to those beyond, at least in the case of activities carried out under
their jurisdiction or control, a provision which is plainly applicable in
principle to whaling wherever it is conducted.9 In such cases, the parties
are to cooperate directly or through competent international organiza-
tions in order to ensure conservation and sustainable use, 29' a provision
of obvious relevance to the IWC.
A preliminary responsibility is to identify components of biodiver-
sity the conservation and sustainable use of which are judged to be
especially important in light of criteria spelled out in Annex I, as well as
processes and activities likely to have an adverse effect on these objec-
tives.296 There can be no doubt that whales satisfy a number of the
specified criteria, being not only of "economic value," but also of "so-
cial, scientific, or cultural importance." Furthermore, whales may have a
possible significance for purposes of biodiversity research. In addition, a
number of the larger cetacean species are currently classified as "threat-
ened" Lastly, whaling activities are plainly capable of producing
"significant adverse impacts" on conservation, in the absence of the kind
of regulation and management measures envisaged by Article 8(1) .297
This obligation sits alongside various more general duties regarding in
situ conservation that are spelled out in other paragraphs of Article 8 and
may be of relevance in the present context. A wide range of supporting
measures are established under various provisions of the Convention. As
in the case of other conservation treaties, this primary level of regulation
is complemented by a vast body of principles, recommendations, and
guidelines formulated over the years by the Conference of the Parties.
292. The preamble is extremely extensive, and these represent just some of the funda-
mental principles noted.
293. CBD, supra note 120, art. 1.
294. Id. art. 4.
295. Id. art. 5.
296. See id. arts. 7(a), 7(c).
297. Id. art. 8(1).
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It is therefore clear that the Biodiversity Convention impinges di-
rectly on the activities addressed by the ICRW, although it is not its
intention simply to replace earlier treaties of this kind. Rather, Article
22(1) of the CBD disclaims any intention to affect the rights and obliga-
tions deriving from existing agreements except where their exercise
would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity. The risk
of such a conflict may not always be easy to estimate with certainty, and
this provision has therefore been interpreted under other treaty regimes
to require a collaborative approach with CBD organs in order to avert or
remove any fundamental disharmony of policy with the regime it estab-• 298
lishes. At the Eighth Meeting of the CBD Conference of Parties in
2006, Decision VIII/16 urged CBD Parties to "facilitate cooperation
among international organizations, and to promote the integration of
biodiversity concerns into all relevant sectors by co-ordinating their na-
tional positions among the various conventions and other international
forums in which they are involved, as appropriate." Since the vast major-
ity of IWC members are also parties to the CBD, it will plainly be
necessary, as part of the normalization process, to give careful considera-
tion to the compatibility of approaches under the two conventions. Of
particular significance for this purpose are the CBD's Addis Ababa Prin-
ciples and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, adopted at
the Seventh Conference of Parties in 2004.299 In addition, it will also have
to be borne in mind that Article 22(2) requires CBD parties to implement
the CBD consistently with the rights and obligations of States under the
law of the sea wherever the marine environment is concerned.
298. This process is pursued in a variety of ways, including participation in the Liaison
Group of the biodiversity-related conventions, established pursuant to CBD Decision VII/26.
For the report of its most recent meeting, see Liaison Group of the Biodiversity-related Con-
ventions, Bonn, F.R.G., May 31, 2008, Report of Sixth Meeting, available at http://
www.cbd.int/cooperation/BLG-6-rep-final-en.doc. Furthermore, cooperative work programs
have been agreed in some cases. See, e.g., CMS, Cooperation with Other Bodies: CBD/CMS
Joint Work Programme (2002-2005), UNEP/CMS/Inf.7.13 (July 31, 2002). Finally, particular
CBD measures, such as the Addis Ababa Guidelines on Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, have
been adopted by the organs of other treaties. See infra text accompanying notes 718-728; see,
e.g., Sustainable Use of Biodiversity: Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines, CITES Res.
Conf. 13.2 (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/13/13-02RI4.shtml; Coop-
eration and Synergy with the Convention on Biological Diversity, CITES Res. Conf. 10.4,
13.2 (June 1997), available at http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/ 10/ElO-04R14.pdf.
299. SECRETARIAT OF THE CBD, CBD GUIDELINES: ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE SUSTAINABLE USE OF BIODIVERSITY (2004), available at http://www.
cbd.int/doc/publications/addis-gdl-en.pdf [hereinafter ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDE-
LINES]. Note also the Elaborated Programme of Work on Marine and Coastal Biological
Diversity, which states that the overall vision is "to halt the loss of marine and coastal biodi-
versity nationally, regionally and globally and secure its capacity to provide goods and
services" Elaborated Programme of Work on Marine and Coastal Biological Diversity, Annex
I to Decision V11/5. The Goal of Programme Element 2 is to ensure the conservation and sus-
tainable use of marine and coastal living resources.
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It will therefore be necessary shortly to turn to the question of the
law of the sea, but before doing so, it should be noted that it is not only
conservation treaties of global application that are relevant to the nor-
malization process. It is also necessary in principle to consider the
implications of regional treaties that may have a bearing on these issues,
particularly because they have in some cases evolved so as to represent
instances of local application of the Biodiversity Convention itself. In
practice, however, the majority of these are likely to have little signifi-
cant impact. The 1940 Organization of American States (OAS)
Convention Respecting Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation
predates the ICRW, and, therefore, obviously cannot prevail over it by
reference to any lex posterior principle, although it may conceivably
bear some relevance to its interpretation, a question which will be ex-
plored in subsequent Parts. The 1985 Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources (Nature Conservation Convention)'O has never entered into
force, while the lists of protected species under the 1968 Algiers Con-
vention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources3 2 do not
seem to include any cetaceans; this agreement is in any event in the
process of being phased out by the 2003 Revised Convention of
Maputo,' 3 which contains a savings clause for all existing agreements.
3°4
The whaling issue is not directly addressed in the 1976 Apia Convention
on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific,05 the operation of which
has, in any event, recently been formally suspended until further no-
tice. 36 Noteworthy, however, is the high level of commitment in that
300. Convention between the United States of America and Other American Republics
Respecting Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12,
1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 229 [hereinafter Western Hemisphere Convention].
301. Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, July 9, 1985, 15
E.P.L. 64.
302. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Sept. 15,
1968, 1976 U.N.T.S. 4.
303. See IUCN-THE WORLD CONSERVATION UNION, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AFRI-
CAN CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES (Mohamed
Ali Mekouar & Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin eds., IUCN Envtl. Pol'y & L. Paper No. 56,
2004).
304. Id. at 51.
305. Apia Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific, June 12, 1976, 20
IPE. 10, 359. Note that, despite its title, the 1986 Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region (SPREP), is essentially a regional
seas pollution agreement. However, like others of its kind, it does provide for protected areas.
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific
Region, Nov. 25, 1986, 26 I.L.M. 38.
306. Pacific Regional Environment Programme: Regional Conventions, http://
www.sprep.org/legal/regional.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2008) (noting suspension of the Con-
vention at the Eighth Meeting of the Parties in 2006).
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region to the protection of whales, particularly through the creation of
sanctuaries. Building on work previously undertaken under the aegis of
the South Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP), °7 a 2006
Memorandum of Understanding concerning the Conservation of Cetace-
ans and their Habitats in the Pacific Islands Region 30 8 was concluded in
accordance with Article IV(4) of the Bonn Convention. 309 It took effect
on September 15 of that year, and, by the time of writing one year later,
it had attracted as signatories some thirteen States of the region and a
number of key international NGOs.3l0 The Memorandum, which is not
legally binding, is supported by an Action Plan, which is of an essen-
tially programmatic, rather than normative, character. It may nonetheless
have an impact on the attitudes adopted by States of the region in rela-
tion to their implementation of the ICRW. It will doubtless be the
responsibility of these States and those of other regions to ensure that
they draw the attention of the IWC to any treaty that the States consider
to be pertinent to the normalization process.
One regional arrangement which must certainly be considered rele-
vant, however, is the 1979 Berne Convention on the Conservation of
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, which recognizes that "wild
flora and fauna constitute a natural heritage of aesthetic, scientific, cul-
tural, recreational, economic, and intrinsic value that needs to be
preserved and handed on to future generations."3 ' With that in mind, Ar-
ticle 2 requires the Parties to take appropriate measures to maintain
wildlife populations at, or adapt them to, levels which correspond to eco-
logical, scientific, and cultural requirements, while taking account of
economic and recreational requirements. It is widely accepted that this
accords general priority to conservation over economic considerations.3 2
More specifically, Article 6 requires them to prohibit particular conduct,
including "all forms of deliberate capture and keeping and deliberate
307. Pacific Island Countries Sign New Agreement to Conserve Whales and
Dolphins and Their Habitats (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www.sprep.org/article/news-
detail.asp?id=312.
308. See Information Paper from the Government of Australia to the Conservation
Committee (May 2007), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/documents/commission/
IWC59docs/59-CC5.pdf (providing an overview of the Memorandum of Understanding).
309. Bonn Convention, supra note 205, at 2-3.
310. Notably, the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), the Whale & Dolphin
Conservation Society, and WWF International.
311. Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Sept.
19, 1979, Europ. T.S. No. 104 available at http:l/conventions.coe.intlTreaty/FR/Treatiesl
Html/104-3.htm [hereinafter Berne Convention].
312. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, THE EXPLANATORY REPORT CONCERNING THE
CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF EUROPEAN WILDLIFE AND NATURAL HABITATS
(1979); LYSTER, supra note 273, at 131-32.
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killing" in relation to those species listed in Appendix I. 33 This Appen-
dix includes a large number of cetacean species, '1 4 including the blue,
fin, humpback, bowhead, Bryde's, and North Atlantic right whales, as
well as the minke and sei whale when they are in the Mediterranean.3 5
There is no savings clause in respect of the exercise of rights or obliga-
tions under the ICRW (or any other treaty) and this article is therefore a
highly significant provision in the present context. The implications of
the Berne Convention will therefore demand closer attention in the Parts
that follow.
b. The Law of the Sea
The law of the sea is, of course, relevant to the activity of whaling in
all its aspects, although the majority of these are unlikely to give rise to
particular controversy in relation to the specific question of normalizing
the ICRW. The principles clearly relevant to that particular issue are
those concerning the exploitation of marine living resources, which are
set out in general terms in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention.36 The
Convention has attracted the support of over 150 members of the interna-
tional community,37 and much of its content can by now be taken to be
reflective of customary international law.3 8 Consequently, the rules it
establishes can prima facie be taken to be applicable to IWC members,
unless they are able to show that they have somehow exempted them-
selves from their scope.3 9 The Law of the Sea Convention contains rules
concerning the exploitation and the conservation of resources both in the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and on the high seas, and these are of
clear potential relevance to the present controversy.
In many cases, particular fisheries are the subject of regulation by
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations that have been created
313. Berne Convention, supra note 311.
314. All cetaceans not listed here are included in Appendix III, which permits regulated
exploitation. Id. app. HI.
315. The Berne Convention does not exclude the listing of sub-species or populations,
though this is generally discouraged. The designation "for the Mediterranean" appears to
reflect a different technique of protection, however, effectively creating a sanctuary area for
certain species, rather than protecting a particular stock wherever it may roam. See id.
316. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act arts. 61-73,
116-20, Nov. 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261; see also Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 88.
317. See Chronological Lists of Ratifications, Accessions, and Successions, http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/referencefiles/chronological-lists of ratifications.htm#The%2OUnite
d%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%2OLaw%20of%2Othe%2OSea (last visited Aug.
24, 2008).
318. See, for example, the views of the iCJ on this point in the Gulf of Maine Case,
which was decided well before the Convention had even entered into force. Delimitation of
Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246, 294 (Oct. 12).
319. For Law of the Sea Convention parties themselves, the opportunities are strictly
limited by Article 309. See UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 309.
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pursuant to specific international agreements.3 20 Document 58/12 calls
for the harmonization of decision-making policy in the IWC with such
instruments, ostensibly on the grounds that "whales should be treated as
any other marine living resources available for harvesting subject to con-
servation and science-based management. 321 This assertion, however,
manifestly begs the question of the relevance of these agreements, which
is by no means immediately apparent. Insofar as many of these instru-
ments apply only to specified fisheries, there would appear to be no
substantive functional overlap with the ICRW; accordingly, they are not
to be regarded as "treaties relating to the same subject-matter" within the
meaning of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention. Where there is the theo-
retical possibility of such overlap, this will normally have been resolved
(as in the case of CCAMLR discussed above) by the insertion of a dedi-
cated provision in the treaty in question, which in all probability will
accord primacy to the ICRW. Equally, there is no practical likelihood of
any formal legal relationship between the ICRW and treaties of the kind
specified in Article 31(2) or 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention.322 Fur-
ther, since most of them post-date the conclusion of the ICRW, they
cannot even be regarded as part of the circumstances under which the
latter was concluded, as envisaged by Article 32.
It may, of course, be the case that in many countries the same gov-
ernment agency is responsible for the administration of these Regional
Fisheries Management Organizations as for the ICRW, and that it would
therefore be convenient for them if a uniform approach were to be
adopted in relation to their interpretation and application. However, this
is plainly not a consideration of any legal significance-indeed, the pos-
sibility cannot be excluded that such a consideration might actually tend
to exert a distorting influence on the proper interpretation of the ICRW,
thereby contributing to the generation and exacerbation of the conflicts
that have arisen in its application. What can be accepted, however, is
that, since these conventions may have to operate in the same physical,
ecological, and organizational milieu as the ICRW, there is a genuine
possibility that the application of the latter might in some practical sense
impact on that of the former: it has been claimed, for example, that the
moratorium on commercial whaling has produced adverse effects on fish
320. See PHILLIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 584-
87 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (1995); see also DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL FISH-
ERIES LAW (E. Hey ed., 1999) (providing a more detailed discussion); GOVERNING HIGH SEAS
FISHERIES (0. Stokke ed., 2001); S. KAYE, INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT (2000).
321. IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
322. That is, they constitute neither "agreements relating to" the ICRW made "between
all its parties" and "in connection with its conclusion," nor "subsequent agreements between
the parties regarding its interpretation or application." See Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 31(2), 31(3)(a).
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stocks, thereby possibly undermining the conservation endeavors of
other organizations and treaty regimes. Without passing judgment at pre-
sent on the validity of such claims, it should be conceded that such
considerations might conceivably justify treating these fisheries agree-
ments as the source of "relevant rules of international law applicable in
the relations between the parties" to the ICRW, or some of them, and
therefore as materials to be "taken into account" in accordance with Ar-
ticle 31(3)(c).323 These issues will accordingly be reserved for
exploration in the Parts that follow.
c. Respect for Cultural Diversity
Alongside the CBD, the one other instrument to which express ref-
erence is made in Document 58/12 is the U.N. Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Universal Declaration on Cul-
tural Diversity.3 24 Adopted in 2001, the Declaration affirms that "respect
for the diversity of cultures, tolerance, dialogue, and cooperation, in a
climate of mutual trust and understanding are among the best guarantees
of international peace and security."3 25 Article 4 declares that "the de-
fense of cultural diversity is an ethical imperative, inseparable from
respect for human dignity.' 326 Culture is defined for this purpose as "the
set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features
of society or a social group," and "encompasses, in addition to art and
literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions,
and beliefs. 327 Insofar as it might be claimed that the pursuit of whaling
is a cultural tradition of certain communities, forming part of their life-
style and value system, it is arguable that the 2001 Declaration could
have some bearing on the debate regarding future implementation of the
ICRW, and that it therefore merits consideration as part of the normaliza-
tion process. Although it is not a legally binding instrument, that does
not, of course, rob it of legal significance entirely: the Director-General
of UNESCO has suggested that it lays down "not instructions but gen-
eral guidelines," '328 and therefore a case might be made for its having
soft-law status. Even that may risk overstating its effect, however, since
many of its provisions are not really expressed in normative terms at all,
323. ICRW, supra note 1, art. XXXI(3)(c).
324. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 28, pmbl.
325. Id. (seventh recital).
326. Id. art. 4.
327. Id. (fifth recital). This definition is said to be in line with the conclusions of the
World Conference on Cultural Policies (MONDIACULT, Mexico City, 1982), the World
Commission on Culture and Development (Our Creative Diversity, 1995), and the Intergov-
ernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm, 1998).
328. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 28 (introduc-
tion).
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being purely descriptive, argumentative, or aspirational.32 9 Article 2, for
example, reads:
In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure
harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural,
varied, and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willing-
ness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation
of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of
civil society and peace. Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives
policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity. Indissocia-
ble from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is
conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative
capacities that sustain public life."330
Even where particular provisions flirt with normativity, it is usually
of a very loosely expressed and open-ended kind-thus, "care should be
exercised so that all cultures can express themselves and make them-
selves known. 331
It might therefore appear surprising that the normalization docu-
ments make no reference to the later instruments through which
UNESCO has endeavored to invest certain of the principles and aspira-
tions contained in the Declaration with concrete and binding legal
significance, namely the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the
Intangible Cultural Heritage 3 and the 2005 Convention on the Protec-
tion and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.333 These
agreements complement, and in some respects parallel, the 1972 World
Heritage Convention,3 in that each establishes an international fund for
supporting cultural projects and advancing cultural diversity in particular
respects, while the former incorporates a Representative List of the In-
tangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity, as well as a further list of
elements of that heritage which are in urgent need of safeguarding. De-
spite their recent adoption, these treaties have rapidly secured a sufficient
329. Id. art. 2.
330. Id.
331. Id. art. 6.
332. UNESCO, Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage,
UNESCO Doe. MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14 (Oct. 17, 2003), available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf.
333. UNESCO, Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural
Expressions, Oct. 20, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 73, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/
001429/142919 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention].
334. UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Na-
tional Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1358, available at http://whc.unesco.org/archive/
convention-en.pdf.
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level of governmental support to bring about their entry into force, the
former on April 20, 2006, and the latter on March 18, 2007."'5
Although the center of gravity of these instruments is rather far re-
moved from the preservation of traditional practices of hunting and
resource exploitation, the key concepts involved have a decidedly open
texture, raising the question of their possible relevance for present pur-
poses. The 2003 Convention defines the intangible cultural heritage in
terms of "practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills"-
together with associated instruments, objects, artifacts and cultural
spaces-that communities, groups, and individuals recognize as part of
their cultural heritage. 36 In contrast, the 2005 Convention embraces the
many manifestations of human creativity expressed through sound, im-
ages, activities, or artifacts and transmitted through books, television
programs, music, live performances, and other forms of cultural activi-
ties, goods and services.337 Perhaps the former is more likely to be on
point. Although its principal focus is on the preservation of traditional
manifestations of the performance arts (i.e., song, dance, theatre, etc.),
338
Article 2(2) confirms that "social practices," "knowledge and practices
concerning nature," and "traditional craftsmanship" are also included,
and it is therefore at least arguable that customary methods of resource
exploitation might be subsumed within it. In any event, the specific do-
mains referred to in the text are indicative rather than exhaustive, and it
has been expressly contemplated that they might be expanded to include,
for example, traditions of animal husbandry.339 Indeed, such matters al-
ready form component parts of certain traditions that have been included
in the Proclamation of Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage
of Humanity,340 which is to represent the permanent centerpiece of the
335. As of this writing, the 2003 Convention boasts 100 parties and the 2005 Convention
eighty-nine (including the European Community). UNESCO 2003 Convention Signatories,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=17116&language=E (last visited Aug. 24,
2008); UNESCO 2005 Convention Signatories, http://portal.unesco.org/1a/convention.asp?
KO=31038&language=E (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
336. Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, supra note
332, art. 2(1).
337. See UNESCO, Diversity of Cultural Expressions, http://portal.unesco.org/culture/
en/ev.php-URL ID=33014&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URL_ SECTION=201.html (last visited
Aug. 24, 2008).
338. All the Japanese entries in the Proclamation, for example, are of this kind (i.e.,
Kabuki, Bunraku Puppet Theatre, and Nogaku Theatre). UNESCO, Masterpieces of the Oral
and Intangible Heritage of Humanity, http://www.unesco.org/culture/en/masterpieces/ (follow
"List of the 90 Masterpieces" hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
339. UNESCO, Intangible Heritage Domains in the 2003 Convention, http://
www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?pg--00052 (last visited Aug. 24, 2008).
340. The Proclamation was launched in 1997, independently of any plans for the adop-
tion of a convention, but has subsequently been brought within its remit. It contains ninety
entries from 107 countries (many of the traditions it recognizes are transnational), compiled in
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Representative List which the Convention establishes; for example, the
"[c]ultural Space of the Bedu in Petra and Wadi Rum" embraces tradi-
tions relating to knowledge of wildlife, traditional medicine, camel
husbandry, and tent-making craftsmanship amongst the semi-nomadic
pastoral communities of southern Jordan.
On the other hand, the substantive provisions of these agreements
suggest that, however widely their operational scope might ultimately be
drawn, they are unlikely to play a significant part in the current debate.
The principal obligations of the 2003 instrument apply essentially at the
national level, requiring parties to identify and safeguard the intangible
heritage constituted within their own territory, and to endeavor to adopt
general policies and measures designed to secure its promotion, preser-
vation, and appreciation.341 The role of other parties is restricted to
general duties of cooperation and the establishment of mechanisms of
342assistance, especially through the institutions that the UNESCO Con1 43
vention establishes. Most importantly, Article 3(b) provides that
nothing in the Convention is to be interpreted as "affecting the rights and
obligations of State Parties deriving from any international instrument
relating to ... the use of biological and ecological resources to which
they are parties," thereby indicating the intention of the parties to yield
primacy to such instruments over considerations of cultural diversity.3"
Very much the same message can be taken from regional treaties ad-
dressing the question of cultural diversity, such as the 2005 Council of
Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage forSociey (Famewrk " • ,45
Society (Framework Convention). Although the provenance and over-
three phases between 2001 and 2005, and closed on the entry into force of the Convention.
The Masterpieces may be incorporated within the Convention's Representative List in accor-
dance with Article 31; currently around half of them are associated within the territories of
contracting parties. UNESCO, Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity,
supra note 338.
341. See Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, supra note
332, arts. 11-15.
342. Id. arts. 19-24.
343. Id. arts. 4-10.
344. The 2005 Convention makes complex provision for its relationship to other treaties
in Articles 20 and 21, entailing the obligation to promote the Convention's objectives in other
fora, foster mutual supportiveness between instruments, and "take into account" relevant pro-
visions in the interpretation of other treaties; it does, however, disclaim any intention to
modify the parties' rights or obligations under other treaties. See Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, supra note 333.
345. Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for
Society, Dec. 27, 2005, Council Europ. T.S. No. 199, available at http://
conventions.coe.intfrreaty/EN/Reports/Html/199.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2008) [hereinafter
Framework Convention]; see also id. (Explanatory Report). The Convention is unlikely to be
in force for some time. In any event, it will not be directly applicable to the majority of IWC
members; it is discussed only with respect to the light it may cast on the legal protection of
cultural diversity generally. Id.
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all focus of this treaty is substantially different from that of the
UNESCO instruments,346 the Framework Convention does clearly record
the Parties' recognition that "rights relating to cultural heritage are in-
herent in the right to participate in cultural life" and that "everyone,
alone or collectively, has the responsibility to respect the cultural heri-
tage of others, as much as their own heritage.'3 47 Yet, once again, these
principles are heavily qualified. Articles 4(c) and 6 both allow for the
subordination of the exercise of the right to cultural heritage to the pro-
tection of the public interest and/or the rights and freedoms of others.348
Article 6 further provides that nothing in the Framework Convention
should in any event be interpreted as creating enforceable rights.349 Under
Article 7, finally, the Parties undertake, inter alia, to encourage reflec-
tion on ethical issues relating to the cultural heritage, as well as respect
for diversity of interpretations, and to establish processes for conciliation
to deal equitably with situations in which contradictory values are exhib-
ited by different communities. 350 This suggests that even in geopolitical
regions where notions of cultural heritage are taken seriously, there is
little sign of a move toward the recognition of enforceable rights in that
regard, or to give traditional practices automatic priority over other con-
siderations.
In light of these considerations, it would seem that the various in-
struments concerning cultural diversity can have at best a marginal
impact on the normalization debate. Nevertheless, since it might be
claimed that, even after the adoption of the treaties mentioned, the 2001
Declaration retains some residual significance over the entire field, it
will be appropriate to address that possibility in the Parts that follow.
At the same time, it is conceivable that a stronger source of support
for the recognition within the IWC of the importance of preserving cul-
tural traditions may be found in the suite of earlier treaties designed to
give direct and concrete effect to the principles originally articulated in
the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, because these are
more obviously dedicated to the recognition of enforceable rights and
the demarcation of acceptable limitations thereto. Foremost amongst
these are the two U.N. International Covenants of 1966, together with
their various regional counterparts.3 1 It is not suggested that the deci-
sion-making processes of the IWC are likely to engage the liability of
346. ld. § B.
347. Id. arts. 1(a), 4(b).
348. Id. arts. 4(c), 6.
349. Id. art. 6.
350. Id.
351. See generally BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Ian Brownlie & Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill eds., 4th ed. 2002).
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States under these Covenants directly, but simply that it would be prefer-
able that the policy outcomes avoid any consequence that might be
discordant with their provisions or otherwise contrary to their spirit. In
order for this possibility to be meaningful, it must first, of course, be
demonstrated that the notion of cultural diversity represents an objective
of these instruments, or can somehow be grafted on to them. The princi-
ple referred to above from the 2001 Declaration regarding participation
in cultural life, for example, seemingly has its origins in Article 15(1)(a)
of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights,352 while Article 15(2) establishes that the steps to be taken by the
Parties to achieve realization of this right of participation "shall include
those necessary for the conservation of ... culture." '353 On the other hand,
questions of failure to conserve culture and exclusion from participation
are inevitably relative in character, and provision is in any event made
for the possible limitation of all such rights "for the purpose of promot-
ing the general welfare in a democratic society."354 This simply takes us
back to the general substantive debate about the pros and cons of com-
mercial whaling, while at the same time failing to offer concrete
guidance on its resolution. A key point here is that the programmatic na-
ture of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights envisages only a process of gradual progression toward achieve-
ment of the rights incorporated,355 the majority of which are not viewed
as "self-executing" ' 56 while the mechanisms for implementation are not
such as to generate the kind of case law from which specific guidance
can readily be gained.351
Of greater potential assistance, therefore, are those treaties that do
tend to generate such jurisprudence, namely those for the protection of
civil and political rights, at least insofar as they are capable of bearing
on issues regarding the conservation of, and participation in, cultural
traditions. Despite the broad distinctions recognized in the drafting of
352. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3. This provision in turn derives ultimately from Article 27 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 127, art.
27.
353. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 352,
art. 15(2).
354. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 28, art. 4.
355. See Comm. on Econ., Soc., & Cultural Rts. [CESCRI, General Comment No. 3,
Dec. 14, 1990, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+
comment+3.En?OpenDocument.
356. According to the CESCR, possible exceptions include Articles 3, 7(a)(i), 8, 10(3),
13(2)(a), 13(3), 13(4), and 15(3), but no reference is made to Article 15(1)-(2). Id. T 5.
357. Implementation takes the form of a general reporting system, overseen since 1987
by the CESCR, acting on behalf of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 352, arts. 16-22.
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the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the one hand,
and the International Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
on the other, it is clear that no watertight division between the two cate-
gories of rights can be maintained. Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights does indeed refer expressly to the entitlement of cer-
tain persons "to enjoy their own culture.""' What is more, the Human
Rights Committee charged with enforcing the Covenant has specifically
observed that "culture manifests itself in many forms, including a par-
ticular way of life associated with the use of land resources" and that
"that right may include such traditional activities as fishing and hunt-
ing."359 While this appears to be more promising in terms of its specific
relevance to the issue in hand, it must be noted that this particular right is
not one of those guaranteed to "everyone" or to "all persons," but rather
only to persons belonging to "ethnic, religious, or linguistic minori-
ties."36 Although there still seems to be no universally agreed-upon
361definition of what constitutes a minority for this purpose, the general
idea is clear enough, with indigenous peoples representing perhaps the
most clear and prominent-though by no means the only-example.
Indeed, there is now a substantial body of international law devoted to
the protection of minorities in general,362 and indigenous peoples in par-
ticular.3 63 Under the ICRW, the position of indigenous peoples is
358. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 130.
359. U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/2 1/Rev. l/Add.5 (1994).
360. See generally Working Group on Minorities, Sub-Comm. on Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Final Text of the Commentary
to the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and
Linguistic Minorities, 33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2 (Apr. 2, 2001) [hereinafter
ECOSOC Declaration of Minority Rights]; CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 35, at 725-29 (offering commentary and examples of relevant cases).
361. See generally Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion & Prot. of Minorities, ECOSOC, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic,
Religious and Linguistic Minorities, 568, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev. 1/1979 (1979)
(defining the term "minority"); CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note
35, at 725; JOSHUA CASTELLINO & DEIRDRE O'LEARY, MINORITY-RIGHTS.ORG, SOME DEFINI-
TIONS OF "MINORITIES" (2003), available at http://minority-rights.org/docs/mn_defs.htm.
362. See generally Framework Convention for the Proection [sic] of National Minorities
and Explanatory Report, opened for signature Feb. I, 1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157; ECOSOC
Declaration of Minority Rights, supra note 360; JAVAID REHMAN, THE WEAKNESS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS (Kluwer Law Int'l 2000) (2000); PATRICK
THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MINORITIES (1991); Gudmundur Alfredsson & Al-
fred de Zayas, Minority Rights: Protection by the United Nations, 14 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1993);
Nigel S. Rodley, Conceptual Problems in the Protection of Minorities: International Legal
Developments, 17 HuM. RTS. Q. 48 (1995).
363. See generally United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007); Int'l Labor Org. [ILO],
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382; ILO, Indigenous
and Tribal Populations Convention, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247; S. JAMES ANAYA,
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specifically safeguarded through the special arrangements governing
aboriginal whaling, and it is unclear that there is any possible basis on
which the Japanese coastal communities that engage in whaling can be
considered a "minority" within the generally agreed understanding of the
term. In any event, the Japanese authorities would seem themselves to
have excluded any such possibility through their repeated insistence that
whaling represents a cultural tradition of the Japanese people as a
whole. 6 Consequently, the norms governing the protection of minorities
seem to have no role to play in this context.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to envisage that the denial to coastal
communities of the opportunity to engage in whaling activities might be
considered incidentally to involve the breach of one or other of the estab-
lished civil or political rights to which all individuals are entitled, such
as the rights to freedom of association, freedom of thought or con-
science, respect for privacy or private life, or peaceful enjoyment of
possessions. Under the European Convention, for example, it has been
held that (i) the construction of a hydro-electric power station within
lands traditionally occupied by nomadic people, whose culture and life-
style were dependent on the maintenance of open space, and
(ii) measures affecting the stationing of caravans, in relation to persons
of itinerant lifestyle, both raised potential issues under such provisions.365
As it happens, the claimant in each case was a member of a recognized
minority,3 66 but it is unlikely that this is a necessary condition of such a
claim. More recently, a national court declined to exclude in limine a
similar claim by individuals who had no such affiliation, but were
merely members of the fox hunting community in the United Kingdom,
and were complaining of the prohibition of this activity by the Hunting
Act of 2004.367 The claim was thought to justify consideration on the
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996); JUSTICE PENDING: INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES AND OTHER GOOD CAUSES (Gudmundur Alfredsson & Maria Stavropoulou eds.,
2002); THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES (James Crawford ed., 1988); Elisa Stamatopoulou, Indigenous
Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights as a Developing Dynamic 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 58
(1994).
364. See, e.g., Government of Japan, Background Paper for Japan's Small-Type Coastal
Whaling, IWC/60/9 (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/
commission/iwc60docs/60-9.pdf; see also Embassy of Japan in South Africa, The Japanese
Government's Position on Whaling, http://www.za.emb-japan.go.jp/topics/topics
whaling.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2008); Media Release, Japan Whaling Ass'n, The History
and Science of Whales (June 2004), available at http://www.whaling.jp/english/release/
040909.html.
365. See Chapman v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2001); G. and E. v. Nor-
way, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 30 (1983).
366. The Lapps in G. and E. and the Roma in Chapman were recognized minorities. See
supra note 365.
367. See R. (Countryside Alliance) v. Attorney Gen. [2006] EWCA (Civ) 817, [2007]
Q.B. 305 (Ct. App. (Crim)) (Eng.).
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merits at least in the case of those for whom hunting was central to their
personal lifestyle. Consequently, a similar argument might be applicable
by analogy to the Japanese whaling communities on the basis of general
principles of human rights law. The application of such principles will
therefore be considered in Part IV.
d. Food Security
It is arguable that human rights principles may impact on the nor-
malization debate not only from the point of view of the maintenance of
cultural diversity, but also with regard to the protection and advancement
of food security. The relevance of human rights law to food issues cer-
tainly cannot be doubted, since Article 11 of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, echoing Article 25 of the
Universal Declaration, proclaims the right of everyone to "an adequate
standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,
clothing, housing." The following paragraph requires the parties, in rec-
ognition of "the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger,"
to take the measures necessary "to improve methods of production, con-
servation and distribution of food," referring also to "the most efficient
,,311development and utilization of natural resources. In extreme cases,
denial of access to food may also entail infringement of civil and politi-
cal rights, and even the right to life itself. The moratorium on
commercial whaling has undoubtedly impacted on the availability of
whalemeat, which is still valued as a food source in certain communities,
while it has also been claimed that the resulting increase in whale popu-
lations has served to deplete fisheries resources which might otherwise
have been available for human consumption. The global interest in food
security is certainly a sufficient justification for examining the whaling
issue from that perspective.
e. Other Relevant Norms
The potential relevance of norms governing the conservation and
sustainable use of living resources, the law of the sea, respect for cultural
diversity, and the protection of food security, all of which have been spe-
cifically referred to and recognized in Document 58/12, is amply
established. Since many of the relevant principles have emerged and
evolved during the postwar period, subsequent to the adoption of the
ICRW, it will be appropriate to consider them in Part IV, as part of the
examination of contemporary perspectives on the implementation of the
368. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 352,
art. 11. This point is made with specific regard to the development and reform of agrarian
systems, though this reference might be regarded as merely illustrative.
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ICRW. It is most unlikely that these exhaust the bodies of legal material
applicable to the process of normalizing the ICRW, however. It will be
for the parties to the ICRW to raise further relevant areas of substantive
legal principle, but there is one body of principles that is surely inescap-
able: namely, the protection and welfare of animals, and their humane
treatment in the course of any sanctioned exploitation. Although there
appears to be a rather unconvincing attempt in Document 58/12 to brush
these issues aside, this is not an approach that can rationally be sus-
tained, not least because the principles in question are so closely inter-
connected with those on which reliance is placed in that very document.
If, for example, it is claimed that the whaling traditions of coastal com-
munities in Japan or elsewhere are worthy of respect and consideration,
it is difficult to understand the justification for neglecting the cultural
traditions and value systems of hundreds of millions of people world-
wide that demand consideration be given to the humane treatment of
sentient creatures. In any event, as virtually every serious investigation
by the international community into the question of sustainable utiliza-
tion has demonstrated, it is all but impossible to devise a rational and
acceptable system for the exploitation of living resources without con-
fronting this question.36 9 Although there is a degree of complexity and
controversy attached to this issue, that is hardly a reason to neglect it.
Indeed, the IWC would forfeit the respect and confidence of the interna-
tional community if it were seen as shirking a task of such importance.
Given the complexities of this issue, it is appropriate for the purposes of
the present study to postpone its consideration until after the analysis
and application of the other categories of norms identified in this Part.
First, it is necessary to examine the question of the proper interpreta-
tion of the ICRW, and especially its fundamental object and purpose, as
it was originally conceived, and prior to the clear emergence of other
relevant norms in the postwar period. It is this topic that forms the sub-
ject matter of the following Part.
III. THE APPLICATION OF RELEVANT NORMS (1):
THE VIEW FROM 1946
A. The Principle of Good Faith
Document 58/12 asserts that "responsible management of whaling
requires full respect for the ICRW" and interpretation of the treaty in
369. See generally CARING FOR THE EARTH (David A. Munro & Martin W. Holdgate
eds., 1991).
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good faith.3 70 This is undeniably correct, although it does not follow that
it will necessarily be easy to arrive at an unchallengeable, uniform per-
ception of precisely what the dictates of good faith and responsible
management will ultimately require in this context. While the document
presents its own perception of these issues in forthright terms, it will be
necessary to investigate the question of interpretation of the treaty more
fully in order to determine whether this perception is capable of com-
manding endorsement by an impartial arbiter.
At the heart of the call for normalization lies the assertion that "the
position of some members that are opposed to the resumption of com-
mercial whaling on a sustainable basis irrespective of the status of whale
stocks is contrary to the object and purpose of the [ICRW] ....
In its context, this statement is difficult to interpret other than as an
allegation of bad faith on the part of the governments in question. It is
inevitable, however, that any such accusation will tend to cast a reflective
glare back on the conduct of those who advance it, exposing their own
activities to scrutiny for evidence of deviation from accepted standards
of conscientious behavior. The whaling nations themselves are most
unlikely to emerge unscathed from any such process, since the history of
the IWC offers such a rich vein of examples of conduct that might be
thought to fail to measure up to the dictates of good faith.
It would be difficult to imagine a more egregious manifestation of
bad faith than that involved in a systematic, long-term failure by a party
to comply with its legal obligations, coupled with attempted conceal-
ment of this non-compliance through the false reporting of its activities.
However, this seems to be precisely what occurred in the case of the So-
viet Union, almost from the moment of entry into force of the ICRW.
According to one well-placed whistleblower, "[t]he information on vio-
lations of rules contained in official Soviet reports to the IWC bore no
relation to reality .... All information about Soviet whaling was false,
and the conclusions based upon it erroneous.
'3 72
The full extent of this delinquency was subsequently confirmed by
the Russian authorities, following an internal investigation, and
amounted to a total falsification of 82.2 percent of the officially reported
370. IWC/58/12, supra note 3.
371. See IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2, pmbl. (ninth recital).
372. Robbins Barstow, Global Perspectives on Whaling, WHALES ALIVE!, Apr. 1994,
available at http://www.whales.org.au/policies/barstow.html (quoting ERNST CHERNY, INTER-
NATIONAL FUND FOR ANIMAL WELFARE (1994)). Cherny is reported to have worked as a
young man in the Soviet whaling industry before eventually becoming Chair of the Independ-
ent Union of Fishery Workers of the Russian Federation. See id. The article itself quotes
extensively from Commercial Whaling: A Corrupt Industry, IFAW Technical Briefing 94/6
(Feb. 1994).
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harvest.373 In all, the taking of "more than 9,000 blue whales, about
46,000 humpback whales, 3,350 right whales, and more than 21,000
sperm whales" went unreported.374 In relation to humpbacks, it seems
that the Soviet take alone during this period was actually three to four
times greater than the entire global postwar catch as reported to the
IWC.
375 The circumstances that gave rise to the revelation of these abuses
were, furthermore, somewhat unusual, and it strains credulity to believe
that no cases of suppression or falsification of data have ever occurred on
the part of other whaling fleets. One experienced participant in IWC sci-
entific activities notes,
I would not ... wish to give the impression that the USSR was
alone in large-scale falsification of whaling statistics; this is
known now because of the subsequent collapse of the State.
More recently similar kinds of falsification of Japanese statistics
have been documented, but relating to the coastal whaling activi-
ties in the North Pacific. This, too, occurred in the period when
international (IWC) observers were assigned to the whaling plat-
forms and, as with the Soviet revelations, have been brought to
light by scientists and by official inspectors who were involved
at the time. The devices adopted to defy timely detection were
similar: species wrongly identified; two or more small whales
counted as one large one; inspectors and observers lured away
from their posts. As such information comes at last into the
open, it seems increasingly likely that such falsification was
more widespread in the various Antarctic operations-both pe-
lagic and from land stations-than had been presumed even by
cynics.376
Indeed, in the run-up to the Fifty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the IWC,
allegations surfaced in Western media that South Korean fishermen had
been deliberately netting minke whales and passing them off as acciden-
tal "by-catch" of other fishing operations. It was claimed, furthermore,
373. V.A. Zemsky, A.A. Berzin, Yu. A. Mikhalyev & D.D. Tormosov, MATERIALS ON
WHALING BY SOVIET WHALING FLEETS, 1947-1972 (1995).
374. Alexey V. Yablokov, On the Soviet Whaling Falsification, WHALES ALIVE!, Oct.
1997, available at http://csiwhalesalive.org/csi97403.html.
375. Id.
376. Sidney J. Holt, Sharing the Catches of Whales in the Southern Hemisphere, in CASE
STUDIES ON THE ALLOCATION OF TRANSFERABLE QUOTA RIGHTS IN FISHERIES 322, 368 (Ross
Shotton ed., FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 2001), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/
fao/004/y2684e/y2684e23.pdf; see ENDANGERED SPECIES HANDBOOK: TRADE: PIRATE WHAL-
ING (Animal Welfare Inst. 2005) (1983), available at http://www.endangeredspecieshandbook.
org/trade.pirate.php (last visited Aug. 25, 2008) (providing information on the apparent falsi-
fication of catch statistics of the "pirate" whaling operation run by Aristotle Onassis in the
1950s).
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that the number of specimens caught in this way was almost double the
numbers officially reported, putting at risk the survival of minke whales
in the Sea of Japan.377 It remains to be seen whether such claims can ul-
timately be substantiated, but it seems logical to conclude that the
exacting circumstances under which whaling is conducted create a pow-
erful inducement toward the evasion of regulatory controls through the
falsification of catch data. Consequently, even if they were not opposed
to the resumption of commercial whaling in principle, many objective
observers might justifiably require assurance of the most rigorous and
independent systems of inspection and catch verification before offering
their endorsement.
Be that as it may, breaches of good faith have by no means been con-
fined to covert non-compliance. The record of the early years of IWC
regulation reveals numerous instances of more overt lapses of commit-
ment. The persistent failure to agree to realistic catch quotas, along with
a propensity to opt out of quotas already agreed on, gravely undermined
the credibility of the entire organization from the start.378 It will be re-
membered that, by virtue of the doctrine of abuse of right, even the
exercise of rights and powers that are specifically accorded to a State
under the terms of a treaty can amount to a failure to act in good faith if
the effect is to subvert its fundamental object and purpose. In more re-
cent times, there has been widespread concern, manifest both in official
pronouncements379 and in academic commentary, that resort by the
Japanese government to the scientific whaling exemption established by
Article VIII of the ICRW amounts to a breach of good faith on its part. It
is fair to point out that the government in question has vigorously re-
jected these charges, 8' although recent criticism both from inside
Japan312 and elsewhere 383 has cast further doubts over the legitimacy of
the program.
377. Peter Aldhous, Too Many Dead Whales in Korea, NEW SCIENTIST, May 12, 2007, at
10, available at http://www.newscientist.com/data/pdf/press/2603/260310.pdf (reporting a re-
search project conducted by Scott Baker of Oregon State University); see also Media Release,
New Study: DNA Analysis Suggests Under-Reported Kills of Threatened Whales (May 16, 2007),
available at http://oregonstate.edu/dept/ncs/newsarch/2007/May07/whalemeat.html.
378. For further discussion, see infra Part III.B.2.f.
379. See, e.g., U.S. Department of State: Clinton Letter to Congress on Japan's Whaling
Practices, 3 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 312 (2000).
380. See, e.g., Gillian Triggs, Japanese Scientific Whaling: An Abuse of Right or Opti-
mum Utilization?, 5 ASIA PAC. J. ENVTL. L. 33 (2000).
381. Sumi describes it as a "deplorable misunderstanding." Sumi, supra note 12, at 317,
320; see also id. at 317-24 (offering a general discussion).
382. See A. Ishii & A. Okubo, An Alternative Explanation of Japan's Whaling Diplo-
macy in the Post-Moratorium Era, 10 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 55, 79-81 (2007).
383. KAREN STEUER, WWF, SCIENCE, PROFIT AND POLITICS: SCIENTIFIC WHALING
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2005), available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/
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Finally, it was noted in Part I that there are regrettable manifestations
even in the normalization documents themselves of a tendency to mis-
represent and disparage the motivations underlying opposition to
commercial whaling-a tendency which calls into question the genuine-
ness of the claims made in those documents regarding respect for
cultural diversity and implementation of the ICRW in good faith. As in-
dicated in that Part, it would be greatly preferable if a more constructive
and conciliatory approach to resolving the IWC's problems could be
adopted, and it is encouraging that some hopeful signs at least were evi-
dent in the proposals emerging from the Normalization Conference held
in Tokyo in February 2007. Nevertheless, this process is likely to require
a rather more searching and sophisticated investigation of the meaning to
be attributed to the terms of the ICRW than is generally evident from
past discussions. In particular, the question of the requirements of good
faith cannot realistically be pursued without a clearer sense of the object
and purpose of the Convention, to which the present discussion is in-
tended to make a modest contribution.
B. The Object and Purpose of the ICRW
Despite the fact that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
refers frequently to "the object and purpose" of a treaty,3M the point has
already been made that, in the case of a multilateral law-making agree-
ment, this may well prove a very slippery concept of which to gain a
firm hold. At the very least, it can be expected to assume a complex and
multi-faceted character, and it may, indeed, be more realistic to suppose
that such agreements would normally exhibit a range of objectives of
differing prominence and priority. As it happens, the ICRW itself refers
expressly to the "objectives and purposes" (plural) of the Convention,3 5
thereby circumventing any possible controversy that might otherwise
have arisen in that regard.
1. Conventional Approaches to Identification
of the Object and Purpose
By what means, then, are these objectives and purposes to be identi-
fied? In the absence of their specific enumeration in the substantive
provisions of the treaty, it was established in the previous Part that the
wwfsciwhalingreportfinal.pdf; C.S. Baker & P.J. Clapham, Ethics of Scientific Whaling: Issues
and Alternatives, in SCIENCE, PROFIT AND POLITICS: SCIENTIFIC WHALING IN THE 21ST CEN-
TURY, supra, at 27.
384. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 18, 19, 31,
33, 41, 58, 60.
385. ICRW, supra note 1, arts. V(2), VI.
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preamble represents the obvious starting point for such a task, and most
conventional analyses of the ICRW draw particular attention to the final
386recital, which states that the parties have "decided to conclude a con-
vention to provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus
make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry. ... ""'
This is characteristically presented as creating two objectives-the
conservation of whale stocks and the development of the whaling indus-
try-that are seen as being essentially distinct, or even in conflict with
one another. While some see this as a straightforward reflection of the
contrasting objectives of the negotiators,""' others are of the view that the
drafters did not even recognize the contradictions inherent in the con-
junction of the two goals. 3 9 Since the tension between these two
objectives is plain, the argument runs, they have somehow to be priori-
tized, but this task is typically undertaken without extensive analysis,
and ultimately accomplished, it might appear, largely in accordance with
the preferences or preconceptions of the individual commentator. Thus,
from one viewpoint, 90 the phrasing of this recital
makes it quite clear that the primary purpose of the Convention
is conservation of whale stocks for the secondary objective of
enabling the whaling industry to develop in an orderly fashion.
386. For a range of examples by commentators of different nationalities, perspectives,
and disciplines, see P.W. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 168-72, 655-60
(1985); BURKE, supra note 10, at 288-91; J. CHERFAS, THE HUNTING OF THE WHALE 112
(1989); LYSTER, supra note 273; K, MULVANEY, THE WHALING SEASON 116 (2003); S.V.
SCOTT, THE POLITICAL INTERPRETATION OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES 120 (2004); S. Andre-
sen, The Making and Implementation of Whaling Policies, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS 433 (D.G. Victor, K.
Raustiala & E.B. Skolnikoff eds., 1998); Anthony D'Amato & Sudhir K. Chopra, Whales:
Their Emerging Right to Life, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 21, 34 (1991); R.H. M'Gonigle, The Econo-
mizing of Ecology: Why Big Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLOGY L.Q. 120 (1980); S. Oberthur,
The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling: From Over-Exploitation to Total
Prohibition, YB. INT'L CO-OPERATION ENV'T & DEV. 29, 34 (1998-99); G. Rose & S. Crane,
The Evolution of International Whaling Law, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (P.
Sands ed., 1993); G. Rose & G. Paleokrassis, Compliance with International Environmental
Obligations, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 151 (J.
Cameron, J. Werksman & P. Roderick eds., 1996); J.E. Scarff, The International Management
of Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises, 6 ECOLOGY L.Q. 326, 353-54 (1977); Sumi, supra note
12, at 317, 324-27; C. Wold, Legal Opinion on the Competence of the IWC to Include Hu-
mane Treatment and Human and Cetacean Concerns in the RMS (2000), available at
http://www.Iclark.edu/org/ielp/objects/comp-opinion.pdf.
387. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
388. Rose & Crane, supra note 386, at 164.
389. Scarff, supra note 386, at 353-54.
390. LYSTER, supra note 273, at 20; see also CHERFAS, supra note 386; D'Amato &
Chopra, supra note 386.
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Conservation is the top priority: development of the whaling in-
dustry comes next.
3 1
To others, that self-same wording "makes clear that to the extent that it
referred to protection of the stocks, this was to be done with a view to
ensuring the future of the whaling industry: the ultimate aim of this Con-
vention was to develop the industry.
'3 92
To the dispassionate observer, however, there might seem to be little
reason thus far to favor either option over the other, and it is noticeable
that commentators who strive for a more balanced view seem to achieve
it largely by vacillating between these two approaches.393
One recent analysis seeks to eschew so-called "legal" approaches en-
tirely, advocating instead the adoption of an overtly political approach to
treaty interpretation based on the theory of "Cognitive Structures of Co-
operation" (CSC).394 This entails, it seems, the identification of the
common goal which risked being frustrated in the absence of the estab-
lishment of a regime for cooperation, and calls for the identification of
the "foundation ideology" of the CSC-a "principle or small set of inter-
related principles that underpins the limits that a group of States is pre-
pared to place on the pursuit by each of [the] common goal." In the case
of the ICRW, the common goal "can be understood to be the profit mo-
tive from the whaling industry, for if the industry in each country
pursued this without limit and the whale stocks were decimated, there
would be no industry.' 395 The foundation ideology is identified as "con-
servation." It is asserted that this was a term in widespread use in the
mid-twentieth century, and that its meaning was well understood.
Broadly, it connoted "guarding against over-exploitation," and could be
contrasted with "environmentalism," which demands "protection of the
environment for its own sake, and non-use for aesthetic or other 'uto-
pian' reasons. '"396 More specifically, the notion of conservation is said to
be encapsulated in the definition given in Article 2 of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas,397 which defines "conservation" as
391. LYSTER, supra note 273, at 20 (emphasis added).
392. SCOTT, supra note 386, at 125 (citing BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 172) (emphasis
added) (internal quotes omitted); see also Andresen, supra note 386; Rose & Paleokrassis,
supra note 386.
393. See, e.g., BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 172, 655.
394. SCOTT, supra note 386, ch. IX
395. Id. at 122.
396. Id. at 124-25.
397. Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
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[tuhe aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum
sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maxi-
mum supply of food and other marine products. Conservation
programs should be formulated with a view to securing in the
first place a supply of food for human consumption.9
Thus, the CSC theory approach to interpretation leads to the conclusion
that the ultimate aim of the Convention was to develop the whaling in-
dustry.399 Unfortunately, however, the cogency of this argument is
somewhat diminished by the fact that this was virtually the premise from
which the author's whole discussion started&
In truth, this supposedly novel approach appears to differ from those
it criticizes only in compounding their deficiencies. In particular, it as-
sumes most of what it seeks to prove and then proceeds to paint the
interpretational picture with such a broad brush as virtually to guarantee
glossing over any inconvenient details, of which there are, regrettably,
quite a few. We may note as examples:
That there are good reasons to doubt that the single, common
goal of the negotiators was to secure the profitability of the in-
dustry, as the author herself seems to concede at one point;4°'
That other accounts of the general development of conservation





That the technical issues associated with fisheries conservation
in particular, such as maximum sustainable yield, were in fact
the focus of profound controversy at the time in question;4
03
398. Id.
399. SCOTT, supra note 386, at 125.
400. See Jennifer L. Bailey, Working Paper, Arrested Development: "The Prohibition of
Commercial Whaling" as a Case of Failed Norm Change (2006), available at
http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/Jennifer.Bailey/Bailey%20APSA%202006%20norm%20change.pd
f (offering another recent study manifesting some of the same problems).
401. SCOTT, supra note 386, at 123.
402. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 290, at 550-
54; ROBERT BOARDMAN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE CONSERVATION OF NA-
TURE 49-50 (1981) (noting that "[1]andmark publications ... appeared at intervals during the
1950s and 1960s. The intellectual basis of conservation, that is, was being slowly put together
piecemeal at a time when the urgency of the threat facing the world's wildlife seemed to many
to be approaching crisis proportions."). IUCN, the World Conservation Union, was not even
founded until October 1948, with its original name being the International Union for the Pro-
tection of Nature (IUPN). It did not change its name to incorporate "Conservation of Nature
and Natural Resources" until 1956.
403. FRANCIS T. CHRISTY, JR., & ANTHONY SCOTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN
FISHERIES 189 n.23 (1965) (citing S. Oda, The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Fisheries, 55
DIE FRIEDENS-WARTE 317, 317 (1960)) (offering a contemporaneous perspective); see also
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That the clause from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High
Seas, cited above, was in fact originally advanced to explain the





That the Conference at which the Convention was concluded
duly adopted a resolution on humane killing, with particular re-
gard to whales and seals,4°5 which plainly did reflect recognition
of the need to protect certain creatures for their own sake, if only
as an ancillary consideration;
That the definition quoted was in any event expressed to apply
for the internal purposes of the 1958 Convention itself, 4 6 and
there is little or no indication of its having been adopted by other
conventions of the period;
4 07
That the Convention did not attract widespread ratification and,
from one perspective, "largely proved a dead letter";408 its defini-
tion of conservation certainly did not survive later codification
efforts, ° which recognized the need for a more sophisticated
approach;
That, since key aspects of thinking on fisheries conservation
were still being refined during the late-1950s, it is uncertain how
firmly established they could have been in the minds of the
drafters of the ICRW over a decade earlier-whereas the 1958
Geneva Convention on the High Seas purported to be "generally
MYRES S. McDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 972-73,
975 (1962). McDougal and Burke noted that
[t]he Convention on Fishing ... is not drafted in the most precise, unambiguous
terms and therefore is subject to various interpretations; those delegates voting for
the same provisions were not necessarily voting for the same interpretations ....
There was perhaps little consensus at the Conference on the real meaning of 'Con-
servation' or the proper means of implementing it.
Id.; see INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 290 (offering a similar
assessment); R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 279-327 (3d ed. 1999);
D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 386, at 35-36.
404. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 286-88, 11 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9).
405. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Geneva, Switz., Feb. 24-Apr. 27, 1958, Resolu-
tion.
406. See Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, supra note 397.
407. See ALEXANDRE C. Kiss, SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF
THE ENVIRONMENT (Imprint Nairobi ed., 1983) (offering examples of treaties from the pe-
riod).
408. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 403, at 281, 287.
409. See UNCLOS, supra note 88; Straddling Stocks Agreement, supra note 88.
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declaratory of established principles of international law," no
such claim was ever made in or of the Fisheries Convention;
That the emphasis on "conservation" and its supposed meaning
unhelpfully distracts attention away from other key considera-
tions, such as the precise implications of the term "orderly
development"; and
That it is in any event essential to consider not merely the origi-
nal motivations underlying the ICRW, but the extent to which
they might have changed or evolved during the past sixty years.
Given their questionable theoretical and factual foundations, it is not
particularly surprising that arguments of this kind have produced confu-
sion, and the possibility cannot be excluded that this may even have
contributed to the polarization of views within the IWC itself, thereby
exacerbating its dysfunctional state. Needless to say, governments have
tended simply to align themselves with one approach or the other de-
pending on their political stance on the whaling question at any given
time. Often, this involves "cherry-picking" phrases in the preamble that
seem to suit the needs of the moment. This is, indeed, a notable feature
both of Resolution 2006-1 and Document 58/12, neither of which makes
any genuine attempt to get to grips with the preamble in its entirety.
The real problem here is that all of these approaches to interpreta-
tion, insofar as they evince a preoccupation with what might be regarded
as the "headline" features of the preamble, in truth have much more of a
political than a genuinely legal flavor about them: for, while politics may
justifiably entail obsessing over the headlines, lawyers are surely re-
quired to read all the way down to the small print. That process will,
moreover, necessarily entail paying scrupulous attention to what the
treaty actually provides, rather than becoming diverted by preconcep-
tions as to what it might have been expected to contain. Furthermore, it
must always be borne in mind during the course of such examination
that a key principle of treaty interpretation-the principle of effective-
ness--cautions against assumptions of outright redundancy or
contradiction in treaty clauses whenever alternative constructions not
entailing those consequences are possible. While it may be utopian to
expect that international conventions will be wholly free of errors, omis-
sions, ambiguities, and elements of internal tension, it is surely not
unrealistic to expect that treaty makers will have steered clear of funda-
mental contradictions in their expression of basic objectives. This calls
into question the general thrust, and hence the methodology, of many of
the analyses that have been presented to date.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Some of the problems with these accounts may in turn be attribut-
able to the fact that they appear to pay both too much and too little
attention to the significance, for the purposes of treaty interpretation, of
the perspectives and circumstances prevailing in 1946, the year of the
ICRW's adoption. Too little, in the sense that they tend to disregard key
elements of the social, economic, and political background to the draft-
ing process, which will certainly have helped to shape the legal terms of
reference for its elaboration. Too much, in the sense that they fail to ac-
cord sufficient weight to subsequent changes in the broader legal
environment within which the ICRW currently has to be interpreted and
applied.
How, then, is the task of identifying the objectives and purposes of
the ICRW correctly to be approached? It is assumed that there will be no
dissent from the proposition that a legal instrument should be interpreted
responsibly, in good faith and in accordance with established legal crite-
ria. It is extremely encouraging to note that these basic principles all find
reflection in the normalization documents. It is submitted that the task
must be tackled in two phases. First, it is necessary to extract from the
preamble, in conjunction with the text as a whole and the surrounding
circumstances, a more reliable and comprehensive sense of the original
motivations that prompted the adoption of the ICRW and the extent to
which they have formally been encapsulated in its "objectives and pur-
poses." Secondly, it is crucial to assess whether, and to what extent,
those elements might have evolved or been transformed in the sixty
years or more since the ICRW was adopted. The latter task will be the
subject of the following Part, while the remainder of the present Part is
devoted to tackling the former.
First, in seeking to identify the original object(s) and purpose(s) of
the ICRW, it will be important to recall that, unlike many other interna-
tional agreements, the ICRW was not the product of prolonged or
recurrent multilateral negotiations amongst national delegations which
commenced with a blank sheet of paper and elaborated a draft virtually
from first principles. Rather, it was the product of a single conference
lasting around ten working days,4 ° conducted under the pressures of dif-
ficult postwar circumstances, which essentially endorsed-subject to
410. The conference ran from November 20 to December 2, 1946. It did not meet on
either Sunday within those dates or on Thanksgiving Day, and evening sessions were pre-
cluded by social events. Not all delegations were able to be present for the entire event. Apart
from the ICRW itself, the conference had also to draft a Final Act and a Protocol to cover the
1947-48 whaling season. A great deal of time was also spent throughout the meeting discuss-
ing a single issue-the Norwegian legislative embargo on its nationals cooperating with
nations that had not recently been engaged in whaling-which was of particular concern to the
Dutch delegation, even though it was plainly felt by the Chair to fall outside the conference
remit. See infra Part III.B.2.d.
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comparatively minor modifications-a draft treaty put together in rela-
tively short order through the individual efforts of just one power, the
United States.4 ' Very little advance notification of the proposals had
been given.4 2 Inevitably, therefore, the majority of the treaty's essential
elements were conceived and crafted in accordance with the policies and
perceptions of the United States, which for various reasons may well
have differed quite considerably from those of other participants. While
the detailed implications of this consideration are explored in the argu-
ments below, it is important that it be taken on board as a general issue
from the outset, in view of its significance to the overall process of inter-
pretation. In particular, it is essential to appreciate the precise bearing
which this consideration has on the determination of the ICRW's goals.
Crucially, there is no suggestion here that the ICRW, as a matter of legal
principle, should be understood to mean what the United States says it
means-international treaties are not the property of any individual
State, however prominent its role in the drafting process, and are to be
applied on the basis of their meaning as determined objectively and in
accordance with globally accepted principles. On the other hand, the
preeminent contribution of a particular State to the elaboration of a treaty
draft is almost certain to result, as a matter of practical reality, in
the outcome that the treaty generally says what that State meant it to
say--consequently, any seemingly incongruous elements or surprising
implications of the text may be attributable to that State's own individ-
ual-perhaps even idiosyncratic-concerns. With that general point in
mind, we may embark on the quest to determine the ICRW's objectives.
411. The Official Records of the Washington Conference are currently held by the Inter-
national Whaling Commission itself, the Secretariat of which is located at The Red House,
135, Station Road, Impington, Cambridge, CB24 9NP United Kingdom. The author would
like to express his sincere thanks to Dr. Nicola Grandy and her staff at the IWC for their in-
valuable assistance in the provision of materials and facilities for the preparation of this study,
which was, however, not undertaken on behalf of the IWC and remains the sole responsibility
of the author. See also BIRNIE, supra note 386 (providing the most thorough and persuasive
account of the negotiations to date). Amongst the more substantial modifications of the U.S.
text noted by Birnie are the rejection of proposals (i) for the creation of an Executive Commit-
tee; (ii) for bringing the IWC/ICRW under the aegis of FAO; and (iii) for allowing the
Convention to be brought into force by just three ratifications. Id.
412. This point was repeatedly made at the Conference itself. See IWC, Minutes of the
2nd Session, 211, IWC/14 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on file with IWC) (offering observations
by the Dutch delegation); Minutes of the 6th Session, 1 65, IWC/26 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946)
(on file with IWC) (offering observations by the Soviet delegation); Minutes of the l0th Ses-
sion, 64, 1WC/47 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on file with IWC) (offering observations by the
French delegation). Note further that contemporary correspondence of the Australian govern-
ment suggests that detailed notification of the proposals had been received only on November
21, just days before the Conference was due to commence. See Cablegram 1660, Nov. 27,
1946, reprinted in 10 HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS: DOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN
POLICY No. 252 (Dep't Foreign Aff. & Trade, Gov't of Austl. ed.), available at http://
www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vWeb?OpenView.
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2. Identification of the Original Object and Purpose of the ICRW
The most obvious features of the preamble of the ICRW are its rela-
tive prolixity and complexity, at least in comparison with those of its
predecessors in the field. While the preamble to the 1937 Whaling
Agreement comprised no more than a single recital, the 1931 prototype
convention omitted any rehearsal of objectives at all.4"3 This move toward
greater expansiveness may to some extent have been attributable simply
to the emerging fashions of the day with regard to the drafting of treaties,
but it is also likely to have indicated a degree of enhanced sophistication
in the motivations underlying regulation. It is therefore essential to scru-
tinize the recitals of the preamble in detail and with care, and in as
objective a fashion as possible, in order to fully and reliably identify the
"object and purpose" of the ICRW.
a. Regulatory Antecedents
We may begin by recapitulating that one well-established device for
demonstrating the underlying purpose of a legal instrument is to explain
it by reference to its relationship to any regulatory antecedents. The aim
may variously lie in advancing further down the trail that its predeces-
sors have blazed, branching off on a slightly different track, or changing
course entirely. The preamble to the ICRW can be seen to have followed
this time-honored practice by referring in its sixth, penultimate recital to
the 1937 International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling (to-
gether with its Protocols of 1938 and 1945),414 using wording that makes
it clear that some element of continuity with those instruments was in-
tended.
Yet, to the treaty lawyer, by far the most striking feature of this
cross-reference lies in the altogether extraordinary terms in which it is
expressed. Whereas typical formulations would involve simply recalling
specified earlier instruments by name, or referring to the "principles or
purposes" which they embody, or invoking more specifically their "pro-
visions," or certain of them, the ICRW effectively combines these
approaches, announcing its quite distinctive intention as being to estab-
413. The text simply began with Article 1, which provided that "The High Contracting
Parties agree to take, within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, appropriate measures to
ensure the application of the provisions of the present Convention and the punishment of in-
fractions of the said provisions." Convention for the Regulation of Whaling art. 1, Sept. 24,
1931,49 Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 349.
414. See ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl; Convention Between the United States of America
and Other Governments Respecting Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 148 U.N.T.S. 1143; Protocol
Amending the International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, Nov. 26, 1945, 11
U.N.T.S. 43; Agreement Between the United States of America and Other Powers for the
Regulation of Whaling, June 8, 1937, 190 L.N.T.S. 79.
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lish a system of regulation "based on the principles embodied in the pro-
visions" of the earlier instrument. Since no comparable usage of
terminology in a multilateral treaty came immediately to the present au-
thor's mind, a brief survey was conducted of over 100 such preambles,
both in environmental agreements and more generally, but not a single
instance of similar phraseology was discovered. This strongly suggests
that something rather unusual was intended. The crucial point here is
that while the principles or purposes embodied in a treaty must be
gleaned from the text as a whole, and can be read extremely widely, cer-
tainly to include its overall object and purpose, the provisions of any
instrument would conventionally be understood to comprise, strictly, its
dispositive elements only,1 5 rather than the entirety of the text. The
"principles embodied in the provisions," therefore, should be read as be-
ing potentially narrower than those in the text as a whole, and
specifically to exclude any broader indications of motivation or purpose
disclosed exclusively in the preamble.4 6
If this view should require confirmation, it can be obtained both
from standard dictionary definitions and from established usage within
the specific context of the law of treaties. As to the former, the term
"provisions," when applied to a legal instrument, is customarily "used in
the sense of regulations or rules,' 417 and has been defined as "the articles
of an instrument or statute, 4 18 or taken to refer to its "conditions,"
"measures,'" or "stipulations, 4 1 9 rather than to any accompanying mate-
rial of an expository or rhetorical nature.4 2 0 As far as the law of treaties is
415. "Dispositive" meaning "having the quality or function of directing or controlling"
as the Oxford English Dictionary defines it, and to be contrasted with the "introductory," "ex-
planatory," or "testimonial" elements of a legal instrument. Some might prefer to use the terms
"prescriptive," "substantive," or "normative" to convey this sense, though in truth none of
these words is capable of avoiding ambiguity or imprecision entirely. The notion of the dispo-
sitive elements of a treaty is not to be confused with the somewhat different concept of a
"dispositive" (as opposed to "constitutional") treaty. See, e.g., MCNAIR, supra note 91.
416. See, e.g., BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 170-71. Interestingly, this part of the preamble,
if adverted to at all, seems to fall victim to uniform misreading by commentators regardless of
their overall perspective on the issues; thus, it is stated to require regulation "on the basis of
the principles of the earlier agreements." Id.; see also BURKE, supra note 10, at 288-89 (not-
ing "on the basis of the principles embodied in specific agreements in 1937, 1938 and 1945").
417. R. v. Sec'y of State for Soc. Sec. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 198, 202 (H.L.) (Eng.); Walsh v.
Sec'y of State for India, [1863] 10 H.L. 367, 384-85 (Eng.); STROUD'S JUDICIAL DICTIONARY
OF WORDS AND PHRASES (D. Greenberg & A. Milbrook ed., 6th ed. 2000).
418. COLLINS SHORTER DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS (I st ed. 1995) (emphasis added).
419. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004); CHAMBERS ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1988); HEINEMANN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1979); II NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DIC-
TIONARY (4th ed. 1993).
420. See, e.g., G. Haider et al., The Comparative Part of the Corpus Legis Project: Using
SGML for Intelligent Information Retrieval of Legal Documents, www.juidicum.su.se/IRlI
corpus/expersys.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (offering a searchable database of
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concerned, the term "provisions" is not one of those defined in the Vi-
enna Convention,'4 2 ' but is employed throughout that instrument, and
seemingly always to refer to the dispositive elements of agreements, i.e.,
to indicate the measures through which rights or obligations are cre-42•2 424
ated,422 modified or excluded,423 or suspended or terminated; or those
which determine the legal significance of their violation, 2 validity,426 or
relationship to extraneous norms. 427 The provisions of a treaty, put sim-
428ply, are those elements which regulate relevant questions, including the
meaning of terms,429 rather than merely explain or elucidate them in a
more general way, as does the preamble.4 0 This is also the sense in
which the ubiquitous expression "the treaty provides"-or "so" or "oth-
erwise" "provides"-seems to be employed wherever it appears in the
Vienna Convention.
Further support for this point can be obtained from the situations in
which the Vienna Convention avoids the expression "provisions." Spe-
cifically, there are certain contexts in which the Convention finds it
necessary to establish rules to govern the treaty instrument as a whole,
and not merely its dispositive elements: the most obvious examples con-
cern the rules governing interpretation and rectification (since the
preamble is obviously no less in need of interpretation, nor prone to con-
tain clerical errors, than any other part of the treaty). Here, significantly,
the rules in question are stated to apply not to the "provisions" of the
treaty but rather to "the treaty" itself, or (when it is necessary to high-
light its content) "the text" or (to emphasize the component parts of that
content) "the terms" of the treaty.4"
international legal instruments, based on the following structure: Preamble, Main Provisions,
Final Provisions).
421. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 2.
422. Id. arts. 35, 36.
423. Id. arts. 17(2), 21, 41(1)(b)(ii).
424. Id. arts. 42(2), 43-44, 54, 56-57, 65(1), 67, 70, 72.
425. Id. art. 60.
426. Id. art. 69.
427. Id. arts. 30, 59, 65(4), 71; id. arts. 73, 75 (referring to the norms of the Vienna Con-
vention itself, rather than those of the treaties it seeks to regulate); id. art. 46 (concerning
provisions of domestic law).
428. Id. pmbl. para. 9.
429. Id. art. 2(2).
430. See generally I OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 587 (Robert Jennings & Ar-
thur Watts eds., Longman, 9th ed. 1992); INTERNATIONAL LAw DICTIONARY 273 (Robert
Bledsoe & Boleslaw Boczek eds., 1987); GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 483
(Allyn & Bacon, 7th ed. 1996) (1965). This point is rarely confirmed explicitly in the litera-
ture, perhaps because it is thought so obvious. It is, however, often clearly implicit in what is
said.
431. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 31-33, 79.
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There is little reason, moreover, to suppose that usage of the expres-
sion "provisions" during the mid-twentieth century differed in any way
from that of later eras. Indeed, one conservation treaty negotiated almost
contemporaneously with the ICRW, the 1950 International Convention
for the Protection of Birds, '32 and one fisheries convention adopted
shortly afterwards,4  actually make explicit the fact that their "provi-
sions" consist in what follows the preamble. 34 Although there is nothing
quite so unequivocal in the instruments on whaling, usage of the term in
both the ICRW and its 1937 predecessor is certainly entirely consistent
with that approach, since all references to the term "provisions" appear
to be to their dispositive elements, whether in the body of the text or, in
the case of the ICRW, in the Annex.
What, then, are the precise implications of the fact that the ICRW
was intended to create a new regulatory system based on "the principles
embodied in the provisions of the 1937 Agreement" rather than those
embodied in that Agreement as a whole? The answer could hardly be
clearer. The "principles embodied in the provisions" embraced essen-
tially the various devices for regulating the industry, including the
prohibitions on the taking of certain species, or of specimens of par
ticular characteristics;4" restrictions on the use of land stations, factory
ships, and associated whalers in particular areas or for particular periods
of time;4 7 the avoidance of waste in processing or exploitation;4 1 the
controls on remuneration of gunners and crews; 439 the maintenance and
publication of proper records;" 0 the enforcement of the rules by contract-
ing governments, including the punishment of infractions;"' and the
power, notwithstanding other provisions, to grant permits for scientific
research."2 All of these elements can duly be seen to be reflected in the
1946 Convention, either in the Annex or in the body of the text.
432. International Convention for the Protection of Birds, Oct. 18, 1950, 638 U.N.T.S.
186. Initial deliberations concerning the adoption of the Convention, conceived as a replace-
ment for a predecessor of 1902, commenced around 1937, and active negotiations took place
during 1947-48. See BOARDMAN, supra note 402, at 160-62.
433. Warsaw Agreement Concerning Cooperation in Marine Fishing, July 28, 1962,
reprinted in SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES 170 (Kiss ed., Grotius 1983).
434. See also THE TREATY MAKER'S HANDBOOK 46-47 (Hans Blix & Jirina Emerson
eds., 1973).
435. International Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling art. 4, June 8, 1937, 190
L.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter Regulation of Whaling Agreement].
436. Id. art. 5 (size restrictions on certain species); id. art. 6 (calves, sucklings, or ac-
companied females).
437. Id. arts. 7-9.
438. Id. arts. 11-12.
439. Id. arts. 13-14.
440. Id. arts. 14, 16-17.
441. Id. arts. 1-2.
442. Id. art. 10.
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And which elements of the old regime were to be abandoned or ex-
cluded from the new? Again, there can be no doubt as to the answer,
since the only non-dispositive feature in the entire 1937 Agreement
comprised the single, succinct, and uncompromising preambular asser-
tion of its object and purpose: namely "to secure the prosperity of the
whaling industry and, for that purpose, to maintain the stock of
whales."43 To summarize, the effect of the penultimate recital of the pre-
amble to the ICRW was to base the new regulatory system on essentially
the same general conservation techniques as had applied previously, but
to do so in light of a significant change of philosophy and purpose, no
longer dedicated to securing the profitability of the whaling industry it-
self. It was perhaps for these reasons that the U.S. Acting Secretary of
State Dean Acheson, in laying the treaty before the President for trans-
mission to the Senate, described the ICRW as a "complete replacement"
of the earlier agreements (so much so that they were formally to be de-
nounced), while at the same time describing the "regulations" it
contained as "substantially similar.""
4
Given, however, that this interpretation is so different in emphasis
from that advanced in the bulk of the literature to date,"5 it is certainly
essential that it be subjected to intensive scrutiny in order to determine
its robustness in the face of alternative constructions. There are, it would
seem, two principal grounds on which it might be thought open to chal-
lenge. These are, first, that it might seem to place great weight on the
interpretation of one short phrase-"principles embodied in the provi-
sions"-which may conceivably not have been used advisedly or with
great forethought; and, secondly, that it is inherently implausible that an
agreement to establish what is generally referred to as a "whalers' club"
should have put aside what had, less than a decade earlier, been declared
to be the sole objective of regulation, i.e., the profitability of the industry.
It will be convenient to deal with the latter argument first.
The need to evaluate proposed treaty interpretations in light of their
general plausibility can certainly not be denied, since the Vienna Con-
vention makes clear that the avoidance of absurdity or unreasonableness
represents one aim of the relevant rules."6 On the other hand, plausibility
would seem essentially to be a relative rather than an absolute notion, as
443. Id. pmbl.
444. See generally Whaling Conventions, 4 WHITEMAN DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 15 (1965).
445. Note in particular the view of Scott that the "common goal" of the parties to the
ICRW "can be understood to be the profit motive from the whaling industry." SCOTT, supra
note 386, at 122. Later in the discussion, however, Scott acknowledged that there is at least
one reason to query this assumption. Id. at 123.
446. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 32.
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there are likely to be few constructions of complex legal instruments that
succeed in dispelling every lurking doubt as to their correctness. In par-
ticular, the persuasiveness of the view advanced in this Part must always
be weighed against the inherent implausibility of the rival interpreta-
tion-namely, that the parties to the ICRW chose to set up a regulatory
system based on two fundamental objectives, identified in a single sen-
tence, which were intrinsically and transparently contradictory. In
addition to this point, however, there are a number of more positive rea-
sons for rejecting the claim that the interpretation now proposed can be
impugned as implausible.
First of all, the description of the ICRW as a "whalers' club" is po-
tentially extremely misleading, at least in the absence of more detailed
exploration. A preliminary point is that, of the countries with an active
tradition of whaling, several attended the 1946 conference solely in the
capacity of observers," 7 while Mexico opted to stay away entirely. Fur-
thermore, the postwar political situation precluded the invitation of
Germany and Japan."8 A much more crucial factor, however, is that the
initiative for calling the 1946 Conference, and all the preliminary draft-
ing work for the new Convention, was, as noted above, undertaken by
the United States, which, though it still maintained an active interest in
whale products, "was no longer a major whaling country and was
unlikely to be again."449 Indeed, the real whaling era for this nation had
effectively ended more than fifty years earlier.450 It was therefore in a
447. Observer States at the conference were Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, South Africa, and
Sweden. Full participants were Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
USSR.
448. There are indications that the Americans might have preferred to involve the Japa-
nese, who, at the prompting of General MacArthur, had recently resumed whaling under
American direction. Plainly, however, this supervision was intended as only a short-term ex-
pedient, after which Japan would be a full participant in the industry in its own right. By the
end of 1946, however, the conclusion of a peace treaty was not in sight and other governments
were extremely apprehensive about the return of Japan to the Antarctic. It was therefore
agreed that Japanese participation in the Washington Conference would be unacceptable. See
generally Cablegram 1385 from Australian Embassy in Washington, D.C., to Australian De-
partment of External Affairs, Oct. 5, 1946, reprinted in 10 HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS:
DOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 412, No. 156, available at
http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/vVolume/4986F14 1B4B98CCA256B
7E007AA784; see also Shirley Scott, Australian Diplomacy Opposing Japanese Antarctic
Whaling 1945-1951: The Role of LegalArgument, 53 AUSTL. J. INT'L AFF. 179 (1999).
449. SCOTT, supra note 386, at 123.
450. Most accounts suggest that American commercial whaling activities peaked in the
mid-nineteenth century when the industry employed some 70,000 people and well over 700
ships. By 1895, this fleet had dwindled to approximately fifty vessels. Subsequently, the ports
of Boston, Provincetown, and San Francisco abandoned whaling altogether, leaving only New
Bedford, which sent out its last whaler during the mid-1920s. See, e.g., CHERFAS, supra note
386, at 59-106; E.J. DOLIN, LEVIATHAN: THE HISTORY OF WHALING IN AMERICA epilogue
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position to take a relatively detached view of the industry, as reflected in
its attempts to shift the emphasis toward a more (objective) scientific
approach and away from (more subjective) economic and political con-
siderations. Furthermore, it was expressly recognized from the outset
that "if whaling was to be regulated on the basis of scientific information
there was no reason ... why the Commission should consist only of
whaling countries, '0 5' and therefore no attempt was made in the treaty to
exclude participation by other States.452
Finally, the "whalers' club" label tends to obscure the fact that par-
ticipating governments also had other relevant affiliations and concerns.
It is not to be overlooked, for example, that five of the six-strong Ameri-
can contingent-i.e., more than one-third of the States participating in
the drafting Conference as a whole-arrived fresh from the launching of
another significant conservation initiative in the form of the 1940 Con-
vention on Nature Protection and Wild Life Preservation in the Western
(2007); see also New Bedford Whaling Museum, Overview of American Whaling,
http://www.whalingmuseum.org/kendall/indexKI.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 2008). Thereafter,
only a few modestly-sized factory ships operated out of sheltered anchorages, and the U.S.
contribution to global whale oil production fell to two to three percent in 1929, down from
approximately ten percent a decade earlier. The last voyage to Antarctica occurred in 1940.
The previous year, a solitary land station had briefly opened at McNears Point, near San
Rafael, California, and this was succeeded by one further up the coast at Fields Landing,
Eureka, which operated intermittently between 1940 and 1951, buoyed initially by the war-
time market for whalemeat. Throughout the period covering the Washington Conference and
the first meeting of the IWC, this was the sole whaling facility in the whole of the United
States. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Interior, Whaling Commission Meets in
London, Dr. H.J. Deason Sails as U.S. Delegate (May 20, 1949); Anonymous, Submarine
Steaks, TIME, May 10, 1943, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/
0,9171,851567,00.htmi; Dale W. Rice, The Blue Whales of the Southeastern North Pacific
Ocean, AFSC Q. REP., Oct.-Dec. 1992, at 3. Commercial whaling flickered briefly into life
again in the mid-1950s with the launching of operations in the San Francisco Bay area by the
Del Monte and Golden Gate fisheries companies, designed primarily to supply the pet food
trade. See Interview by Judith K. Dunning with Pratt Peterson, in Point Richmond, Cal. (Apr.
4, 1986), available at http://www.archive.org/details/fishermanwhaler00peterich. Even then,
activities were at an extremely modest level, and the value of 1971 landings was estimated at
less than $35,000. Bailey, supra note 400, at 21 n.29. This represented only around a quarter
of the sum realized by the sale of oil and baleen recovered in a single voyage by the whaler
Envoy in 1851, and a tiny fraction of the total proceeds of whaling in that era, which peaked at
$11 million in 1853. Dolin, supra, at 205-06, 270-72. Post-World War II activities were there-
fore no more than a footnote to the history of whaling in the United States. Indeed, in Dolin's
account, the entire period from 1924 is covered in a single footnote. Id. at epilogue n.13.
Eventually, anti-whaling sentiment firmly made itself felt, and the engagement of U.S. vessels
or citizens in whaling on the high seas was formally prohibited by the Marine Mammal Pro-
tection Act of 1972. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421 (1972).
451. SCOTT, supra note 386, at 127 (citing Establishment of Permanent Commission,
IWC U.S. No. 5 (Nov. 21, 1945) (on file with IWC)).
452. See ICRW, supra note 1, art. X.
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Hemisphere,4 ' a ground-breaking treaty which may well have exerted
some influence over their attitudes toward conservation in general and
whaling in particular. More importantly still, all of the participants in
the Washington Conference were members of the fledgling United Na-
tions, and, supposedly at least, committed to its goals of universalism,
economic and social cooperation, and the development of peaceful and
friendly relations. The need to address the urgent food-supply problems
of the immediate postwar era, particularly of oils and fats,45' had led to a
rapid upsurge of interest and investment in whaling,4 6 and it was vital to
ensure that peace and good order were not jeopardized by any renewed
scramble for resources.457 Given, indeed, that Antarctica would inevitably
form a primary focus for whaling activities, the political sensitivities
could scarcely have been greater, as it meant that such matters became
inextricably implicated with a whole host of more fundamental political
controversies. As one inside account put it,
[f]rom the beginning of 1946, as a numbed and war-torn world
reflected upon an uneasy peace, Antarctica and the polar regions
once again became a powerful magnet to human fancy. In Janu-
ary, plans by Lincoln Ellsworth were announced in the press for
an aerial and ground-mapping exercise in Antarctica in 1947.
Also in January, famous aviator Eddie Rickenbacker was pushing
for [U.S.] exploration in Antarctica, including the use of atomic
bombs for mineral research. By late autumn the Netherlands and
453. Western Hemisphere Convention, supra note 300. Canada did not become a mem-
ber of the Organization of American States until 1990, and was the only ICRW negotiating
State from the region that had no involvement in this treaty.
454. It will be necessary to return to this question shortly.
455. See G.L. Prichard, The Current Economic Situation as Related to Fats and Oils, 28
J. AM. OIL CHEM. Soc'Y 453 (Nov. 1951); J.E. Wall, The World Food Situation, 23 INT'L AFF.
307, 312-13 (1947). Whale oil had been widely used for the production of margarine since
1911, when the recently invented process of hydrogenation was first applied on an industrial
scale. From the 1950s, however, it was progressively replaced by fish oil and ultimately vege-
table oil.
456. GORDON JACKSON, THE BRITISH WHALING TRADE 235-36 (Adam Black & Charles
Black eds., 1978) (noting that "[t]he opportunities for whaling after the war were greater than
the most optimistic company could have expected in the bleak days of 1939"). This was re-
flected in the fact that between 1945-46 and 1948-49 the Norwegian fleet expanded from
forty-four vessels to 101 and the British from thirty-three to forty. Id. at 238. The Soviet fleet
visited Antarctica for the first time, and the Japanese revived their brief pre-war activities in
the area. In addition, the Dutch resumed whaling after a lapse of 75 years. See The Fisheries of
the Netherlands, in ATLANTIC OCEAN FISHERIES 119, 121 (Georg Borgstrom & Arthur J.
Heighway eds., 1961).
457. See CHERFAS, supra note 386, at 111.
458. The extent of this dominance is reflected in the fact that during the seasons 1945-
46 to 1947-48 the Antarctic's share in world production of whale and sperm oil amounted to
around ninety-five percent. See JACKSON, supra note 456, at 281.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Soviet Union whaling fleets were operating in Antarctic waters
for the very first time .... November headlines in the New York
Times declared a six-nation race to Antarctica "set off by reports
of uranium deposits" . . . . For the first time in history, an inter-
national crisis was brewing over territorial claims in the
Antarctic wasteland. 9
When interpreting the ICRW some sixty years after this event, it is
important not to be unduly preoccupied with fisheries matters alone, to
the exclusion of the wider political "circumstances of its conclusion,'
" 6
since such matters are bound to have influenced the intentions and aspi-
rations of those involved. Newly endowed with super-power status and
responsibilities, the United States is sure to have been only too aware,
when drafting the ICRW, of the potential for conflict posed by unregu-
lated competition for the natural resources of Antarctica. It would
certainly be no surprise if such considerations greatly overshadowed
concerns about industrial profitability, which could be adequately re-
461
solved over time. Indeed, from the ideological perspective of the
United States, the maintenance of industrial profitability is unlikely to
have been viewed as a suitable topic for governmental intervention at all,
since, as one commentator stated, it "still believed that competition be-
tween individual firms on strict capitalist principles was the only way to
bring down prices and maintain the 'freedom of the seas' ....
It was, no doubt, for precisely these reasons that no attempt was
made to apportion the overall quota-indeed, Article V(2)(b) of the
ICRW specifically forbade any such intervention. Just as the arrival of
kerosene and sprung steel had precipitated the collapse of the U.S. whal-
459. Richard Byrd & Richard Cruzen, The United States Navy Antarctic Developments
Project 1946-1947, ch. 2, http://www.south-pole.com/p0000150.htm (last visited Feb. 5,
2008); see also W.L.S. Fleming, Contemporary International Interest in the Antarctic, 23
INT'L AFF. 546 (1947).
460. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 32; see U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1946) (offering an excellent indica-
tion of the full range of diplomatic issues with which the United States was preoccupied at the
time, and the place of whaling within them).
461. As it happens, the question of economic revival was addressed relatively promptly
and on a broader front by various means, including the Marshall Aid Program, of which sev-
eral whaling countries became beneficiaries. See, e.g., Ola H. Grytten, The Economic History
of Norway, in EH NET ENCYCLOPEDIA, available at http://eh.net/encyclopedialarticlel
grytten.norway; R.M. Havens, The Norwegian Investment Program, 17 S. EcON. J. 166 (1950)
(discussing the case of Norway); see NINA SERAFINO, CURT TARNOFF & DICK K. NANTO,
U.S. OCCUPATION ASSISTANCE: IRAQ, GERMANY AND JAPAN COMPARED, Order No. RL33331
(Mar. 23, 2006) (providing information on the question of postwar assistance to Germany and
Japan).
462. JACKSON, supra note 456, at 238-39. The United States' position on this point was
specifically confirmed by the Chairman of the Washington Conference. See IWC/14, supra
note 412, T 261.
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ing industry through sapping demand for whale oil and whalebone 4 6 3 So,
too, would contemporary whaling operations simply have to take their
chance in the marketplace. The emphasis would henceforth be placed on
the establishment of institutional arrangements, to minimize the risk of
conflict, and the development of a science-based restriction on the over-
all catch, to ensure that competition did not lead to the ultimate
destruction of the resource.
While other participants in the Conference may not necessarily have
shared all of these sentiments, they were evidently prepared to go along
with the overall U.S. strategy as a means of ensuring that the anticipated
escalation in whaling effort did not get out of hand. In particular, the es-
tablished whaling nations would have been troubled by the prospect of
its expansion into countries that had not previously been involved in the
industry. Some accordingly pressed for even stricter regulation than the
U.S. itself had contemplated . One compelling reason not to insist on
maintaining the traditional emphasis on profitability was, of course, that,
despite its having provided the foundation for several decades of regula-• 461
tion, it had comprehensively failed to deliver measurable conservation
benefits, although it is uncertain how clearly that link was perceived at
the time. Eventually, however, the realization occurred that the focus on
profitability was almost inevitably self-defeating, as classical economic
theory was inclined to place a premium on immediate over deferred466
benefits, and the economics of the whaling industry in particular-
involving heavy initial outlay on boats and equipment and the concomi-
tant reluctance to allow them to remain idle, regardless of the state of
whale stocks-has the tendency to create an almost irresistible pressure
• -- 461
in favor of over-exploitation. In any event, the fact that securing the
463. See James S. Robbins, How Capitalism Saved the Whales, 42 FREEMAN 311, 312-
13(1992).
464. For example, some participants unsuccessfully attempted to render IWC decisions
binding on all members, without the possibility of any opt-out procedure. See infra Part
III.B.2.c (offering further discussion).
465. These began with unilateral measures designed to protect national industries, such
as exclusion of foreign whalers from the Bering Sea by Russia in 1821 and the various pieces
of Norwegian legislation dating from 1903, continued with private agreements within the
industry, and culminated in the treaty arrangements of the 1930s and early 1940s. See gener-
ally CHERFAS, supra note 386, at 109-11; D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 386, at 28-32.
466. See ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, POLICY, AND
ETHICS 57-61 (1997) (offering a helpful discussion).
467. This much is now seemingly accepted by most commentators regardless of their
perspectives on other issues. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note 10, at 289 n.126; CHERFAS, supra
note 386, at 201-03; SCOTT, supra note 386, at 122-23; D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 386,
at 30-32; Oberthur, supra note 386, at 30-34; Rose & Paleokrassis, supra note 386, at 151-
53. Thus, Holt describes whaling as more akin to "mining" than "harvesting." Holt, supra note
376, at 345; see PETER G. EVANS, THE NATURAL HISTORY OF WHALES AND DOLPHINS 249-66
(1987) (offering a more detailed explanation); J.A. GULLAND, THE MANAGEMENT OF MARINE
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prosperity of the industry might no longer represent the underlying moti-
vation for regulation certainly did not require individual whaling nations
to abandon any aspirations or attempts to make their industries profit-
able; it was simply that the object and purpose of the 1946 Convention
itself was to be grounded in other considerations.
In retrospect, therefore, the 1937 Agreement can realistically be seen
as the last throw of the dice for the "profitability" paradigm. There is no
real surprise in this, since, although the Final Act to its drafting confer-
ence 468 had contained formal expressions of confidence in the Agreement's
prospects of contributing to industrial prosperity,469 the bulk of the docu-
ment reveals that the parties actually entertained grave doubts over the
efficacy of the instrument they had just adopted. It was recognized, for
example, that the question of whaling methods still required to be ad-
dressed, from the point of view both of wastage and of cruelty.4 7 0 What is
more, even those restrictions that had been established inspired relatively
little faith, and the option of imposing further measures, including the
permanent closure to whaling of certain areas, was specifically re-
served '4 7' The risk was also acknowledged that the controls on pelagic
whaling might simply be circumvented by the re-flagging of vessels to
the registries of non-party States or the transfer of whaling activities to
land stations.47 2 Finally, the possibility was expressly contemplated, in
the event of an intensification of competition resulting from the depreda-
tions of unregulated vessels, of actually abandoning regulation entirely,
and permitting a brief flurry of exploitation until the industry simply col-
471lapsed under the weight of its own excesses.
When, therefore, the 1937 Agreement duly failed to deliver the de-
sired conservation benefits, it is scarcely surprising that the United States
and others should have been seeking to establish a new regime based on
a radically altered paradigm. Whereas the earlier attempts to regulate
whaling could with justification be described as a "cartel,"4 74 and it is,
FISHERIES 105-26 (1974); C.W. Clark & R. Lamberson, An Economic History and Analysis of
Pelagic Whaling, 6 MARINE POL'Y 103, 103-20 (1982).
468. Secretary of State for Foreign Aff., International Agreement for the Regulation of
Whaling, 1937, Brit. Parl. Paper, Misc. Ser. No 4 (1937), Cmd. 5487, at 9-11.
469. Id. 2, 10.
470. Id. 8.
471. Id. 7.
472. Id. TT 5, 6, 9.
473. Id. 10.
474. A cartel in this sense is defined as a "manufacturers' union to control production,
marketing arrangements, prices etc." THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 141 (J.B. Sykes ed.,
7th ed. 1982). Such cartels were generally created with the specific intention of "keeping up
prices [and] monopolizing production." CHAMBERS ENGLISH DICTIONARY 261 (Catherine
Schwarz ed., 1993). While the IWC undoubtedly shared some of these features, its essential
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indeed, not unusual to see the IWC itself described as such,475 it is very
unlikely that it was the intention to create one in 1946, since the break-
ing of the power of such associations was a key ambition of postwar
U.S. policy.476 The general disposition of the day to place trust in the po-
tential of global institutional arrangements477 offered the opportunity to
make that aspiration a reality in the whaling context. The United States'
own medium-term aspiration, indeed, was to internationalize such opera-
tions fully by bringing the IWC under the umbrella of the newly-created
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), though this particular
proposal proved controversial at Washington and emerged only in diluted
form in Article 111(6).
Bearing all these points in mind, it can be seen that there is no
inherent implausibility in the suggestion that the ICRW was predicated
on the implicit abandonment of the profitability of the whaling industry
as the raison d'etre of regulation. That does not in itself prove that the
ICRW actually effected such a change, however. In order to establish
that point specifically, it is necessary to look beyond a single short
nature and overall focus were very different, particularly through its references to consumers'
interests and provision for the involvement of non-whaling States in policy determinations.
475. See, e.g., Michael De Alessi, Op-Ed., Privatize the Whales, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Oct.
17-18, 1997, at 6; Stuart R. Harrop, From Cartel to Conservation and on to Compassion:
Animal Welfare and the International Whaling Commission, 6 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y
79, 88 (2003); Adrienne M. Ruffle, Note, Resurrecting the International Whaling Commis-
sion: Suggestions to Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 639 (2002).
476. See GABRIEL KOLKO, CONFRONTING THE THIRD WORLD (1988). Kolko noted that
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull
regarded the breakup of the world economy into isolated trading blocs after the
1929-31 Depression as the single most important cause of the Second World War as
well as the most likely cause of future wars. Restrictive trade cartels, which had es-
pecially inflated the price of the United States' increasingly essential raw material
imports, were integral to this distorted world economy .... From 1941 onward the
United States never tired of stressing that "raw material supplies must be available
to all nations without discrimination" after the war.
Id. at 12-13; see also President Roosevelt's 1945 Statement to the Senate on Postwar Rehabili-
tation-Bretton Woods Monetary Proposals, 91 CONG. REC. 987 (1945) (confirming this
point); EDWARD S. MASON, CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE: CARTELS AND COMMODITY
AGREEMENTS (1946); Vincent W. Bladen, Fritz Machlup, Robert B. Schwenger & Floyd L.
Vaughan, Discussion, 36 AM. ECON. REv. 768 (1946); Bernard F. Haley, The Relation Be-
tween Cartel Policy and Commodity Agreement Policy, 36 AM. ECON. REv. 717 (1946);
Walton H. Hamilton, The Economic Man Affects a National Role, 36 AM. EcON. REv. 735
(1946); Klaus E. Knorr, The Problem of International Cartels and International Commodity
Agreements, 55 YALE L.J. 1097 (1946) (offering a contemporary discussion of cartels, which
formed one of the "hot" topics of the day); Robert P. Terrill, Cartels and the International
Exchange of Technology, 36 AM. EcON. REv. 745 (1946).
477. See KOLKO, supra note 476. Kolko notes that the United States had a strong belief
in the "efficacy of its institutional proposals for an integrated postwar economic and political
structure." Id. at 15.
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phrase in a preambular recital,478 which may perhaps have been
inexpertly, or even ineptly drafted, and to consider the effect of the
preamble, and indeed the treaty, as a whole.47 9 The reason for this, of
course, is that words or phrases are not to be read in isolation, but in
their context, and the context includes the entire text, including the
preamble and annexes. 80
b. The Preamble as a Whole
As it happens, it is unnecessary to read beyond the first line of the
first recital of the preamble for confirmation that a radical change in di-
rection had occurred. For it was here that the need to safeguard "the
great natural resources represented by the whale stocks" was recognized
to reflect the interest of "the nations of the world" generally, rather than
the contracting parties, in particular, and that the intended beneficiaries
were identified not as the whaling industry but as "future generations."
Furthermore, acknowledgement of the conspicuous lack of success of all
previous attempts at regulation, directed as they were to the profitability
of the industry, was implicit in the second preambular recital, which ob-
served that "the history of whaling has seen over-fishing of one area
after another and of one species of whale after another . . . .,," The ur-
gent need for a new approach was therefore fully apparent.
In an attempt to elaborate that approach, the fourth recital identified
the common interest as lying in the achievement of "the optimum level
of whale stocks as rapidly as possible without causing widespread eco-
nomic and nutritional distress. 82 Taken together with the statements
mentioned above, this reflects clear recognition of the instrumental value
of whales as resources, conceived in terms of the interests both of pre-
sent and of future generations. On the other hand, it plainly does not
actually define the "optimum level" of stocks by reference to such con-
siderations-indeed, it does not define or explain it at all. Further
guidance on this issue, and its impact on the object and purpose of the
ICRW as a whole, must therefore be sought in other preambular recitals.
Of central importance in this context, and following directly from the
reference to the history of whaling in the second recital, is the identifica-
tion of the essential need "to protect all species of whales from further
478. That is, "on the basis of the principles embodied in the provisions of the [1937]
International Agreement." ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
479. While this point is not infrequently acknowledged by commentators on the ICRW,
regrettably the full implications are not always taken on board. See, e.g., BURKE, supra note
10, at 288.
480. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(1 )-(2).
481. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
482. Id.
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over-fishing. 483 The use of terminology here is intriguing. The term
"protection" has a lengthy pedigree in international law as it bears on
human relations with the animal world, and while it might at one time
have been employed to indicate conservation activities undertaken essen-
tially for utilitarian purposes, it has more recently come to be used to
signify a defensive regime undertaken at least in part for the benefit of
the entities covered by the measures in question9 The possibility that
this was the intention in the case of the ICRW is considerably strength-
ened by the fact that the targets of protection are described not as "whale
stocks" or "whale fisheries" but as "all species of whales.4 85 It is true
that this protection is expressly conferred only with respect to over-
fishing, but it is likely that this was perceived as the only significant
threat to them at the time. Although the wording can hardly be described
as unequivocal, this passage is at least open to the interpretation that it
involves recognition of the need to protect whales for their own sake:
otherwise, it serves little purpose, given that the instrumental value of
whales is amply addressed in other recitals. It could be viewed merely as
providing a narrative link between the notions of safeguarding resources
for the future and rapidly achieving the optimum level of stocks, but this
interpretation is implausible in view of the fact that the phraseology used
is plainly teleological in character; indeed, the protection of whales is the
only aim to be specified as "essential." It is possible that the phrase "to
protect all species of whales" was deliberately chosen for its ambiva-
lence,486 leaving States free to act on their own perceptions of the
487matter, though that would doubtless risk planting the seeds for future
controversy when amendments to the regulatory system were discussed.
Whatever the uncertainties surrounding this particular phrase, it is
scarcely open to dispute that the points referred to above represent the
policy objectives of the ICRW in a general sense, since they are not only
483. Id.
484. Note the markedly different conceptions of "protection." Compare Convention for
the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture, Mar. 19, 1902, 191 Consol. T.S. 91, with Inter-
national Convention for the Protection of Birds, supra note 432, and Convention Relative to
the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State, Nov. 8, 1933, 172 L.N.T.S. 241
(influencing the change in the concept of "protection"), and Western Hemisphere Convention,
supra note 300 (influencing the change in the concept of "protection"). It is arguable that the
change in emphasis can be traced to the 1933 African and 1940 Western Hemisphere Conven-
tions. See infra Part lIl.B.2.e. On the question of "protection," see generally Michael J.
Bowman, The Protection of Animals under International Law, 4 CONN. J. INT'L L. 487
(1989).
485. See ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
486. Ambivalence, as opposed to outright internal contradiction, is a well-practiced
technique of treaty draftsmanship.
487. In particular, any non-whaling States that joined the IWC would have the power to
act on this motivation when exercising their votes on quotas, sanctuaries, etc.
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couched in the terminology of objectives, but expressly described as
such in the opening words of the fifth recital, which speaks in terms of
"achieving these objectives." The avoidance of widespread economic and
nutritional distress, presented as a rider or qualification on the goal of
restoring stocks to optimum levels, may doubtless be seen as an impor-
tant ancillary objective. The interests both of the whaling industry itself,
and of its consumers, might be brought into play by these words, but
only to the extent that agreed regulatory measures might put them at se-
rious risk through their restriction of catch levels.488 Given the need to
address contemporary food shortages, such considerations might have
been expected to prove especially significant in the short term.
The only other matter that precedes the reference to "these objec-
tives," and might therefore be regarded as falling within the scope of that
phrase, can be found in the third recital of the preamble, which reads:
RECOGNIZING that the whale stocks are susceptible of natural
increases if whaling is properly regulated, and that increases in
the size of whale stocks will permit increases in the numbers of
whales which may be captured without endangering these natu-
489ral resources ....
On one reading, this might be regarded as indicating an actual objec-
tive of increasing catch levels in due course, but the obvious difficulty
with this interpretation is that, unlike the first, second, and fourth recit-
als, this one is not expressed in terms of goals, aims, needs, or interests
at all, but is rather a simple assertion of fact, the main purpose of which
seems to lie in providing a narrative or explanatory link between the de-
clared objectives of protection against over-fishing and securing an
optimum level of stocks. That is to say, it simply presents one of the po-
tential advantages of the adoption of conservation measures. At the very
least, however, it elucidates the matter in a negative sense, confirming
that it was certainly not part of the overt objectives of the ICRW to pre-
clude all taking of whales from the outset.490 Given the immediate need
to address widespread food shortages, that would obviously have been a
most unlikely starting-point for the regulatory process. Further endorse-
ment of this point, if any were needed, can be found in the fifth recital,
488. That is to say, recognizing a need to avoid widespread economic distress in pursuing
conservation objectives is a far cry from seeking to advance economic interests as a primary
objective.
489. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
490. Of course, this is by no means the same as saying that a decision to preclude all
harvesting, or all commercial harvesting, is inherently contrary to the ICRW's object and pur-
pose. The matter is simply left for determination by means of the decision-making processes
that the ICRW establishes.
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which identifies the general means by which the ends identified above
were to be achieved, namely that "whaling operations should be con-
fined to those species best able to sustain exploitation in order to give an
interval for recovery to certain species of whales now depleted in num-
bers. 49'
In order to identify the detail of the proposed approach, the array of
techniques employed under the 1937 Agreement was then the subject of
cross-reference in the sixth recital, as explained above. These methods
could be expected "to ensure proper and effective conservation and de-
velopment of whale stocks,, 492 provided always that they were applied in
light of the newly stated objectives, rather than driven by the old mantra
of the profitability of the industry itself.
The final recital of the preamble, which indicates the precise legal
purpose of the parties in concluding the Convention, must plainly be un-
derstood by detailed reference to the underlying policy objectives and
explanatory statements in the earlier recitals, as a result of which it inevi-
tably emerges in a subtly different light. In particular, the words "to
provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make pos-
sible the orderly development of the whaling industry ' 493 are to be read
not as implying any dissonance, or dichotomy of interest, between con-
servation of stocks and development of the industry, which must then
somehow be reconciled or prioritized, but rather as reflecting the per-
ceived consonance or complementarity of the characteristics that these
processes were henceforth respectively to display, i.e., proper in the case
of conservation (as opposed to the philosophically misconceived and
unsuccessful regulatory endeavors of previous decades) and orderly in
the case of development of the industry (to displace the chaotic practices
of the past and avoid any risk of conflict in the scramble for resources).
In short, these are not two separate currencies at all, but rather the two
sides of a single coin-twin aspects of the single goal of establishing a
stabilizing legal mechanism that would serve to protect all species of
whales from the major threat they faced, and preserve the resources they
embodied for the benefit of future, and indeed present, generations.
A critical weakness of all interpretations which see the development
of the industry as a key objective in its own right is that they fail to
accord appropriate weight to the word orderly, as though it served no
significant normative function at all. Given that its ostensible role was in
fact to determine the very path that such development should follow, this
seems to be a particularly cavalier infringement of the principle of
491. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
492. Id.
493. Id.
Michigan Journal of International Law
effectiveness. In contradiction of this approach, the well-established
rules of treaty interpretation clearly require that it be given its ordinary
meaning in the context in which it appears, when viewed in light of the
overall object and purpose of the treaty. Admittedly, there is a difficulty
here, in that the word appears in a preambular recital the very function of
which is to establish that object and purpose, and therefore a key element
of the conventional guidance as to the intended meaning of the word is
unavailable in a strict sense. Nevertheless, much can be gleaned from the
other elements of the preamble, the contents of the treaty as a whole, and
the surrounding circumstances generally.
On the one hand, the word "orderly" might simply have been in-
tended to convey that an enhanced degree of organization would
henceforth be imposed on whaling activities by the treaty, not only
through its codification of the established mechanisms of regulation, but
by virtue of the creation of a permanent international forum for ensuring
their ongoing application. Yet although this aspect of its meaning is un-
deniable, it is unlikely that it exhausts the full purport of the word,
which, while not exactly a term of art, would have been recognizable to
the negotiating States as being heavily pregnant with implications in
light of established usage. In 1946, the implications in question would
have derived ultimately from the specific conceptions and ramifications
of the notion of "order" (or "good order" or "public order") that pre-
vailed within the international community at the time. From a
consideration of diplomatic usage, there is ample evidence that the con-
cept was seen as closely related to notions of peace, security, and the rule
of law and that it connoted specifically the preservation, restoration, or
establishment of constitutional equilibrium within a given community in
circumstances in which controversy or conflict had either been antici-
pated or actually experienced. In this vein, the Principal Executive
Officer of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. General Assembly in the late
1940s described the earlier League of Nations Covenant'9 4 as having em-
bodied the goal of "subjecting the inevitability of change to the restraints
of orderly procedures" and as "altering political frontiers by orderly
means."
495
The term was, moreover, routinely employed in international legal
instruments to convey the same general idea. In some cases, the notion
of "order" was central to the very objectives of the instrument, as in the
case of the 1928 Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
494. Covenant of the League of Nations, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 195.
495. DONALD C. BLAISDELL, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 273 (1966) (emphasis
added).
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National Policy,496 the third preambular recital of which proclaimed the
conviction that any changes in the parties' mutual relations "should be
sought only by pacific means and be the result of peaceful and orderly
process."97 Similarly, Articles 1 and 2 of the 1936 International Conven-
tion Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace required
the parties to prohibit broadcasts from their territories which constituted
an incitement to war, or to acts contrary to the internal order or security
of another State.9 In other instances, "order" featured rather as an over-
riding interest to be protected in the course of addressing particular
causes or consequences of conflict. Thus, Article 6 of the 1923 Lausanne
Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straits prohibited the station-
ing of troops in the demilitarized zones of Turkey other than "the police
and gendarmerie forces necessary for the maintenance of order.' 499 In a
similar way, the "just requirements of... public order" were considered
of sufficient importance to qualify as one of the general justifications for
the limitation of human rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration.52
Although these conventions might be considered as rather far re-
moved from the ICRW in terms of scope and substance to carry much
weight as aids to its interpretation, it is apparent that precisely the same
usage was regularly encountered, at both the national and international
levels, in legal instruments regulating both maritime and commercial
affairs, into both of which categories the ICRW unquestionably falls. To
take the latter as an example, 0' it was specifically the interests of "or-
derly" marketing which had inspired the creation of the national Wheat
Boards which were established in Canada and Australia during the First
World War and revived at or around the time of the Second World War.
50 2
Similar arrangements had been applied to other commodities, such as
496. Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers Providing for the Renunciation
of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (em-
phasis added) (naming the "Kellogg-Briand Pact" for Frank B. Kellogg, U.S. Secretary of
State at the time, and not Remington Kellogg, the principal architect of the ICRW).
497. Id.
498. International Convention Concerning the Use of Broadcasting in the Cause of
Peace, Sept. 23 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301 (1938).
499. Convention Relating to the Regime of the Straights art. IV, July 24, 1923, 28
L.N.T.S. 115 (emphasis added). This convention was signed with the Treaty of Peace, July 24,
1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11.
500. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 127, art. 29; see also European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 124,
Article 29; id. arts. 6(l), 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2), 15(l) (following through on article 29 and
referencing the "protection of public order" or the "prevention of disorder" as potentially
legitimate grounds for such restrictions).
501. See infra Part III.B.2.f (explaining the implications of the term in the maritime
context).
502. See, e.g., The Canadian Wheat Board, Parliamentary Research Board 98-2E (Sept.
1998); The Australian Wheat Industry, 2006 AUSTL. Y.B. 436.
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wool, 0 3 and in other countries, including New Zealand.5°4 Although these
arrangements not infrequently incorporated a protectionist aspect, what
they essentially had in common was that they all represented instances of
crisis management in the form of governmental interventions into the
market place in the wider interests of social stability. In the case of New
Zealand, for example, they were specifically designed to combat the ac-
tivities of black marketeers during World War I.5°  Despite this strong
wartime association, "orderly marketing" arrangements had also been
adopted at other times of trade turmoil or acute national stress, as in the
case of the U.S. farming industry during the 1930s, following "sporadic
outbreaks of violence on American farms," and fears of an imminent
"revolution in the countryside."'5c Furthermore, the terminology of "or-
derly marketing" was to re-emerge in other international commodities
agreements dedicated to the achievement of stability in the immediate
postwar era, such as the 1951 Commonwealth Sugar Agreement,50 7 and
in the vernacular of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.00
In light of this general pattern of usage, the "ordinary meaning" of
the word "orderly" in its context in the ICRW should sensibly be seen as
going far beyond a desire to impose a degree of organization on the
503. M.J. Keneley, Woolgrowers, Brokers and the Debate over the Sale of the Australian
Wool Clip, 1920-1925, 41 AUSTL. ECON. HIST. REV. 35, 41 (2001).
504. See J.V.T. Baker, War Economy, in OFFICIAL HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND IN THE
SECOND WORLD WAR, 1939-45, 1, 1-3 (1965), available at http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/
tei-WH2Econ-_N72825.html.
505. Id. at 1.
506. Agricultural Adjustment Relief Plan: Hearings on H.R. 13991 before the U.S. Sen-
ate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 72nd Cong. 15 (1933) (statement of Edward A.
O'Neal, President, American Farm Bureau Federation).
507. See generally Arvid Boolell, ACP Ministerial Spokesman on Sugar & Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Cooperatives, Address at the Proceedings of the Fiji/FAO 1997
Asia Pacific Sugar Conference: The Importance of Special Trading Arrangements in the Pro-
motion of Growth and Stability in Developing Countries, http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/
X0513E/x05l3e08.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2008) (noting that this agreement was recently
described as representing the beginnings of a process of liberation for producing countries
from "the bondage of poverty and misery," through its contribution to "social harmony" and
the "principles of democracy, good governance and the rule of law").
508. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT]; R. Sharma, Agriculture in the GATE: A Historical Account, in MUL-
TILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE: INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL TOPICS
(FAO Corporate Doc. Repository 2000), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/003x7352e/
X7352E04.htm (describing GATT as aiming to create "an orderly and transparent framework
within which barriers to trade could be gradually reduced and international trade expanded").
In a more specific sense, Orderly Marketing Agreements (OMAs) are understood to refer to
inter-governmental arrangements designed to ensure stability through the restraint, by means
of quotas or licenses, of surges in exports that might otherwise threaten to disrupt sensitive sec-
tors of industry in the importing country. See, e.g., Institute for Trade and Commercial
Diplomacy, Glossary: I. Terms Related to Trade Policy and Negotiations (2004), available at
http://www.itconline/introduction/glossaryl-opqr.html (providing a comprehensive definition).
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industry, and to reflect the need to ensure that its activities did not pose
any threat to international peace and stability. This obviously begs the
question of why such concerns should have arisen in this particular con-
text: after all, there had been several earlier examples of instruments
which established international institutions concerned with the exploita-
tion of fishery resources,5 0 but they do not appear to have disclosed any
preoccupation with orderly conduct or conditions in the above sense.
The simple answer seems to be that what distinguished whaling from
these other activities was its much greater potential for generating dis-
cord, particularly in light of the political circumstances surrounding the
conduct of the negotiations. As one commentator put it,
[flisheries organizations preceding the IWC were established to
achieve essentially non-controversial tasks: to promote research
... or to rebuild stocks which had been depleted .... Under the
1946 Convention[,] the Whaling Commission was concerned
with the prevention of overfishing. Here the interests of nations
do not coincide. Accordingly the Whaling Commission was the
first international fisheries organization to deal with problems
that were inherently controversial in nature50°
In fact, the hazards that the IWC would inevitably have to address
were quite formidable, and stemmed from the interactions amongst a
number of key factors. First, the ICRW was expressly designed to regu-
late the whaling industry, the inherent intractability of which was
demonstrated by the fact that it had effectively defied all previous at-
tempts at regulation. Secondly, the complexities of this regulatory
endeavor arose both in the marketing and the harvesting phases of activ-
ity. As to the former, under-production of essential oils and fats, and for
some communities meat, could have proved disastrous in light of post-
war food shortages. At the same time, the problems associated with over-
production were already well appreciated, not least with regard to their
impact on the precarious condition of whale populations. In particular,
the rapid postwar escalation of investment in whaling had created a
509. See, e.g., Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size
Limits of Fish, Apr. 5, 1946, 1956 U.K.T.S. 8; Convention for the Protection, Preservation,
and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System, U.S.-Can., May
26, 1930, 8 U.S.T. 1058; Convention for the Preservation of the Pacific Halibut Fishery, U.S.-
Can., Mar. 2, 1923, 32 U.N.T.S. 93. Note also the existence of the International Council for
the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), created in 1902, and the International Commission for the
Scientific Exploration of the Mediterranean Sea (1919), neither of which was constituted on a
treaty basis until after the adoption of the ICRW.
510. ALBERT W. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIEs 88 (1973);
see also CHERFAS, supra note 386, at Ill (noting that without the establishment of effective
institutional regulation, "there might have been appalling conflict").
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renewed risk of extreme and unbridled over-exploitation. Thirdly, over
and above the threat to conservation, potential problems arose from the
extreme volatility of whaling as an activity, as exemplified by (i) the
highly competitive nature of the harvesting process, which came to be
known as the "Whaling Olympics"; (ii) the fact that this process would
necessarily unfold on the oceans, where direct confrontations between
participants could occur in circumstances far removed from the social
and political constraints that normally govern commercial activities; (iii)
the consideration that the particular arena where this drama would
largely be enacted was, as explained above, one of the utmost political
sensitivity; and (iv) the fact that the principal protagonists not only
shared a long history of intense rivalry in these matters, but had in addi-
tion barely emerged from a situation of all-out global conflict, in which
the nature and consequences of their involvement had been highly diver-
gent, to say the least.5 '
To expand on these points, it can be observed that, in the years im-
mediately preceding World War II, diplomatic correspondence between
putative IWC members, especially Norway and the United Kingdom,
had been peppered with frosty exchanges over fisheries matters, whaling
included 1 2 In a number of cases, the use of force-usually in the form
of the deployment of naval gunboats-had been called for by fishermen,
and actively considered or even specifically threatened, by govern-
ments. "'3 In 1946, forebodings as to the threats posed to stability and
good order by confrontations over the exploitation of marine resources
would inevitably have loomed largest in areas where there was a risk of
fanning back into flame the dying embers of the recent military conflagra-
tion. As an example, in the months leading up to the Washington
Conference, the U.S. government had received urgent expressions of con-
cern from its Australian counterpart over the extension of Japanese
whaling "into waters of direct and permanent security interest to Australia,
511. Even leaving aside the case of Japan, consider simply the positions of the five
States on whose ratification entry into force of the ICRW was to be made conditional: the
Netherlands, Norway, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
512. See, e.g., 63 BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS [hereinafter BDFA], ser. F,
pt. 2, Docs. 205, 229, 252, 272-274 (Kenneth Bourne, D. Cameron Watt & Michael Partridge
eds., 1996) (noting the ongoing dispute over fishing limits between these States); 64 BDFA,
supra, ser. F, pt. 2, Does. 143, 163; 65 BDFA, supra, ser. F, pt. 2, Docs. 18, 19, 113, 114; 66
BDFA, supra, ser. F, pt. 2, Does. 112, 113; 64 BDFA, supra, ser. F, pt. 2, Doc. 120 (concern-
ing whaling disputes in particular); 65 BDFA, supra, ser. F, pt. 2, Does. 81, 96 (regarding
trawler disputes with Iceland); 18 BDFA, supra, ser. E, pt. 2, Does. 53, 93-97, 112, 113 (ex-
hibiting the disputes between the USSR and Japan).
513. See 63 BDFA, supra note 512, ser. F, pt. 2, Doc. 229; 18 BDFA, supra note 512,
ser. E, pt. 2, Doc. 53 (noting the Japanese government's declared willingness "in the last resort
to take effective and appropriate measures for the defence of Japan's rights").
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without prior consultation."'5 4 The British, along with Norway and New
Zealand, had voiced similar anxieties, echoes of which continued to cir-
culate in public debate for many months 5
Of course, it was not to be expected that the specific reasons why
good order might be at risk would have been identified or elaborated on
in the text of the ICRW itself: that would scarcely have been considered
appropriate t 6 Nevertheless, they would have been fully apparent to the
negotiating States, as is evidenced by their reiteration at meetings of the
Far East Commission and their reemergence in the terms of the Treaty
of Peace with Japan"8-not finally concluded until September 1951-to
which almost all of those States were to become parties. A key element
of this instrument was the requirement that Japan enter into negotiations
with the Allied Powers for the regulation and limitation of fishing and
the conservation and development of high seas fisheries," 9 and the par-
ticular urgency of such action in relation to whaling is evident from
Japan's admission to the IWC some months before the Treaty of Peace
was actually finalized.
Even amongst the Allied Powers themselves, and specifically those
that were directly involved in the Washington ICRW negotiations,
tensions had been steadily escalating during 1946, not only with regard
to Antarctica but over a host of issues of more general political
significance. 52' During the months leading up to the Conference,
514. Aide-memoire from the U.S. Department of State, forwarded by the Australian
Embassy in Washington, D.C., to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 26,
1946, reprinted in 10 HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS: DOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN
POLICY, supra note 412, No.138, available at http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/
HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/10-138.
515. See, e.g., ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1946, at 843; ECONOMIST, June 28, 1947, at 1043.
516. Aide-memoire, supra note 514. The U.S. government's correspondence with the
Australian government over its specific concerns in this matter was classified as "Most Imme-
diate Secret."
517. See Cablegram 869 from the U.S. Department of State to the Australian Department
of Foreign Affairs, July 3, 1947, reprinted in 12 HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS: DOCUMENTS ON
AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 412, No. 402, available at http://
www.info.dfat.gov.auL/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/(LookupVolNoNumber)/l 2-402. Despite
the acuteness of Australian sensitivities on this issue, the matter was ultimately not pressed at
FEC, as it was anticipated that the United States, determined to reduce the burden on its econ-
omy of support for Japan, would use its power of veto for the first time in that organization.
518. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 46.
519. See id. art. 9.
520. To put the matter into perspective, the key objectives of the Australians, as far as the
Peace Treaty was concerned, specifically included, alongside all of the expected elements,
"the banning of Japanese whaling in the Antarctic." Cabinet Submission, May 22, 1947,
reprinted in 12 HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS: DOCUMENTS ON AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY,
supra note 412, No. 314, available at http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical[HistDocs.nsf/
(LookupVolNoNumber)/1 2-314.
521. To take just the briefest sample, U.S. policy regarding the testing and exclusive
possession of nuclear weapons had attracted protest from a variety of sources; the USSR had
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moreover, the extreme fragility of maritime security had been
dramatically exposed by events in the Corfu Channel,522 which were
subsequently to provide the newly created ICJ with its first substantive
item of business.523 In these circumstances, it would have been altogether
extraordinary if the need to ensure that the rapid escalation of whaling
did not further prejudice good order had not been a prominent
consideration in the consciousness of participants in the ICRW
524negotiating process .
There is certainly little room for doubt of this in the case of the
United States. The urgent need for a new array of institutional arrange-
ments to regulate not merely political relations, but economic and
commercial activities, had been explained to Congress by President Roo-
sevelt in 1945.525 Essentially, the choice was seen as lying between "a
world caught again in the maelstrom of panic and economic warfare
culminating in war ... or a world in which the members strive for a bet-
ter life through mutual trust, cooperation, and assistance. 5 6
Alongside the creation of a new world financial system and a food
and agriculture organization within the United Nations, this was seen to
found itself increasingly at odds with the other major powers over a range of issues, including
its own plans to build a nuclear bomb, the creation of the so-called "Iron Curtain," spying
activities, the question of admission of States to the United Nations, and the appointment of
the first Secretary-General; the United Kingdom and the United States had been involved in
sharp exchanges over the situation in Palestine; South Africa had been condemned over its
plans for South-West Africa and Argentina in connection with the sheltering of war criminals.
522. See generally ERIC LEGGETT, THE CORFU INCIDENT (1974) (providing a graphic,
journalistic account of the incident).
523. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
524. Memories were perhaps also still fresh of the devastating consequences of a 1941
wartime incident concerning the whaling industry specifically, when an entire Norwegian
whaling fleet was seized by German vessels off Antarctica. Note the following account of this
extraordinary episode:
World War II interrupted any further research efforts in Antarctica, but the continent
was not immune to wartime activity. On the night of January 13th 1941, German
commandos boarded and captured two Norwegian factory ships in the sea north of
Dronning Maud Land. By the end of the next day, the Germans had taken posses-
sion of three factory ships and eleven catchers. The German navy later used the
waters of the peninsula and the sub-Antarctic islands as a haven from which they
could venture forth to attack allied shipping. Their main base was an obscure harbor
on Kerguelen Island. Mines laid by this German Antarctic fleet around the ports of
Australia sank the first American vessel lost to enemy action.
Antarctic History, http://www.antarcticonline.com/antarctica/history/history.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2008); see also Byrd & Cruzen, supra note 459, ch. 2; Norwegian Victims of Pinguin,
http://www.warsailors.com/raidervictims/pinguin2.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2008).
525. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Bretton Woods Money and
Banking Proposals, Feb. 12, 1945, reprinted in 13 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 548 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
526. Id.
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require in particular "the reduction of trade barriers, the control of car-
tels, and the orderly marketing" of commodities.527 In relation to
whaling, it was, furthermore, precisely the establishment of a new stand-
ing body, the IWC, that created the opportunity for the imposition of
order, and indeed for the full ramifications of the ICRW's preambular
notions of propriety and orderliness to be progressively elaborated over
time.
All these considerations strongly support the notion that the empha-
sis of the final preambular paragraph is on orderly development rather
than development as such. In view of the unequivocal indications at the
time of a rapid and imminent intensification of competition in the pursuit
of whales, the aim was not so much to facilitate the development of the
industry as to ensure that its already inevitable, and indeed potentially
rampant, expansion did not prove prejudicial to the good order of the
oceans, and thereby of the international community generally. Indeed,
given the abandonment of profitability as the overt motivation for regula-
tion, and the relegation of whaling industry interests generally to the
status of only subordinate concerns, it is simply not credible to see the
development of the industry for its own sake as the ultimate objective of
the ICRW, or even as one of its major goals.
c. The Text as a Whole
Yet it would still be unwise to embrace this conclusion as definitive
without pursuing the process of interpretation through all of its stages.
The task of identifying the object and purpose of the ICRW may begin
with the preamble, but it does not end there, and it is also necessary to
examine the text as a whole for confirmation, or indeed counter-
indications, regarding the view provisionally reached on this issue. In
fact, relatively few provisions shed much additional light, though those
that do tend to reinforce the impression of a radical change of fundamen-
tal objectives. Article X, for example, is noteworthy in allowing non-
whaling States to become parties to the ICRW because, although this
was theoretically possible under the earlier whaling agreements as well,
the consequences would now be entirely different. Instead of merely as-
suming a series of obligations (which would be of little relevance for
States that were not actually engaged in whaling), such States would
henceforth acquire significant powers, since, as members of the Com-
mission, they would enjoy an equal say in shaping the ongoing evolution
of the regime.528 Obviously, the involvement of such States might consid-
erably enhance the prospects of imposing order on the industry and
527. Id. (emphasis added).
528. ICRW, supra note 1, art. 111(1).
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conserving stocks, confirming that the preambular recognition of the
interests of all nations was no mere rhetorical flourish.
Perhaps the key provision in this context, however, is Article V(2),
which established the parameters for future development of the Conven-
tion through adjustment of the Schedule, in which the detail of the
regulatory scheme was set out. Amendments were, first of all, to be
"such as are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this
Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and opti-
mum utilization of the whale resources. '5 29 This wording is surprising in
that the imposition of these two conditions, linked by the word "and,"
might be taken to suggest that the conservation, development, and opti-
mum utilization of whale stocks were not in themselves part of the
ICRW's original objectives. Yet, in light of the preamble, this can
scarcely be true of conservation and development, even if it is in the case
of optimum utilization. On the other hand, by requiring that future
amendments satisfy this composite criterion, this provision unquestiona-
bly gives "optimum utilization" a substantial role in shaping the
Convention's future. Perhaps this clause is best understood as providing
confirmation that the objectives of the Convention extended beyond con-
servation and rational utilization alone to embrace other concerns as
well, the preservation of good order in maritime affairs obviously being
the most plausible candidate. Although it cannot be claimed that the
wording of these provisions is ideal, some sense can at least be made of
them by reading them in that way.
Optimum utilization itself is not defined, and was presumably left to
be elaborated over the course of time, though there is certainly nothing
to suggest that it equated to maximum utilization.3 In light of concerns
expressed in the preamble, however, it should at least be taken to have
entailed that immediate attention be paid to the avoidance of economic
and nutritional distress, and the ongoing relevance of such considerations
is confirmed by sub-paragraph (d) of Article V(2), which requires that
amendments "take into consideration the interests of the consumers of
whale products and of the whaling industry."53' This wording, however,
strongly underlines the extent to which the profitability of the whaling
industry had been relegated in importance: henceforth, the interests of
the industry were not to be the only, or even the paramount, considera-
tion, and should not dictate the outcome, but merely have some claim to
influence it.532 Profitability as such is not mentioned at all. In its place,
529. Id. art. V(2)(a) (emphasis added).
530. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part II.B.2.d.
531. ICRW, supra note 1, arts. V(2)(b), V(2)(d).
532. See William T. Burke, Memorandum of Opinion on the Legality of the Designation
of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary by the IWC, 27 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 315 (1996) (stating
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sub-paragraph (b) identified a new consideration-science-the findings
of which were intended to become a fundamental (albeit clearly not ex-
clusive)533 element in the elaboration of the regulatory system for the
future.
Despite this new emphasis, the provisions of the ICRW were plainly
not intended to subjugate the industry entirely. All remained free to
compete for acquisition of the resource, since, as noted above, Article
V(2)(c) expressly forbade the imposition of restrictions on the number or
nationality of factory ships or land stations, or the allocation of specific
quotas to any factory ship or land station, or to any group thereof, de-
spite the fact that such measures might well have proved "the most
effective for conservation purposes. 534 In addition, traditional attach-
ments to state sovereignty dictated the eventual retention of a power to
opt out of agreed controls via the objections procedure, against the
wishes of certain whaling nations, who foresaw the abuses that might
follow.536 Ironically, it seems to have been the United States that ulti-
mately insisted on the inclusion of this provision,537 partly no doubt out
of concern that certain whaling States might otherwise not agree to par-
ticipate at all, but also, perhaps, partly out of unwillingness in principle
to contemplate its own ultimate powers of decision being curbed by an
international institution.
d. Preparatory Work
Next, it must be remembered that the materials relevant to treaty in-
terpretation are not strictly confined within the four corners of the text,
but may in appropriate circumstances be gleaned from beyond. Article
that the phrase "shall take into consideration" is "a formula that serves mainly as a reminder
of relevant interests rather than mandating satisfaction of such interests").
533. Fundamental, in the sense that amendments were to be "based on" scientific find-
ings, but clearly not exclusive, in that the additional considerations enumerated above had also
to be borne in mind.
534. BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 192. It seems that ideological considerations may have
triumphed here over pragmatism and good sense. It is perhaps unfortunate that the United
States had not paid more heed to the successes it had achieved through an earlier treaty con-
cerning the exploitation of marine mammals which had involved a far more interventionist
approach to management and exploitation. See Convention for the Preservation and Protection
of Fur Seals, Dec. 14, 1911, 37 Stat. 1542, 214 Consol. T.S. 80.
535. ICRW, supra note 1.
536. See IWC, Minutes of the 2nd Session, supra note 412, 1 263-271 (noting that the
United Kingdom, backed by Norway, voiced the strongest opposition); IWC, Minutes of the
10th Session, supra note 412, $T 43-103 (same).
537. IWC, Minutes of the 2nd Session, supra note 412 (noting that it was most strongly
supported by France, which saw it as an important safeguard for sovereignty in light of the
importance of the issues under discussion and the lack of prior notice of the detail of the U.S.
proposals); BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 162 (noting that the U.S. position perpetuated the
stance it had taken at the earlier, 1945, negotiations, prior to embarking on the current draft).
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32 of the Vienna Convention, for example, refers to the preparatory work
of the treaty as a "supplementary means of interpretation" to which re-
sort may be had to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of
the basic rule of interpretation under Article 31, or to determine the
meaning when that process
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable."'
In point of fact, passing reference has already been made to the
background to development of the ICRW, and relatively little needs to be
added here. It is well-known in any event that the guidance to be gained
from such sources is often limited and equivocal, which is why they are
accorded an essentially subsidiary role under the Vienna Convention.
A further difficulty here is that the ILC purposely refrained from de-
fining the notion of travaux priparatoires, but did indicate that they
should not necessarily be regarded as limited to published documents, or
to records of deliberations in which all the eventual parties had partici-
pated.539 Plainly, this approach creates some uncertainty with regard to
where the line should be drawn in circumstances in which, as in this
case, all the preliminary drafting work has been undertaken by a single
State. Common sense suggests that the records of the Washington Con-
ference itself should be regarded as the primary source of guidance,
though it may still be instructive to take brief cognizance of the general
background to the genesis of the text, if only as a means of setting the
negotiations in context.
Specifically, it is noteworthy that, since the only draft for considera-
tion in Washington had been prepared by the United States, the primary
force in shaping its original form and content was not the whaling indus-
try itself, as the United States had none to speak of at the time. Instead,
that role fell to the career diplomats and lawyers of the U.S. State De-
partment, together with their established cetacean expert, A. Remington
Kellogg.540 Kellogg, who has been described as arguably "the single most
538. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 31-32.
539. ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at 223. One passage might be read to require that
unpublished documents at least be accessible. In Iron Rhine Railway Arbitration, it was held
that documentary materials may only be deemed to possess the character of travaux pripera-
toires to the extent that they "serve the purpose of illuminating a common understanding" of
the negotiating States as to the meaning of particular terms. Iron Rhine Ry. Arb. (Belg. v.
Neth.), 27 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 41,63 (Per. Ct. Arb. 2005).
540. It is clear that there was also significant input from fisheries officials, though some
of this was to be excised from the draft during the negotiations. See infra text accompanying
notes 571-575.
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influential person in the history of efforts to regulate whaling, '5 4 ' had
been a member of the U.S. delegation to the earlier 1930 and 1937 whal-
ing conferences and was subsequently to chair both the Washington
Conference and, ultimately, the IWC itself. Significantly, his profes-
sional background was as an academic researcher in marine mammal
palaeo-biology and an administrator in educational and scientific institu-
tions, most notably the Smithsonian. His strong personal interests, as his
papers confirm, lay in the evolution and conservation of whales rather
than the development of whaling. 42 This disposition was evident in the
fact that he "had strongly advocated trade sanctions against whaling na-
tions that did not join the IWC, but U.S. diplomats decided that trade and
conservation issues should not be intertwined. 543
Where he was much more successful, however, was in urging the
Department of State
to use the opportunity provided by World War II to grab control
of whaling diplomacy from Norway and the United Kingdom.
He feared ... that the British and Norwegians would be more
concerned with harvesting whales in the aftermath of the war
than with conserving them. Only American leadership, he con-
cluded, could give science its proper place relative to the
whalers, who seemed to have too much say in London and
Oslo.,"
Such considerations would not, of course, be of any great legal sig-
nificance were it not for the fact that they had such an obvious effect on
the way the structure and content of the ICRW was actually to evolve.
Undoubtedly, the whaling industry had bequeathed to the United States a
significant legacy in the form of the text of the earlier agreements, which
rendered it unnecessary to begin the drafting process with a completely
blank sheet, but beyond that their essential role in 1946 was only as
eleventh hour consultees. In all these circumstances, and bearing in mind
also the very recent termination of global hostilities, it would have been
surprising if the main thrust of the innovatory input to the regulation of
whaling had not resided in science-based conservation, institutional co-
operation, diplomacy, and the rule of law, as indeed the analysis of the
text offered in earlier sections of this Part suggests that it did.
541. Kurk Dorsey, US Foreign Policy Encyclopedia: Environmental Diplomacy, http://
www.answers.com/topic/environmental diplomacy (last visited Aug. 29, 2008).
542. Id. (conducting extensive research on Kellogg's personal papers in preparing his
analysis); Remington Kellogg, The History of Whales: Their Adaptation to Life in the Water, 3
Q. REV. BIOLOGY 29-76, 174-208 (1928).
543. Dorsey, supra note 541.
544. Id.
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As regards the Conference itself, certain general observations are
also in order. First, although it was no part of its formal brief to discuss
the military conflagration from which the world had so recently
emerged, the war inevitably came to form a kind of continuous backdrop
on to which the deliberations were projected. It was, after all, the pri-
mary reason for the troubling food shortages, especially of oils and
fats,u'5 which now needed to be addressed; for the original loss, and sub-
sequent potential restoration, of ships to the whaling industry,546 which
was now expanding at a precipitate rate;5 47 for the possible recovery in
whale populations during the recent hiatus in exploitation; for the ab-
sence, loss, or destruction of records regarding certain categories of
whaling activities;5 4 ' and for the sensitivities over the resumption of
whaling in crucial areas.5 49 As noted above, it also provided the explana-
tion for the absence of one key player, Japan,550 whose future role in the
overall unfolding of events would obviously be critical, but who lacked
any opportunity to influence the shape of the regime under which they
would be conducted. In hindsight, and with the benefit of temporal dis-
tance from these events, it would have been greatly preferable if Japan
had been represented at the proceedings.
On questions of detail, however, the Conference was somewhat less
instructive for present purposes, since, although the plenary sessions
were comprehensively minuted, they contain relatively little of relevance
to the elucidation of the Convention's objectives. As is not unusual at
such events, most delegations appear to have arrived with a shopping list
of specific substantive items for inclusion in--or exclusion from-the
draft, and had not exercised their minds greatly over questions of general
policy or philosophy. Consequently, when Kellogg, having confirmed
from the Chair that the function of the preamble was indeed to provide
an indication of the ICRW's object and purpose,55' requested comments
on its wording, none were forthcoming. Regrettably, this appears to have
545. IWC/14, supra note 412, §§ 60-72; Corrigendum to IWC/14 (on file with IWC).
546. See, e.g., IWC, Minutes of the 13th Session, 9TT[ 32 et seq., IWC/14 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2,
1946) (on file with IWC).
547. IWC, Minutes of the 4th Session, U 22 et seq., IWC/14 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on
file with IWC).
548. See IWC, Norwegian Investigations in the Antarctic, IWC/19 (on file with IWC);
IWC, Report on Japanese Whaling Operations 1939-45, IWC/51 (on file with IWC).
549. See supra Part III.B.2.a.
550. Japanese attitudes and activities were not infrequently the focus of express consid-
eration at the Conference. See IWC, Minutes of the 3rd Session, T 60, IWC/14 (Nov. 20-Dec.
2, 1946) (on file with IWC); IWC, Minutes of the 4th Session, supra note 547; IWC, Minutes
of the 13th Session, supra note 546; IWC, Report on Japanese Whaling Operations, supra
note 548. One may surmise that it was much more often the undisclosed subject of attention in
the minds of participants.
551. IWC, Minutes of the 2nd Session, supra note 412, T 137.
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been the case on each occasion that the matter was raised, from the ini-
tial presentation of the original draft, right through to the adoption,
without objection, of the final amended version,52 despite the fact that
the phraseology had undergone quite extensive modification in the in-
terim. These changes had been effected by an ad hoc Drafting
Committee,553 and seem for the most part to have been made purely in
the interests of achieving greater clarity, brevity, elegance, and coher-
ence: this is precisely as might be expected, as it was not the role of this
Committee to make alterations of substance. On the other hand, this is a
notoriously difficult frontier to police, and it may on occasion have been
transgressed, although the Chair of that Committee was certainly alert to
the desirability in principle for genuinely substantive issues to be trans-
ferred to other groups. 54 Unfortunately, committee deliberations appear
in the official records not in the form of detailed minutes, but as brief
overview reports and, in the case of this particular committee, merely the
text of the draft treaty with proposed changes overwritten on it, 555 making
it difficult to ascertain their precise rationale.
As regards the crucial, final recital of the preamble, it is interesting
to note that the wording of the original U.S. draft had contained no spe-
cific reference to the whaling industry at all, but had stated, "[h]aving
decided to conclude a convention to provide for the orderly conservation
and development of the whale fisheries. 55 6 Plainly, however, the expres-
sion "orderly conservation" is less than ideal either semantically or
stylistically, and it was transformed into "the proper conservation of
whale stocks" in the ultimate version, which also produced greater con-
sistency with the wording of the previous recital. The word "orderly"
was obviously considered too important to lose, however, and came to be
attached to a newly inserted phrase-"development of the whaling in-
dustry"-to which it more accurately relates. This strongly supports the
notion that the incorporation of this latter phrase was designed essen-
tially to provide a suitable semantic peg on which to hang the concern
552. See id. 137-142; IWC, Minutes of the 7th Session, 232-235, IWC/14 (Nov.
20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on file with IWC); IWC, Minutes of the 12th Session, IT 78-81, IWC/14
(Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on file with IWC).
553. The Committee was chaired by Thomson (United Kingdom) and comprised repre-
sentatives of the various national delegations as follows: Chile (1), France (3), the Netherlands
(1), New Zealand (1), Norway (3), the United Kingdom (I other), and the United States (2).
Consequently, all of the major whaling interests were represented. It was supported by a U.S.
secretariat of two. See IWC, Final Act of the Conference, IWC/64 (on file with IWC).
554. See, e.g., IWC, Minutes of the 8th Session, 57, IWC/14 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946)
(on file with IWC).
555. See IWC, Report of the Drafting Committee, IWC/49 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on
file with IWC).
556. See IWC, United States Draft of the International Convention on the Regulation of
Whaling, IWC/3 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on file with IWC).
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for good order, rather than to indicate a redirection of basic objectives
for the benefit of the whaling industry, since it was not the function of
the Drafting Committee to make such changes.
The discussions in plenary session, for what they are worth, offer
broad endorsement to that interpretation. Passing references were unde-
niably made by various delegations to the importance to them of the
whaling industry and the difficulties it faced,557 and individual provisions
were certainly revisited to take account of such concerns. 58 But, the
United States repeatedly drew attention, without apparent challenge, to
the fact that the overall objective was one of conservation. Addressing
the Conference in its opening session, Under-Secretary of State Acheson
recalled the era in which the United States had itself been the primary
exploiter of whale resources and regretted that conservation responsibili-
ties had not been taken more seriously during that period.559
Conservation can, of course, readily be viewed not as posing a threat to
the interests of the industry at all, but rather as a prerequisite to its long-
term survival, and the United States was certainly not averse to making
that connection 6 0 although that in any event served its own interests by
offering an inducement to participants to adopt and ratify the ICRW. By
contrast, however, when it came to matters that concerned the develop-
ment of the industry in a more general sense-such as the Dutch
objections to the Norwegian embargo on the provisions of skilled em-
ployees to new entrants to the whaling industry, which they regarded as
discriminatory-the U.S. delegation remained resolute in their determi-
nation to keep them out of the draft. Although considerable opportunity
was allowed for the matter to be aired in debate,5 6' Kellogg, from the
Chair, expressed the view that it was beyond the formal remit of a "con-
servation conference. 5 62 The U.S. position was confirmed during the
557. See, e.g., IWC, Minutes of the Opening Session, IWC/14 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946)
(on file with IWC) (U.K. response to opening address); IWC, Minutes of the 2nd Session,
supra note 412 (statement of the Netherlands); IWC, Minutes of the 4th Session, supra note
547 (statement of the USSR). The Norwegian delegation arranged for the showing on several
occasions of a film designed to demonstrate "the magnitude and importance of the whaling
industry." See C.G. Davidson, Nor. Assistant Sec'y of the Interior, Address, IWC/42 (July 2-6,
1990) (on file with IWC).
558. These were often points of detail. The Norwegians were, for example, concerned
about the issue of penalties for illegally taken whales. See IWC, Minutes of the 3rd Session,
supra note 550, 53.
559. IWC, Minutes of the Opening Session, supra note 557 (opening address by David-
son).
560. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 557.
561. Indeed, a committee was created to address the matter, although, since it contained
both principal protagonists, it was unable to reach a conclusion. See IWC, Report of the Indus-
try Committee, IWC/59 (May 28-31, 2007) (on file with IWC).
562. See IWC, Minutes of the 2nd Session, supra note 412, 76.
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Thirteenth Session: "We came together to discuss conservation of whale
stocks. This issue which has come forth is broadly related to the whole
question of whaling, however, we feel that it is strictly a question of for-
eign policy which should be taken up by other means.
5 63
Eventually, it was decided by nine votes to three not to offer collec-
tive endorsement of the Dutch concerns even in the Final Act, let alone
in the treaty itself.564 A British proposal to impose sanctions on nations
that ultimately declined to participate in the ICRW regime received even
shorter shrift from the U.S. delegation, on the grounds that it was inap-
propriate "in a strictly conservation measure"-the economic aspects of
whaling should be dealt with through other channels.56 ' Here, too, their
view ultimately prevailed.566
As regards elucidation of the wider aspects of the Convention's ob-
ject and purpose, drawn from the preamble as a whole, the few faint
glimmers of light to be derived from the discussions tended to emphasize
the interests of whales rather than the whaling industry. In a telling in-
stance of scene-setting for the entire Conference, Acheson's opening
address drew specific attention to the fact that whales "belong to no sin-
gle nation nor to a group of nations but rather they are the wards of the
entire world. 567 In so doing, he underlined, first, the truly global nature
of the interest in cetacean stocks and the determination effectively to
reclaim them from the handful of States still engaged in active exploita-
tion. The lack of any restriction on the ability of nations to join the IWC
can therefore justly be seen as a direct and tangible means of giving ef-
fect to this aspiration. It is clear, moreover, that the implications of this
563. IWC, Minutes of the 13th Session, supra note 546, 67.
564. The Netherlands was, however, permitted to attach an addendum to the Final Act,
recording the tenor of the discussion. It should be noted that even the Dutch statement had
attempted to justify the need for action "in the interest of effective conservation and develop-
ment of whale stocks" and not "in the interest of development of the whaling industry." See id.
(concluding the debate on industrial whaling).
565. IWC, Minutes of the 14th Session, TT 330, 336, IWC/14 (Nov. 20-Dec. 2, 1946) (on
file with IWC). It was also made clear that "the instructions of the American delegation allow
no latitude on this point." Id. In reality, of course, securing the participation of all the major
players could readily be construed as absolutely vital to conservation. Indeed, a major irony is
that it was the U.S. delegation that had first formulated this very proposal in previous confer-
ences, when the United Kingdom had been unwilling to support it. See id. (concluding the
debate on industrial whaling). Dorsey suggests that the State Department may well have pre-
vailed over Kellogg himself on this point. See supra text accompanying note 541. Actually, the
United States gave a number of reasons why it was now opposed to such action, including that
it was contrary to its policy on international trade and was in any event unlikely to work. Per-
haps it was judged unduly inflammatory in the postwar context, the United States believing
that there were other means by which the participation of key players could be secured. See
IWC, Minutes of the 14th Session, supra.
566. See Minutes of the 14th Session, supra note 565, 336.
567. IWC, Minutes of the Opening Session, supra note 557 (opening address by
Acheson).
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provision were fully appreciated by the negotiating States, since there
was specific discussion of the possible impact on decision-making of
Member States with little personal interest in whaling.568 Secondly, the
striking description here of whales not merely as resources but as "wards
of the entire world" is strongly suggestive of their recognition as entities
worthy of consideration in their own right.5 69 If so, it tends to confirm the
potential duality of focus envisaged in the regulatory regime between the
"protection" of whales for their own sake, and the "conservation" of
whales as resources. Patricia W. Birnie correctly notes in this connection
that the U.S. recruitment of the notion of wardship did not result in any
formal change in the legal status of whales under the Convention, in that
they were still seen as a common property resource,57 ° but this fact is in
no way inconsistent with the possibility that the motivations underlying
the instrument had expanded to include protection of whales for their
own sake.
Obviously, much would also depend on how the key concept deriv-
ing from Article V, that of "optimum utilization," was properly to be
interpreted, though that would seem effectively to have been left to be
determined over the course of time. One intriguing aspect of this issue,
however, is that the original American draft of the preamble had ex-
pressly included a statement that the "ultimate objective should be to
achieve and to maintain the stocks at a level which will permit a sus-
tained capture of the maximum number of whales, 57' but that this
statement was excised completely during the course of the negotiations.
Ordinarily, such an excision could be taken as a reasonably clear indica-
tion of a deliberate change of policy,5 72 although in this case it appears to
have been effected by the Drafting Committee,573 which would not nor-
mally have been expected to undertake modifications of such substantive
magnitude and effect. It is possible that the explanation may lie in a con-
cession by the U.S. delegation in another context that, in preparing the
568. See, e.g., IWC, Minutes of the 10th Session, supra note 412, 145.
569. Certainly, legal notions of wardship or guardianship would commonly carry that
implication.
570. BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 166.
571. This language appeared in the wording of what became the fourth recital, after the
reference to the need to avoid economic and nutritional distress. See IWC, United States Draft
of the Preamble to the International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling (Nov. 20-Dec.
2, 1946) (on file with IWC).
572. Indeed there is judicial authority for the view that "[i]n the technique of treaty in-
terpretation, there can never be a better demonstration of an intention not to provide for
something than first including and then dropping it." Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 14, T 45 (1975) (separate opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice). While this proposi-
tion may have been overstated, it does make a valid general point.
573. See IWC, Notes of the Drafting Committee of the 49th Annual Meeting (1997) (on
file with IWC).
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draft, it had for convenience engaged in what it called a "pot-boiling op-
eration," which had entailed the incorporation of various notions and
provisions commonly found in fisheries arrangements generally. It read-
ily agreed that it would be sound practice to eliminate any that were
judged inappropriate, superfluous or misleading, and it may therefore be
the case that the "maximum sustained capture" objective fell victim to
that particular purge.574 It was certainly a concept that was beginning to
gain firm acceptance in North American fishery management circles at
the time,"' but perhaps it was ultimately thought unsuitable for the
ICRW. What cannot be denied, however, is that the Convention as finally
approved contained no such objective or expectation, and that its omis-
sion had survived the scrutiny of all the major whaling nations at the
committee stage, and of every delegation present in plenary session.
e. Elucidation from External Sources
Finally, there are various grounds on which it may be relevant to
consider other materials external to the treaty itself for the purposes of
its interpretation. In particular, recourse may be permitted under Article
32 of the Vienna Convention to other agreements, to instances of state
practice, and to surrounding factual conditions as supplementary means
for the interpretation of any given treaty insofar as they form part of the
"circumstances of its conclusion," while norms deriving from other
agreements, or from any other authoritative source, may have to be taken
into account to the extent that they constitute "relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the parties" within the
meaning of Article 31(3)(c). In point of fact, numerous references have
already been made to such sources in the discussion above, and the pur-
pose of this Section is largely to address any that may previously have
been overlooked.
In particular, it is noteworthy that Document 58/12 itself refers to the
harmonization of IWC decision-making with that of the various regional
organizations that have been established for the regulation and
management of fishing activities, although, as explained in the previous
Part, the precise legal basis of the significance of these agreements for
574. See IWC, Minutes of the 6th Session, supra note 412, $ 40-47. The discussion
concerned the need for a provision concerning "stricter domestic measures," which was also
ultimately excised.
575. P.A. Larkin, An Epitaph for the Concept of Maximum Sustained Yield, 106 TRANS-
ACTIONS AM. FISHERIES Soc'Y 1 (1977). The point is evidenced by its formal appearance in
the preambles to the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. Feb. 8,
1949, 1 U.S.T. 477, 157 U.N.T.S. 157 [hereinafter ICNAF]; see also Convention for the Estab-
lishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, U.S.-Costa Rica, May 31, 1949, 1
U.S.T. 230 [hereinafter IATTC]; Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the
Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea art. 3(2), U.S.-Can., Mar. 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 5.
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present purposes is not at all clear. 1 6 In strict formal terms, such
agreements could only be pertinent to the interpretation of the ICRW as
originally conceived if they were already in existence at the time of its
conclusion, which is not in fact the case as far as most of them are
concerned. Nevertheless, it is proposed to consider them here both out of
deference to the view expressed in the normalization documents and
because the possibility cannot be excluded that, regardless of the precise
moment of their adoption, they may cumulatively reflect some general
sense of ongoing fisheries policy during the immediate postwar era, and
thereby shed some light on the question of interpretation of the ICRW in
particular.7 ' A brief overview of such instruments is therefore desirable.
A convenient starting-point for this survey can be identified in the
form of a bilateral treaty concluded between the United States and the
United Kingdom during the inter-war period. The 1923 Convention for
the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean578
is claimed to be "the first treaty to be concluded anywhere for the con-
servation of a depleted deep-sea fishery.'5 79 It was twice extended during
the 1930s,55 and renewed in 1953,58 ' thereby overlapping the entire pe-
riod during which whaling became the focus of international legal
regulation. The same parties had meanwhile concluded the International
576. The reference to harmonization of decision-making with that of these agreements
suggests that their relevance is seen to lie in the extent to which they bear on the ongoing
evolution of the ICRW regime, rather than its purport at the time it was adopted. This question
forms the subject of separate consideration in the Part that follows.
577. See Fisheries & Aquaculture Dep't, Food & Agric. Org. of the United Nations,
http://www.fao.org/fishery/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2008); see also D.M. JOHNSTON, THE IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES (1965) (providing a contemporaneous analysis of these
agreements); International Fisheries Treaty Database, http://www.intfish.net/treaties/index.htm
(last visited Aug. 29, 2008) (offering a valuable database of such treaties, containing their
texts and additional information). Note that the acronyms in the text that follows relate strictly
to the institution established by the treaty in question, but are used in this paper, for conven-
ience, to refer to the treaty itself. In some cases, acronyms have been specifically devised for
that purpose.
578. Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fisheries of the Northern Pacific
Ocean, U.S.-U.K., March 2, 1923, T.S. No. 701.
579. See Int'l Pac. Halibut Comm'n [IPHC], http://www.iphc.washington.edu/halcom. It
was doubtless for that reason that, despite the limitations of its brief, the organization it cre-
ated was originally known simply as the International Fisheries Commission. It is now the
International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC).
580. See Convention on the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific
Ocean and Bering Sea, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 29, 1937, T.S. No. 917; Convention for the Preserva-
tion of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, U.S.-U.K., May 9,
1930, T.S. No. 837.
581. Protocol amending the Convention between Canada and the United States of Amer-
ica for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea,
May 2, 1953, 1953 T.S. No. 14, 1931 U.N.T.S. 46.
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Pacific Salmon Fisheries Convention (IPSFC)58 2 in 1930. The 1946 Con-
vention for the Regulation of Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size
Limits of Fish,5 concluded just a few months prior to the ICRW, was,
despite its modesty of purpose, significant in constituting the first multi-
lateral fisheries regime for the North Atlantic, although it was soon
replaced by a revised arrangement 5 8
Subsequently, a host of other marine fisheries agreements was con-
cluded that attracted various combinations of IWC members as
participants. Examples include the 1948 Multilateral Agreement Re-
specting the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council
(IPFC) the 1949 equivalents for the Mediterranean,586 and Northwest
Atlantic (ICNAF);58 7 the bilateral convention of the same year for theS • 588
Establishment of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission; sev-
eral agreements of 1952 concerned respectively with establishing
Measures for the Protection of Stocks of Deep-Sea Prawns, European
Lobsters, Norway Lobsters and Crabs (DSP),589 the Permanent Commis-
sion of the Conference on Use and Conservation of Marine Resources of
the South Pacific (CPPS),59° and the International North Pacific Fisheries
Commission;59' the 1959 North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention,5 92 the
582. Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon
Fisheries in Fraser River, U.S.-Can., May 26, 1930, 50 Stat. 1355, 184 L.N.T.S. 305.
583. Convention for the Regulation of the Meshes of Fishing Nets and the Size Limits of
Fish, supra note 509.
584. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention, Jan. 24, 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 7078, 486
U.N.T.S. 158 [hereinafter NEAFC].
585. Multilateral Agreement Respecting the Establishment of the Indo-Pacific Fisheries
Council, Feb. 26, 1948, 62 Stat. 3711 [hereinafter IPFC]. The IPFC later became the Asia-
Pacific Fisheries Commission [hereinafter APFIC].
586. Agreement for the Establishment of a General Fisheries Council for the Mediterra-
nean, Sept. 24, 1949, 1952 U.N.T.S. 239 [hereinafter GFCM].
587. International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic, Feb. 8, 1949, 1967 U.N.T.S.
292 [hereinafter ICNAF]. This Convention was eventually replaced by the Convention on
Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, 1 U.S.T.
477, 1135 U.N.T.S. 369.
588. See IATT'C, supra note 575.
589. Kiss, supra note 407, at 94 [hereinafter DSP].
590. Agreement Relating to the Organization of the Permanent Commission of the Con-
ference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the South Pacific,
Chile-Ecuador-Peru, Aug. 18, 1952, 1006 U.N.T.S. 331.
591. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,
May 9, 1952, 205 U.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter INPFC]. This treaty was replaced by the Conven-
tion for the Conservation of Anadromous Fish Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean. Feb. 11,
1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-30, available at http://www.npafc.org/new/publications/
HandBook/English%20(page 1-44).pdf.
592. NEAFC, supra note 584. The NEAFC was eventually replaced by the Convention
on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries. Nov. 18, 1980, 1285
U.N.T.S. 129.
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1959 Convention concerning Fishing in the Black Sea;593 the 1962
Agreement concerning the Protection of the Salmon Population of the
Baltic Sea;594 the 1966 International Convention for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas;5 9 and the 1969 Convention for the Conservation of the
596Living Resources of the South-East Atlantic Fisheries. 6 During that pe-
riod, a multilateral agreement of intended universal scope, the 1958
Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of
the High Seas,597 already discussed in the opening Section of this Part,
was also concluded. The year 1969 may be treated as a (slightly arbi-
trary) cut-off point for the purposes of this survey of fisheries
instruments, since, however long the immediate postwar era can be re-
garded as extending, it must certainly be regarded as having ended by
the early 1970s. By this time, the acquisition of independence by a large
number of formerly dependent territories, the dramatic changes in atti-
tude toward the rights of coastal States in the context of fisheries
conservation, the formal adjudication of certain critical fisheries disputes
in the North Sea,598 the progressive replacement of a number of the ear-
lier regional fisheries agreements by revised arrangements, the
commencement of negotiations for an entirely new global convention on
the law of the sea, and the convening of the Stockholm Conference on
the Human Environment unmistakably heralded the arrival of a new age.
What, then, can be learned from this substantial body of international
legislation that might provide elucidation as to the proper interpretation of
the ICRW? The overriding impression is that although all these treaties
draw on the same broad armory of conservation weapons for the purpose
of establishing the mechanisms of regulation, the ICRW stands very much
on the fringes of this group, if not outside it altogether, when it comes to
consideration of the precise goals and objectives which this weaponry is
593. Convention Concerning Fishing in the Black Sea, July 7, 1959, 377 U.N.T.S. 220
[hereinafter FBS]; see also Kiss, supra note 407, at 141. It is unclear whether the Convention
is still actively applied.
594. Agreement Concerning Protection of the Salmon Stock in the Baltic Sea, Dec. 20,
1962, 955 U.N.T.S. 259 [hereinafter APSBS]. This Agreement was effectively superseded by
the 1973 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Baltic Sea
and the Belts. Kiss, supra note 407, at 137.
595. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14, 1966, 20
U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 [hereinafter ICCAT]; Kiss, supra note 407, at 202.
596. Convention on the Conservation of the Living Resources of the South-East Atlantic
Fisheries, Oct. 23, 1969, 801 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter ICSEAF]; Kiss, supra note 407, at
225. The Convention was amended in 1985 and terminated in 1990. It was eventually replaced
by the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South-
East Atlantic Ocean. Apr. 20, 2001,41 I.L.M. 257.
597. Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High
Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
598. See Fisheries Jurisdiction (ER.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25).
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designed to secure. In particular, although no fully comprehensive survey
of these instruments has as yet been undertaken by the present author, a
preliminary analysis strongly suggests that the "object and purpose" of the
ICRW is characterized by a number of features that are not shared by the
remainder of treaties in this category.
First, although all conservation is by definition undertaken with an
eye to the future, the ICRW is distinctive in its express preambular rec-
ognition of the interests of future generations. Furthermore, while the
ICRW specifically recognizes the interest of all "the nations of the
world" in the conservation of whales, the other conventions are for the
most part more narrowly focused on the parties themselves and driven byter"uul ' 9 9 ",,600 or,61 ~ 0
their "mutual" 99 "common, "shared, ' 6° ' or "joint" interests,6  or
"common concerns." 60 3 This is not universally the case, however, and the
preamble to the INPFC, for example, which was established by Canada,
Japan, and the United States, does speak of serving "the common inter-
est of mankind."' On the other hand, it then immediately refers to the
"interests of the Contracting Parties" as well, having already strongly
reaffirmed the parties' sovereign rights under international law to exploit
the fishery resources of the high seas.65 Furthermore, the substantive
provisions of the INPFC limit the right of participation in certain deci-
sion-making processes to those parties that are actually engaged in
substantial exploitation of the stocks in question.6°6 By comparison with
the ICRW, therefore, the avowed concern for the common interest of
mankind looks rather more like window-dressing.
Next, the emphasis in the fisheries agreements tends to be much
more heavily weighted toward exploitation. Thus, while statements of
aims often begin modestly enough with talk of "conservation," "rational"
or "proper". "utilization" or "exploitation,, 60 7 this is sometimes coupled
with references to "full" utilization, improving fishing methods6 or
increasing yields or productivity
6
1
0 through the development of fishing.
61
599. IATTC, supra note 575; IPSFC, supra note 582; IPFC, supra note 585; GFCM,
supra note 586; ICCAT, supra note 595; ICSEAF, supra note 596.
600. FBS, supra note 593.
601. ICNAF, supra note 575.
602. IPFC, supra note 585.
603. IPSFC, supra note 582; IATTC, supra note 575.
604. INPFC, supra note 591, pmbl.
605. Id.
606. Id. art. ll(l)(c)(ii).
607. GFCM, supra note 586, pmbl.; NEAFC, supra note 584, pmbl.; FBS, supra note
593, pmbl.; ICSEAF, supra note 596, pmbl.; IPFC, supra note 585, pmbl.
608. IPFC, supra note 585, art. IV.
609. GFCM, supra note 586, art. 111(b).
610. IPFC, supra note 585, art. IV(b)(i).
611. FBS, supra note 593, pmbl.
Michigan Journal of International Law
In other cases, the aim is quite explicitly to secure "maximum sustained
catches,"6 2 "yields, 6 3 or "productivity."64 In the ICRW, by contrast, we
have already seen615 that such an objective was specifically rejected and
replaced by the goal of achieving "the optimum level of whale stocks as
rapidly as possible without causing wide-spread economic and nutri-
tional distress"-a very different proposition indeed.66 Although it was
expressly recognized in the preamble that a recovery in whale stocks
would permit an increase in the number of whales that could be taken,
this was not, as noted above, couched in the form of an objective as such.
The sense that whales were, from the outset, seen as rather different
from fish, is compounded by the reference to the essential need "to pro-
tect all species of whales from further overfishing," to which there
appears to be no close parallel in the fishing agreements, where the tar-
gets of conservation or protection are almost always stated to be
617 ,6186160"fisheries" or "resources" or "stocks ' 6 9 or "populations" of fish.62°
Since these terms appear in the ICRW also, there can be no doubt that
whales were seen as resources for possible exploitation. On the other
hand, this comparison with the fishing agreements tends to reinforce im-
pressions of the existence of an additional dimension to the conservation
of whales, whereby the latter were seen also as entities meriting protec-
tion in their own right. This latter perspective can, moreover, plainly be
expected to have had some substantive practical implications, almost
certainly in the form of providing additional constraints on the incidence
of exploitation.
This is not a matter about which it is satisfactory to rest content with
mere speculation, however, so it is fortunate that there is firm evidence
not only of the existence of such attitudes, but of formal commitment to
them in legally binding form. This evidence derives essentially from the
612. ICCAT, supra note 595, pmbl.; IATTC, supra note 575, pmbl.; ICNAF, supra note
575, pmbl.
613. IPHC, supra note 579, art. 111(2) (as amended through 1953).
614. INPFC, supra note 591.
615. See BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 169.
616. See McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 403, at 941-42 (offering further information
on this comparison).
617. IPHC, supra note 579; IPSFC, supra note 582; INPFC, supra note 591; ICNAF,
supra note 575; NEAFC, supra note 584.
618. GFCM, supra note 586; IPFC, supra note 585; CPPS, supra note 590; ICNAF,
supra note 575; INPFC, supra note 591; ICCAT, supra note 595; ICSEAF, supra note 596.
619. INPFC, supra note 591; NEAFC, supra note 584; FBS, supra note 593; APSBS,
supra note 594; DSP, supra note 589.
620. IATTC, supra note 575.
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entry into force, shortly before negotiation of the ICRW,6?! of the 1940
Western Hemisphere Nature Conservation Convention (WHC), the sub-
ject of brief reference earlier in this Part.62  The United States had
deposited the first acceptance of this agreement, which had also been
ratified by Argentina and Peru in the months leading up to the ICRW
conference. In addition, Brazil and Chile were signatories, and therefore
under a provisional obligation to do nothing to defeat its object and pur-
pose pending their determination whether to ratify. The WHC is not
expressly invoked or mentioned in the ICRW, and there is, of course, no
suggestion that either the treaty as a whole, or the meaning it attributes
to particular terms, can of itself be formally binding on IWC members
who are not party to it.623 The only question concerns its elucidatory po-
tential with regard to the interpretation of the ICRW, in respect of which
its claims would certainly seem to be at least as strong as those of the
early fisheries treaties previously discussed, and stronger than most,
given its earlier date of adoption. At the very least, it may shed light on
the contemporary perspectives of some ICRW parties, especially the one
party responsible for the actual drafting.624
621. Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemi-
sphere, Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 193 [hereinafter WHC]. The WHC entered
into force on May 1, 1942.
622. See D. Sheinin, Wilderness and Pan-American Preservation 1910-1948, Paper Pre-
sented to the Latin American Studies Association, XXIth International Congress, Chicago, Ill.
(Sept. 24-26, 1998), available at http://168.96.200.17/ar/libros/lasa98/Sheinin.pdf (offering
an instructive analysis).
623. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 34, 35.
624. Note that in the course of his address to the 1946 Whaling Conference, the U.S.
Assistant Secretary of the Interior observed that the "[c]onservation of wildlife resources of-
fers an excellent opportunity for successful concerted action on an international level. We who
live in the Western Hemisphere have already enjoyed the benefits of international cooperation
in this field and can point with pride to results arising out of more than 30 years experience"
though the 1940 Convention was not mentioned specifically. U.S. Assistant Sec'y of the Inte-
rior, Address, IWC/42 (July 2-6, 1990) (on file with IWC). Anyone inclined to doubt the
possibility of substantive linkage between these two treaties may care to note that both were
instigated primarily by the United States, and that the main motivating force was in each case
provided by the twin engines of the Smithsonian Institute and the U.S. State Department.
Indeed, the U.S. representative to the Pan American Union's Inter-American Commission of
Experts on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in 1940-who has been described as
the "architect" of the whole treaty and therefore the counterpart of Remington Kellogg in
relation to the ICRW-was none other than his long-term friend and colleague, Alexander
Wetmore. The two had met at the University of Kansas in 1910, falling under the tutelage of
Charles Dean Bunker, Curator of Birds and Mammals. Both emerged as palaeobiologists,
Wetmore specializing in avian species and Kellogg transferring his original interest in ento-
mology to the field of mammalogy. Wetmore, the elder by some years, joined the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's Bureau of Biological Survey in 1911 and helped Kellogg to se-
cure vacation employment there while still an undergraduate. He became Chief Administrative
Officer of the U.S. National Museum in 1925, and Kellogg joined him there three years later,
serving first as Assistant Curator, then Curator in the Division of Mammals, before succeeding
his mentor as Chief Administrative Officer in 1948. Finally, Wetmore served as Secretary of
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Building on certain ideas elaborated in the 1933 Convention for the
Protection of Fauna and Flora621 in Africa (to which, incidentally, certain
other ICRW signatories had already committed themselves),626 this
agreement was in many respects of a pioneering nature, marking some-
thing of an attitudinal step-change from the more narrowly focused,
essentially utilitarian conservation treaties of the past. In addition to pro-
viding for the establishment of various categories of protected area and
imposing fairly standard forms of control over the exploitation of certain
species,627 these conventions also contained some more innovative fea-
tures. First, each contained a provision in virtually identical wording that
declared the "protection of the species mentioned in the Annex ... to be
of special urgency and importance., 628 Despite the absence of any ex-
press requirement that these species actually be endangered, the regime
governing their management was to be extremely strict:
Species included therein shall be protected as completely as pos-
sible, and their hunting, killing, capturing, or taking shall be
allowed only with the permission of the appropriate government
authorities in the country. Such permission shall be granted only
under special circumstances, in order to further scientific pur-
poses, or when essential for the administration of the area in
which the animal or plant is found.629
Unlike the African treaty (the annex to which contained no cetace-
ans), the WHC Annex was compiled purely on the basis of unilateral
designations, and there is some evidence that even prior to 1946, consid-
eration was being given in certain quarters to the inclusion of cetacean
610species.
the Smithsonian from 1945-52, overlapping with Kellogg's stint as Assistant Secretary. See
generally National Academy of Sciences, Remington Kellogg, 46 BIOGRAPHICAL MEMOIRS
158 (1975); H.W. Seltzer, Obituary: A. Remington Kellogg, 1892-1969, 58 J. MAMMOLOGY
251 (1977); http://siarchives.si.edu/findingaids/FARU7170.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2008)
(providing archival material). In these circumstances, it would have been extremely surprising
if there had not been some considerable convergence of perspective between the two individu-
als, and in their respective inputs to the two treaty regimes.
625. Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State,
supra note 484.
626. Specifically, France, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. See id.
627. Id. art. 8; WHC, supra note 623, arts. 5, 7.
628. Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State,
supra note 484, art. 8(1); WHC, supra note 623, art. 8.
629. WHC, supra note 623, art. 8.
630. See the notification to the PAU by Brazil on Oct. 2, 1940. Digital Library of the
Marine Mammal Commission, http://nsdl.tierit.com/search.asp (last visited Aug. 29, 2008). It
is extremely lengthy and complex, and includes, alongside already protected and strictly pro-
tected species, certain taxa listed as "Under Study." These include, under the heading
Balaenidae, an entry reading "Balaena-todas las especias," which presumably covers the
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In addition, one feature peculiar to the WHC was its separate provi-
sion for the designation, on the basis of their "aesthetic, historic, or
scientific interest," of certain species as "nature monuments," to be given
such "strict protection" as to render them "inviolate . . . , except for duly
authorized scientific investigation or government inspection. 631' This can
be contrasted with the less rigorous form of regulation applicable to
wildlife in national reserves, areas that were designed essentially for the
"conservation and utilization of natural resources. 632 While the precise
implications of some of its provisions remain unresolved,633 the WHC
clearly demonstrates that some highly significant changes in thinking
had taken place in the relatively brief intermission between the Whaling
Conventions of 1937 and 1946. In particular, for many States, the utili-
tarian value of wildlife no longer provided the exclusive motivation for
634conservation, and the term "protection" was certainly regarded as ap-
plicable in connection with these more ethically eclectic regimes. The
possibility that these attitudinal changes may have produced some im-
pact on the philosophical underpinnings, and hence the drafting, of the
ICRW, cannot therefore be excluded.
Finally, it is necessary to consider whether any guidance can be ob-
tained from external materials on the meaning and significance of other
key terms appearing in the preamble, especially the concept of "orderly"
development. If that expression was simply intended to connote that a
degree of organization would be superimposed on the industry as a re-
sult of the new institutional arrangements that were to be established,
Bowhead (Balaena mysticetus) and possibly also the right whales, formerly known as B. aus-
tralis, glacialis, and japonica, though now more commonly designated as Eubalaena.
Moreover, Birmie notes the actual designation of certain great whale species by both Argentina
(blue) and the United States (blue, right, bowhead, grey) though without indicating the date at
which this occurred. See BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 156. It does not appear to have been dur-
ing the initial phase of notifications, however.
631. WHC, supra note 623, art. 1(3) (emphasis added).
632. Id. art. 1(2).
633. These included (i) the precise relationship between Articles 1(3) and 8; (ii) the
extra-territorial scope of the two provisions (compare with Articles 2 and 8); and (iii) the ques-
tion whether obligations regarding species in the Annex applied to all parties or only those
who had listed them. See generally LYSTER, supra note 273, ch. 6. Unfortunately, the absence
of a provision in the WHC for any institutional arrangements for the treaty's implementation
precluded the elucidation of these issues.
634. In relation to the United States, Sheinin observed that
[a]s late as 1931, wildlife preservation still stressed commercial and social objec-
tives over environmental ones .... But as the decade wore on, the Bureau [of
Biological Survey] and other government agencies-while still concerned about the
plight of farmers and the dangers of injurious animals--de-emphasized the com-
mercial and human components of preservation, turning increasingly to
preservation for preservation's sake.
Sheinin, supra note 622, at 15-16.
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then it might be expected that similar terminology would be encountered
throughout the mass of other treaties discussed in this section whereby
fisheries of all descriptions were subjected to similar forms of regulation.
Once again, however, a preliminary survey has detected little or no sign
of such language in this array of instruments.
On the other hand, the notion of order does tend to appear in con-
texts in which fishing-or other-activities might be expected to give
rise to a heightened risk of conflict. Under the terms of the 1958 Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,635 for example,
the failure by foreign fishing vessels to observe local fisheries regula-
tions would automatically render their passage through the territorial sea
of a coastal State non-innocent, on the grounds of being prejudicial to
the "peace, good order, or security of the coastal State ' 636 In some cases,
moreover, such considerations have represented the driving force behind
the entire treaty regime. One such instrument, designed specifically "to
ensure good order and conduct" in fishing grounds was the 1967 Con-
vention on the Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic.37
This was not mentioned in the survey above because it is not a conserva-
tion treaty as such, but rather one designed to establish policing
arrangements for activities in the fishery in question, and to prevent in-
terference with fishing operations and disputes between fishermen of
different nationalities. Concluded in the interlude between the First and
Second "Cod Wars" of the modem era, involving Iceland and the United
Kingdom, it was designed to deal with growing problems of congestion
631and harassment amongst fishing vessels. Such problems were not, of
course, in any way new, and had indeed been the subject of formal regu-
lation since as early as 1882, through the Convention for Regulating the
Policing of the North Sea Fisheries.639 Unfortunately, this treaty had not
proved sufficient to prevent the outbreak in 1893 of the original Cod
War, in the wake of a controversial extension by Denmark of its coastal
fishing limits.
635. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
636. Id. art. 14(4) (emphasis added). Under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, by
contrast, it is actual engagement in "fishing activities" which has that effect. UNCLOS, supra
note 88, arts. 19(1), 20(1); see CHURCHILL & LoWE, supra note 403, at 84-86 (offering fur-
ther discussion).
637. Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic, June 1, 1967,
1051 U.N.T.S. 102.
638. See generally FISHERIES CONFLICTS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC: PROBLEMS OF MAN-
AGEMENT AND JURISDICTION (Giulio Pontecorvo ed., 1974).
639. Convention for Regulating the Policing of the North Sea Fisheries, May 6, 1882,
160 Consol. T.S. 219. The Convention was followed by a Supplementary Convention of 1887.
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In 1946, in the immediate aftermath of a global military confronta-
tion, and with the whaling industry expanding at a precipitous rate and
operating in an area of acute political sensitivity, the problems facing the
parties had much in common with these scenarios. It is therefore likely
that these were the considerations that led to the concern for orderly de-
velopment, though the establishment of institutionalized arrangements
for agreeing quotas and other conservation measures, along with the
punishment and reporting of infractions, was evidently thought to be
sufficient for this purpose. There seems to be little doubt from subse-
quent events that this was a miscalculation, and that more stringent
measures should actually have been incorporated in the ICRW, as some
parties had advocated.
More generally, the notion of good order, or public order, was famil-
iar and well established throughout the international community at the
time, as seen above.f In maritime affairs, the concept of the "public or-
der of the oceans" has been particularly widely recognized in the
literature from this period right up to the present day,64' whether by
commentators of academic, governmental, or judicial background. In
their seminal 1962 work, The Public Order of the Oceans, Myres S.
McDougal and William T. Burke identify the four key determinants of
international interactions at sea as being the physical characteristics of
the sea itself, the relationship of such events with those on land, the de-
gree to which such interactions are organized or unorganized, and the
variations in levels of expectations of violence. 642 From this perspective,
the notion of order itself might be seen to have a dual focus, broadly cor-
responding to the latter two elements. In one sense-as reflected,
perhaps, in the adjective ordered-it refers to the existence of a legal
regime through which a degree of organization might be imposed on the
640. For examples of recognition of the concept of "good order" in the literature, see
Myres S. McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value Clarification
as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61 YALE L.J. 915 (1952); Myres S. McDougal
& Florentino P. Feliciano, International Coercion and World Public Order: The General Prin-
ciples of the Law of War, 67 YALE L.J. 771 (1958); Myres S. McDougal & Harold D.
Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1 (1959); Wesley A. Sturges, The Quest for World Law and Order, 22 TUL. L. REV.
558 (1948).
641. See generally ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY (Davor
Vidas & Willy Ostreng eds., 1999); CTR. FOR FOREIGN POL'Y STUD., CANADA'S OCEANS
STRATEGIES PROJECT-THE ATLANTIC: FINAL REPORT 71 (Fred W. Crickard & Glen J. Her-
bert eds., 1997); McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 403; GIULIO PONTECORVO ET AL., THE
NEW ORDER OF THE OCEANS (Giulio Pontecorvo ed., 1986); P. SREENIVASA RAO, THE PUBLIC
ORDER OF OCEAN RESOURCES: A CRITIQUE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF THE SEA (1975);
Michael A. Becker, The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the
Interdiction of Ships at Sea, 46 HARV. INT'L L.J. 131 (2005).
642. McDOUGAL & BURKE, supra note 403, at 20.
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participants; in another (corresponding more closely with the adjective
orderly), it connotes the extent to which that regime is concerned with
the avoidance of conflict or violence. 643 This latter association was spe-
cifically recognized, for example, by the Norwegian Minister of Foreign
Affairs in the opening address he recently delivered to a millennial con-
ference entitled Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, a topic
he explicitly conceptualized in terms of the "peaceful uses of the seas"
and the prospects that "conflicting interests are settled through negotia-
tions and the rule of law '"6" In a similar vein, a recent article by a
distinguished member of the International Tribunal on the Law of the
Sea (ITLOS) explains the whole of the law in this area essentially in
terms of its capacity to "bring order to the oceans and promote interna-
tional stability" through the curbing of unilateral claims and actions and
the prevention of ocean-related conflict.
645
The fact that the notion of "good order" has such a pedigree in the
maritime context sheds considerable light on the choice of the phrase
"orderly development" in the ICRW. In particular, the obligations im-
posed, by virtue of their common membership of the United Nations, on
all the original ICRW signatories regarding the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security have unquestionably to be taken into account in
view of the risk of conflict developing over the exploitation of whale
resources in the short term. To recapitulate, the concern was not so much
to ensure the development of the industry, which was already occurring
at a precipitate rate-and from the point of view of conservation alone
might preferably have been retarded or delayed-but to ensure that the
battle for resources did not threaten the good order of the oceans, and
hence the security of the international community generally.
In conclusion, therefore, the object and purpose of the ICRW must
be understood as being complex and multi-faceted. Its overall policy ob-
jectives were to ensure the protection of all whale species from over-
fishing-in part, arguably, for their own sake, but primarily as a means
of safeguarding the resources they embodied for the benefit of future
generations of all nations. Optimum levels of whale stocks were accord-
ingly to be secured as rapidly as possible, albeit without causing
widespread economic or nutritional distress, which could be achieved
only through the establishment of proper and effective conservation ar-
643. That is, to describe an activity as "ordered" emphasizes the fact of regulation,
whereas "orderly" emphasizes the consequences of regulation.
644. Knut Vollebek, Opening Address to the Conference "Order for the Oceans at the
Turn of the Century," in ORDER FOR THE OCEANS AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY, supra note
641, at xxxi.
645. Jose L. Jesus, Reversing the Loss of Environmental Resources: The Ocean's Wealth
is Not Inexhaustible, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 2002-Feb. 2003, at 54.
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rangements entailing confinement of whaling operations to species best
able to sustain exploitation. The immediate legal purpose was the crea-
tion of such arrangements through the agency of a permanent
international institution employing established conservation techniques,
and acting with an eye to ensuring that the development of the industry
should pose no threat to the good order of the oceans. In view of past
failures, however, the profitability of the industry was abandoned as the
primary goal of regulation.
f. The Impact of Subsequent Practice
In light of these considerations, the description of the ICRW as
"hardly a revolutionary document'646 seems to fall short of doing it jus-
tice, since it could in fairness be regarded as exhibiting a number of
radical and visionary features. It may be, indeed, that some of the diffi-
culties it encountered in its early years should rather be attributed to the
fact that it was, in certain respects, too far ahead of its time in terms of
the attitudes prevailing in the international community as a whole, and
more particularly in the whaling industry itself. What is undeniable,
however, is that it failed to effect a revolution, at least in the short term.
This is by no means an unusual phenomenon in international affairs, es-
pecially in the conservation field, where the moment of adoption of a
multilateral treaty may well represent one of the high points of govern-
mental enthusiasm for the entire project, and the initial determination
and commitment has the tendency to drain away in the face of the harsh
realities of practical implementation. A key test of the long-term viability
of such treaties lies in their ability to withstand these early setbacks and
develop some momentum of their own.
In the case of the ICRW, a number of key factors conspired to defeat
647the rapid achievement of its object and purpose. The first of these was
the marked lack of interest showed by the "nations of the world" gener-
ally in defending their heritage, with the IWC very rapidly assuming the
reality of a whalers' club, or cartel. Indeed, whaling nations that had not
been full participants in the original negotiations, and were strongly dis-
posed toward maximum utilization of the resource, predictably arrived
before long to impress their own distinctive viewpoint on proceedings.648
Secondly, and as a consequence, the quotas initially adopted predomi-
nantly reflected the perceived short-term interests of the whaling
industry itself and, as could so easily have been predicted, led almost
646. D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 386, at 34.
647. See generally BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 202-03.
648. Whaling States that soon became IWC members despite not having been full par-
ticipants in the Washington Conference included Iceland (acceded Mar. 10, 1947), Japan (Apr.
21, 1951), and Mexico (June 30, 1949).
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directly to ruin. The inability to impose quotas on particular factory
ships or land stations was an obvious handicap, while the objections pro-
cedure gravely undermined those amendments to the Schedule that were
agreed, in some cases being so extensively invoked as to nullify the ef-
fect of the measures entirely.6 9 The regulatory techniques employed
were in any event scarcely fit for purpose: the blue whale unit in particu-
lar, devised essentially as a means of regulating the flow of oil on to
international markets, was inherently incapable of protecting "all species
of whales" against over-fishing, because it paid no real regard to species
as such.610 A final deficiency lay in the absence of scientific information
of sufficient sophistication and reliability to make effective regulation a
realistic possibility.
In light of the fact that this early practice was driven so intensively
by the immediate economic interests of the whaling industry, it becomes
necessary to consider whether any doubt is thereby cast on the validity
of the conclusion reached above regarding the abandonment of industrial
profitability as the underlying object and purpose of regulation. This is a
perfectly fair question, since it is beyond doubt that recourse may be had
to the subsequent practice of the parties to a treaty for the purpose of
611retrospectively casting light on their original sense of its meaning.
There are, however, a number of reasons for doubting that the provi-
sional conclusions of this paper can be undermined on this basis. The
first is that, as noted above, it is by no means unusual for treaties in the
environmental field to take some considerable time to exert any real im-
pact on the political consciousness and the entrenched practices of the
parties. Indeed, the vast majority of such treaties would probably be
judged as failures if assessed exclusively on the basis of their first ten to
fifteen years of existence. Secondly, and in any event, it has already been
noted that the argument that the pursuit of industrial profitability was no
longer to be seen as the object and purpose of regulation in no way im-
plies that it was of itself contrary to that object and purpose. Industrial
profitability could certainly be pursued to the extent that it was consis-
tent with the actual object and purpose, as outlined above.
More importantly, however, it is impossible to argue that the head-
long, unrestrained pursuit of immediate profit, to the detriment of long-
term, sustainable exploitation, was in any way consistent with the
treaty's objectives, and yet that appeared to be precisely what was occur-
ring in the early years. Consequently, this early practice should from any
649. See LYSTER, supra note 273, at 27. Even the United States, it should be noted, suc-
cumbed to this temptation.
650. Id. at 25.
651. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 2 1, art. 31 (3)(b).
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viewpoint be seen as being in outright defiance of the treaty's aims,
rather than as an indication of what the treaty was intended to permit.
This impression is strongly confirmed by the fact that no one, it seems,
now seeks to defend these early activities, even those that were responsi-
ble for them. In this vein, Sumi observes that "[e]ven after the
establishment of the IWC in 1946, many of its regulations were not nec-
essarily effective, especially until the mid-1960s, because short-term
economic considerations overrode long term conservation needs. This
was symbolized in the adoption of the BWU.' ' 652 He specifically con-
cedes, moreover, that "[p]ast Japanese whaling policy was biased toward
the promotion of the whaling industry. Throughout the prewar and post-
war periods, economic considerations were given too much weight.
Japanese whaling activities were governed by short-range economic con-
siderations rather than by the requirements of conservation. 653
Accordingly, it seems appropriate to view early practice under the
ICRW as an aberration, rather than as an indication of what the ICRW
was understood to entail. Subsequently, the systematic flouting of the
Convention's basic objectives undoubtedly diminished, although there is
disagreement as to the precise timing and cause of this development.
One view is that it was the influx into the IWC, in response to the clarion
call sounded at the Stockholm Conference, of a number of non-whaling
States seeking at last to exercise the prerogative of "the nations of the
world" to have their say in regulation, and specifically to impose a mora-
torium on further commercial exploitation.654 An alternative perspective
is that the IWC had already put its house in order some years earlier with
the sharp quota reductions of 1965.655 No essential purpose will be
served by entering into this controversy here.
The broader significance of the membership changes cannot be de-
nied, however, and it is commonplace to suggest that a transformation
was wrought in the history of the IWC, either for better or for worse,
depending on one's personal viewpoint. For the purposes of this study,
however, the real importance of these developments lies in their impact
on the relevance of practice under the ICRW. In particular, the arrival of
these non-whaling States brought a balance that was slightly more repre-
sentative of the international community as a whole, and closer, perhaps,
to that which had originally been envisaged when the ICRW was drafted.
652. Sumi, supra note 12, at 367.
653. Id.
654. CHERFAS, supra note 386, preface; D'Amato & Chopra, supra note 386, at 37-38.
655. See GULLAND, supra note 467, at 10-37; J.L. McHugh, The Role and History of the
International Whaling Commission, in THE WHALE PROBLEM: A STATUS REPORT 305-35
(W.E. Schevill ed., 1974); Sumi, supra note 12 (offering examples of this perspective).
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Consequently, it may be particularly relevant to look for indications
of the parties' collective understanding of the object and purpose of the
Convention during the middle period of the IWC's history, after the era
of initial excess had passed but before the organization became locked in
perpetual acrimony following the adoption and continuance of the mora-
torium, when governmental perspectives may have become colored by
the need to defend a particular position in that controversy. A broad im-
pression may be obtainable from a perusal of the selection of just over
forty resolutions taken from the Twenty-Eighth to the Thirty-Fourth An-
nual Meetings of the IWC, 1976-1982,656 and included in Birnie's
657International Regulation of Whaling. It would seem that, of these, a
little over a third made overt reference in their preambles to the object
and purpose of the ICRW. In every case but one, the form of words em-
ployed affirmed that its purpose was "to provide for the effective
conservation and management of whale stocks.,,658 By contrast, in only
one case is the development of the industry mentioned, and then only as
part of a verbatim quotation from the final recital of the preamble. Ad-
mittedly, this brief overview falls a long way short of the systematic and
comprehensive survey of practice which would ideally have been under-
taken had time permitted, but it certainly provides little support for the
notion that the long-term development of the industry was perceived as
being the primary objective of regulation.
While subsequent practice may still be capable, even in its contem-
porary manifestations, of casting light back on the pristine intentions of
the negotiating States, a further key aspect of its legal potential is not to
be overlooked: namely to modify or redirect the original intention of the
treaty. It will shortly be necessary to move on to an exploration of its
role in that regard, but, before doing so, there is one final context in
which the relevance of practice falls to be considered for the illumination
it may shed on the understanding of the terms of the ICRW in their
original, unmodified sense.
It will be remembered that a central contention of the argument ad-
vanced above was that the word "orderly" in the preambular declaration
of the parties' aim to "make possible the orderly development of the
whaling industry" has been significantly undervalued-indeed, all but
ignored-in almost all conventional analyses of the ICRW. In reality,
and viewed especially in light of the fraught, immediately postwar, cir-
cumstances in which the ICRW was drafted, it should be seen as
656. This selection also includes the IwC Special Meeting of December 1978.
657. See generally BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 773-95.
658. In a minority of these cases, the word "worldwide" also appears somewhere in the
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reflecting a particularly vital aspect of the treaty's legal purpose-
namely to avoid any risk that the scramble for resources might result in
renewed conflict or confrontation in maritime affairs. Given the welcome
relaxation in global tensions as the memory of hostilities gradually re-
ceded, the diminution in competition for the resources in question as
various countries abandoned their involvement in whaling, and the even-
tual establishment of an entirely new political climate during the era of
the United Nations, it might have been expected that concerns over the
impact of whaling on public order would have tended to recede over
time, perhaps even to the extent that their importance in the original
scheme of things might risk being forgotten.
And yet, it seems that such considerations are never displaced en-
tirely, as recent events have served only to confirm the latent tendency of
whaling activities to generate discord of one sort or another. In present
circumstances, the risk of confrontation arises not so much from compe-
tition between national fleets for acquisition of the resource, but rather
from the intensity of opposition to exploitation on the part of certain
non-governmental actors who have engaged in various forms of confron-
659tation and harassment of whaling vessels at sea. In a relatively rare
display of unity, IWC members have recently combined to express their
concern over such activities, and (given their propensity to jeopardize
human life, property, and the marine environment) to recognize the need
for action by contracting governments to discourage them.660 One inter-
esting, and highly significant, feature of the resolutions in question is
that it is the very concept of "order" in maritime navigation that is in-
voked-one might almost say disinterred-for this purpose. Indeed,
there could scarcely be a clearer or more reliable indication of the mean-
ing of this expression for ICRW purposes, given that (i) the most recent
resolution was adopted without opposition;6' (ii) it had been jointly
drafted and submitted by two governments, Japan and New Zealand,
which are prominent members respectively of the pro- and anti-whaling
camps;62 (iii) it declared "order" in maritime navigation to be, and to
"have long been," a common interest of nations worldwide,663 thereby
demonstrating its pervasive and perennial significance in maritime affairs;
659. See generally DAVID DAY, THE WHALE WAR (1987); Bailey, supra note 400, at 34-
35.
660. See IWC, Resolution on Safety at Sea and Protection of the Environment, IWC Res.
2007-2, IWC/59/25 (May 29, 2007), available at http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/
commission/IWC59docs/59-25.pdf; IWC, Resolution on the Safety of Vessels Engaged in
Whaling and Whale Research-Related Activities, IWC Res. 2006-2 (2006).
661. See Press Release, IWC, Day 3, 59th Annual Meeting (May 30, 2007), available at
http://iwcoffice.org/meetings/meeting2007.htm#pressrelease.
662. See IWC Res. 2007-2, supra note 660, agenda item 11.
663. Id. pmbl. (first recital).
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and (iv) it employed the term in a context far removed from the principal
area of dispute between IWC members, thereby giving assurance that it
represents a genuine and objective indication of their understanding, un-
compromised by the need to maintain or advance any entrenched
political position in an ongoing dispute.
All of these factors lend considerable support to the contention that
the word "orderly" in the preamble to the ICRW is no mere semantic
embellishment or makeweight, but was intended from the outset to en-
sure that the development of the whaling industry be steered away from
any possibility of generating conflict or discord, through recourse to in-
stitutional arrangements designed to introduce propriety-as well as
effectiveness-into the conservation process.
To recapitulate, the concern was not so much to secure the develop-
ment of the whaling industry, as to ensure that its development did not
undermine the good order of the oceans. It is with these considerations
in mind that we may turn at last to the exploration of the evolutionary
aspects of ICRW interpretation.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF RELEVANT NORMS (2):
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES
A. Good Faith and the Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties
Although a good deal of attention has been paid in the previous Part
to the implementation of the ICRW in light of its object and purpose as
originally conceived, the really significant question in relation to the
normalization process concerns what is required of-or permitted to-its
parties in the present and for the future. Some legal commentators ap-
pear to believe that the requirements of good faith involve the
application of the ICRW in exactly the fashion as that (allegedly) antici-
pated by its negotiators some sixty years ago, though quite how this can
be reconciled with the requirements of the law of treaties-especially
those which are constitutive of international organizations-as so me-
ticulously explained by the ICJ in so many cases is not at all clear. It is,
indeed, something of an irony that one relatively recent reaffirmation of
this static and conservative perspective on interpretation 66 occurred in
the very year that the ICJ held, in relation to the implementation of a
treaty concluded only two decades earlier, that "what might have been a
correct application of the law in 1989 or 1992 ... could be a miscarriage
664. See William T. Burke, Whaling and International Law, in WHALING IN THE NORTH
ATLANTIC (G. Petursduttir ed., 1997).
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of justice if prescribed in 1997. "665 On that basis, it is surely to be ex-
pected that a convention concluded as long ago as the ICRW might
require some quite significant fine-tuning if it is to be capable of con-
tinuing to fulfill its functions into the new millennium.
It is, furthermore, important to understand that it is the very concept
of good faith that both enables and requires the necessary adjustments to
be made. After all, it will be remembered that when, in the process of
drafting the Vienna Convention back in the 1960s, the ILC was called on
to address "the problem of the effect of the evolution of the law on the
interpretation of legal terms in a treaty," it ultimately found the elabora-
tion of a specific provision to be unnecessary, the principle of good faith,
applied in conjunction with the rule requiring treaties to be interpreted in
light of other relevant rules of international law, being of itself sufficient
to achieve that purpose. 666 In particular, the well-established canon of
construction known as the principle of effectiveness, ut res magis valeat
quam pereat, dictates that, wherever possible, treaties be interpreted in
such a way as to ensure their ongoing vitality, and thereby avoid the fate
of slow suffocation or marginalization. This point also serves to demon-
strate that there was nothing remotely novel or unexpected in the
pronouncement of the ICJ cited above: the principles that it saw fit to
apply have long been understood to represent the law, as the analysis in
Part II has already sought to demonstrate. Specifically, international trea-
ties, particularly those of a multilateral, institutionalized, law-making
character, are to be seen not as fixed and unyielding instruments of regu-
lation, but as essentially fluid and malleable devices eminently capable
of responding to evolving needs.
Despite some ambivalence, broad acceptance of this principle seems
to be implicit in Resolution 2006-1 and its supporting documentation,
through its endorsement of the relevance, in connection with interpreta-
tion of the ICRW, both of evolving perceptions of conservation need (the
"ecosystem" approach and the possible threat posed to food security by
burgeoning populations of whales) and of relevant legal instruments
concluded in the decades following 1946 (specifically, the Biodiversity
Convention and the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity). Hope-
fully, therefore, a general consensus will be discernible amongst ICRW
parties that its ongoing interpretation may be affected, and its aims and
objectives brought into contemporary relief, by considerations and
norms unfamiliar to, and even unforeseeable by, its negotiating States.
665. Gab~kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 132-34 (Sept. 25).
666. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session;
Chapter II: the Law of Treaties, [1966] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 172, 222, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/191 (July 19, 1966).
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The aim of the current Part is therefore to consider the question of the
implementation and interpretation of the ICRW in light of the many
changes that have occurred in the factual and legal environment sur-
rounding its operation over the six decades that have elapsed since the
time of its adoption.
In exploring these possibilities, it will be important to recognize that
the crucial engines of change in affecting this evolutionary development
may be found both within and beyond the ICRW itself. For the purposes
of exposition, the principles, procedures, and provisions of the Conven-
tion itself, coupled with practice thereunder, all viewed in light of
adjectival rules deriving from the law of treaties, the law of international
organizations, and international law generally, will be treated as internal
mechanisms, while those deriving from other substantive areas, such as
the laws of the sea, biodiversity conservation, and human rights, will be
treated as external. The overall task is essentially to be approached in
two stages. The first involves an examination of these external mecha-
nisms in order to establish what normative implications they have for the
conduct of whaling activities, and the second is to analyze the internal
mechanisms to determine what prospects they offer for the harmoniza-
tion and integration of these external norms into the ICRW regime.
B. Evolving Norms Deriving from Sources Beyond the ICRW
It is clear from the discussion in Part II that there are a number of
distinct, albeit sometimes inter-related, areas of international law from
which norms relevant to the implementation of the ICRW might derive,
and it is therefore necessary to consider these in turn.
1. Human Rights Norms
First, the matter may be approached from the general perspective of
human rights. Indeed, given the greatly enhanced significance of human
rights principles in the postwar era, ensuring that instruments such as the
ICRW do nothing to undermine the operation of such norms within the
contemporary legal order must be considered a particularly vital aspect
of the quest for systemic integrity. Building on the approach evinced in
the normalization documents, the principles in question may be grouped
into various sub-categories.
a. Cultural Diversity
In the earlier discussion, notwithstanding the fact that the various
agreements recently adopted within UNESCO to give binding legal ef-
fect to the 2001 Declaration on Cultural Diversity appeared to yield
primacy to environmental obligations, or for other reasons did not seem
[Vol. 29:293
Spring 2008] "Normalizing" the International Convention 439
to have any significant normative impact on the whaling question, the
possibility was left open that the Declaration itself might have retained
some residual legal significance in this context. On closer inspection of
its provisions, however, it is extremely difficult to see how it could prove
capable of making any appreciable contribution to the resolution of the
present controversy. First of all, it has already been noted that its status
even as soft law is open to question since many of its provisions either
have no normative content at all, or are drafted in an extremely loose and
open-ended fashion: "[Clare should be exercised so that all cultures can
express themselves and make themselves known."67 It is, of course, dif-
ficult to see how any other approach could have been adopted, for a bare
principle that all activities that have traditionally occurred should be al-
lowed, in the name of cultural diversity, to continue would self-evidently
be absurd.68 For one reason, cultural practices may persist, or be artifi-
cially sustained, as indefensible anomalies which are fundamentally at
odds with the wider traditions or nobler ideals even of the communities
in which they are practiced. Sometimes, for example, it is only the sup-
port of voluble and determined pressure groups, or the patronage of
wealthy and powerful factions in society, that underwrites their survival.
Others linger on in defiance of international norms of behavior: slavery,
torture, and child abuse, for instance, all constitute social phenomena
that have been widespread historically, and continue to exist in many
places, and yet the urgent aim of international law is plainly to secure
their absolute and unconditional elimination, not to encourage their con-
tinuance. Since the preservation of cultural diversity is conceived
essentially as but one aspect of human rights protection,669 it is obvious
that it cannot be allowed to undermine the many more fundamental prin-
ciples and mechanisms that have been so painstakingly established for
that purpose in the past. Thus, where the Declaration does assert a prin-
ciple of a more clearly normative (and potentially relevant) character-
for example, that "all persons have the right to participate in the cultural
life of their choice, and to conduct their own cultural practices"-this is
clearly stated to be "subject to respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms.' 67 1 Quite obviously, moreover, that cannot be the only con-
straint, for a cultural practice that entailed the undermining of world
peace or the destruction of the natural environment would be equally
intolerable; accordingly, it is provided that each State must define its
667. UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, supra note 28.
668. This represents an extreme interpretation of Article 7, which asserts that".., heri-
tage in all its forms must be preserved, enhanced and handed on to future generations...... Id.
art. 7.
669. Id. pmbl. (second & first recitals), art. 5.
670. Id. art. 5.
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cultural policy with due regard to its wider international obligations gen-
erally.67' Obviously, such obligations would include those relating to
species conservation.
In light of these points, it becomes clear that there are certain fun-
damental tensions at the heart of the Declaration that are by no means
easy to resolve in the present context. For while, on the one hand, re-
spect for the cultural traditions of others may indeed be regarded as an
ethical imperative of sorts, it is also recognized that the entrenchment
and sanctification of cultural differences may lead ultimately to funda-
mentalism and segregation, which would run counter to the basic tenets
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.672 The Director-General
of UNESCO accordingly notes that it is certainly not intended that cul-
tural diversity should be viewed as an "unchanging heritage," and
perhaps the best that can therefore be expected is the initiation of some
form of dialogue between communities, with a view to resolving or ac-
commodating such inter-cultural differences as may exist.673 Obviously,
there are many divergences of lifestyle or attitude which are, quite sim-
ply, intrinsically incompatible and therefore not simultaneously
sustainable in accordance with any simple principle entailing the main-
tenance of diversity. For example, the conflicting beliefs that some
particular activity (e.g., bride-burning, genital mutilation, enforced mar-
riages) must (i) out of respect for tradition, be preserved at all costs or
(ii) as a matter of ethical imperative, be expeditiously eliminated plainly
cannot be accommodated within any simple paradigm of preserving cul-
tural diversity, for the endorsement of one inevitably entails the sacrifice
of the other.
The arguments for and against commercial whaling might well be
thought to fall into this category, too. That is, while whaling has com-
monly been presented as a cultural tradition within certain countries or
communities, it is by no means clear, given the very wide definition of
culture employed in this instrument, why equally strong claims might
not be made regarding the development and recognition over recent dec-
ades of a cultural value system requiring that whales be exempted from
all such exploitation. This might, indeed, even be regarded as the resur-
gence and more widespread pervasion of a cultural tradition that had
671. Id. art. 9. This principle is stated in stronger terms in the accompanying Action
Plan, clause 18, which calls for the development of cultural policies "in accordance with the
international obligations incumbent on each State." Id. Action Plan, cl. 18.
672. Id.; see also K. MATSUURA, Introduction to UNESCO UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY (2001).
673. See MATSUURA, supra note 672.
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existed in certain communities from much earlier times,674 and which is
therefore no less deserving of protection than the exploitative tradition.
Since whales represent a global resource, there is no simple means of
resolving the attendant dilemmas-rather, moral choices must be made
and policy preferences established for the benefit of the international
community as a whole. 75 Unfortunately, there is little in the Declaration
to indicate the principles in accordance with which such accommoda-
tions might be attempted.
b. Basic Human Rights Norms
Nor does it seem likely that significant guidance can be obtained
from the established body of jurisprudence relating to more basic and
clearly defined human rights norms. As noted in Part II, instances of ex-
press legal recognition of rights to the perpetuation of, or participation
in, cultural traditions tend to be focused primarily on specialist catego-
ries of claimant, most notably representatives of indigenous peoples orother " • •676
other minorities. Although claims of this kind can sometimes legiti-
mately be brought within the scope of more widely applicable civil and
political rights, such as freedom of association or expression, and have
indeed been admitted for consideration on that basis by courts and tribu-
nals both national and international, the individuals who have presented
such claims have as a matter of fact often actually been members of rec-
ognized minority groups, and have even despite that advantage tended to671• 671
be unsuccessful.677 In the case of Chapman v United Kingdom, for ex-
ample, the European Court of Human Rights held that measures
674. See Whaling in Korea: Issues After the Moratorium, JAPAN WHALING Ass'N NEWS-
LETTER No. 27, July 2003 (recognizing this point in relation to Korea).
675. That is not, of course, to say that some suitable compromise or accommodation
may not sometimes be found.
676. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 130. The
special claims of indigenous peoples pursuant to this provision were confirmed and explained
by the Sapporo District Court in Japan in Kayano v. Hokkaido Expropriation Committee. 127
I.L.R. 173 (Sapporo Dist. Ct. Mar. 27, 1997).
677. See, e.g., LAnsmann v. Finland, Communication No. 671/1995, CCPR/C/58/D/
671/1995 (1995) (holding that the authorization by the Finnish government of certain eco-
nomic development activities in traditional Sami lands did not amount to a violation of the
cultural rights of local reindeer breeders). By contrast, the District Court in the Kayano case
did, it seems, allow a claim of this kind by plaintiffs representing the Japanese Ainu people in
respect of the expropriation and inundation of their ancestral lands in the course of a dam
construction project, on the grounds that the Minister had failed to undertake a sufficiently
careful balancing of public and private interests. Since, however, the project had already been
completed at vast expense and was judged to be of considerable public benefit, the plaintiffs'
only remedy lay in a declaration of illegality. No doubt those with expertise in Japanese law
will be in a position to explain the current state of the law within that jurisdiction.
678. Chapman v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2001); see also G. and E. v.
Norway, 35 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 30 (1983).
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concerning the stationing of caravans in the United Kingdom could be
justified, despite their effects on persons of itinerant lifestyle, by refer-
ence to the wider public interest, the planning legislation under which
they were adopted having made adequate provision for the representa-
tion of all the relevant stakeholders and concerns.
One recent English case that did not involve a minority in the ac-
cepted sense, and arguably comes very close to mirroring the position of
the Japanese coastal communities that have been denied the opportunity
to continue to engage in certain whaling activities, is R. (Countryside
Alliance) v. Attorney-General.6 9 In this case, the appellants-various
individuals for whom the traditional country pursuit of using dogs to
hunt such animals as fox, deer, and hares had previously formed a core
aspect of their lifestyle-argued that the prohibition of such activities by
virtue of the Hunting Act 2004 had infringed their human rights. They
invoked specifically the rights to respect for their homes and private
lives, into which they sought to integrate aspects of cultural heritage and
personal autonomy, and to peaceful enjoyment of their property and to
freedom of association and assembly. The Court of Appeal, however,
upholding the conclusions of the Divisional Court680 held that, for the
most part, these rights were not even engaged, let alone infringed, and
that it was therefore unnecessary to determine whether such incursions
could be justified. Only the property right was genuinely implicated, and
then solely in the limited sense that a degree of state control had been
exercised over the use of the appellants' property. That, however, could
readily be justified by virtue of the legislative aim of "preventing or re-
ducing unnecessary suffering to wild mammals, overlaid by a moral
viewpoint that causing suffering to animals for sport is unethical, 68' to
which the measures adopted were entirely proportionate. The Country-
side Alliance Court made clear that its conclusions were founded on a
willingness to assume that the adverse social and economic conse-
quences predicted by the appellants as likely to result from the hunting
ban would actually occur, although it also emphasized that this assump-
679. R. (Countryside Alliance) v. Attorney Gen. [2006] EWCA (Civ) 817, [2007] Q.B.
305 (Ct. App. (Crim)) (Eng.). The appellants also sought to invoke aspects of E.C. law, in
respect of which they were equally unsuccessful. For an earlier Scottish case arising out of
similar legislation, see Adams v. Scottish Ministers. [2003] S.L.T. 366 (O.H.) (Scot.).
680. R. (Countryside Alliance) v. Attorney Gen., [2005] EWHC (Civ) 1677, [2006]
U.K.H.R.R. 73, (D.C.) (Eng.). The decision of the Court of Appeals was subsequently upheld
by the House of Lords. See R. (Countryside Alliance) v. Attorney Gen., [2007] UKHL 52,
[2008] 2 All E.R. 95 (H.L.) (U.K.).
681. See R. (Countryside Alliance), [2006] EWCA (Civ) 817, T 117. The "sport" aspect
of fox hunting is one element which is presumably not evident in coastal whaling activities,
though other comparable factors are present in that context which affect the overall balance of
policy considerations, such as the possible hazards to health of human consumption of wha-
lemeat.
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tion was, in reality, "by no means fully supported by the evidence.'6 2
There were, after all, alternatives available to the appellants, such as
trail-hunting, which did not involve live quarry.68 3 In any event, policy
decisions taken by governments not infrequently had a major impact on
people's life-styles, as the collapse of the heavy manufacturing and coal-
mining industries had amply demonstrated, but that did not in and of
itself represent a failure to respect fundamental rights .6
It would seem, therefore, that even if the norms deriving from inter-
national human rights law could be treated as representing an
appropriate standard for the evaluation of IWC decisions affecting the
situation of the coastal communities in Japan, it is most unlikely, based
on present evidence, that they would be found to have been violated. Ad-
justment to changes in social conditions and moral attitudes is an
inescapable aspect of modern existence, on which all human progress
and development ultimately depends, and the mere requirement to adjust
cannot convincingly be presented as an infringement on fundamental
rights. If particular communities allow a "siege mentality" to develop,
whereby they refuse to accommodate such change and in consequence
spurn the chances of improving their own material conditions of life, it is
extremely difficult to see how human rights norms can legitimately be
recruited to assist them.685
c. Food Security
Much the same is true if the matter is approached from the perspec-
tive of food security. Although various treaties enshrine the right of
everyone to "adequate food," or to "freedom from hunger,' 68 6 the precise
682. Id. 51.
683. See id. 104. Here again, a close parallel may be evident in the case of the coastal
whaling communities in Japan, for whom whale-watching might seem to many outsiders to be
an obvious, and ethically acceptable, alternative means both of celebrating, and of capitalizing
on, their cultural traditions. But see infra note 685.
684. See R. (Countryside Alliance), [2006] EWCA (Civ) 817, 103.
685. One contemporary commentator has chronicled the way in which the coastal com-
munity in Taiji, Japan, for example, has in recent decades "rejected administrative
consolidation with neighboring cities and towns" and, out of attachment to tradition, opted to
persist with small-scale whaling activities despite the fact that they "provide only 3.2% of the
town's budget" and are perceived to have impacted adversely on tourism, which the locals are
otherwise anxious to encourage. Whale watching has apparently not developed in Taiji, as it
has in certain other coastal communities, as its "citizens do not even consider the possibility."
Shio Segi, The Coexistence of Whaling and Whale Watching in a Traditional Whaling Region:
The Case of Taiji, Wakayama Prefecture, Japan, SPC TRADITIONAL MARINE RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT & KNOWLEDGE INFO. BULL., July 2003, at 23.
686. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra
note 352, art. 11; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 12, O.A.S. T.S. No. 69 (1988), entered into
force Nov. 16, 1999. In addition, although the right to food is not explicitly incorporated in the
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circumstances in which this commitment could be said to have been vio-
lated are obviously subject to significant disparities of appreciation and
opinion. While it may no longer be tenable to claim that economic and
social rights are by their nature nonjusticiable,687 it is extremely difficult
to envisage findings of violations of such rights other than in relatively
extreme and unusual circumstances .
Where, moreover, the issue arises within the context of legitimate
debates over the proper approach to the conservation of wildlife species,
many of which are known to be threatened with extinction or otherwise
vulnerable to environmental hazards, the matter begins to appear incapa-
ble of resolution from a food security perspective alone. Obviously, any
decision to impose restrictions on the exploitation of species that are ca-
pable of satisfying the alimentary requirements of human beings is open
to potential challenge on these grounds, but a rational approach would be
bound to recognize the necessity of considering other interests, including
the need to preserve resources for future generations or the desire to ex-
plore other economically or socially beneficial forms of exploitation, not
to mention the preservation of species for their own sake. It is true that
some soft law instruments strongly encourage the positive exploitation
of marine resources, and even emphasize a preference for direct human
consumption,6 9 but despite the undeniable importance of that considera-
tion, it must still be balanced against others, including doubts that have
been raised regarding the inherent suitability of cetaceans for such pur-
poses in view of the high concentrations of contaminants that have
sometimes been detected in their bodies. While there have also been de-
mands for a resumption in the harvesting of cetaceans on the grounds of
an alleged need to restrict their own consumption of fish, which might
otherwise be available for humans, such claims have been regarded by
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, it has been held by the African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights to be "inseparably linked to the dignity of human beings" and
"therefore essential for the enjoyment and fulfillment of .. . other rights" guaranteed by the
Charter. Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. v. Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96, 2001-02
Afr. Ann. Act. Rep., annex V.
687. See Autism-Europe v. France, Complaint No. 13/2002, Eur. Comm. of Soc. Rts.
(Sept. 29, 2003), available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr-doc/31nterventionAutismEurope
Audition29septembre2003final.pdf (French).
688. Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr., Communication No. 155/96, 2001-02 Afr. Ann.
Act. Rep., annex V. In the African Commission case referred to above, the government of
Nigeria was found to have violated this right through the destruction and contamination of the
food sources of the Ogoni people, undertaken as part of a campaign of terrorization connected
with the imposition of measures for the exploitation of oil resources. The scenario was, there-
fore, very far removed from that under the ICRW. For a recent, skeptical analysis of the rights-
based approach to the question of food security, see Jaqueline Mowbray, The Right to Food
and the International System, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 545 (2007).
689. See, e.g., Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, 5,
G.A. Res. 3348 (XXIX), U.N. Doc. E/CONF.65/20 (Dec. 17, 1974).
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many as speculative and controversial. 690 It is, accordingly, well within
the wide range of opinions that might reasonably be held on this matter
that the moratorium on commercial whaling currently has rather limited
implications for food security. A more compelling argument-both in
fact and law-for permitting controlled exploitation may be thought to
arise in the case of indigenous peoples, though these peoples are, of
course, already the beneficiaries of separate treatment under the ICRW
regime.
If the focus is shifted away from the claims of individuals or particu-
lar communities to embrace the interests of the international community
as a whole, the range of factors to be taken into account alongside food
security is expanded to the point at which the issue must inevitably tran-
scend the bounds of legal justiciability entirely, and can only be
addressed as a question of broad policy. In light of these many complexi-
ties, it is scant surprise that the provisions of human rights instruments
that relate to food security tend ultimately to lay emphasis on the need
for international collaboration to resolve the many conflicts and uncer-
tainties which will inevitably arise in relation to such questions. 69 And,
the IWC itself plainly represents a well-established and inclusive inter-
national forum in which they may be discussed, and hopefully resolved.
These considerations strongly suggest that the jurisprudence of hu-
man rights in general, and of the preservation of cultural diversity or
food security in particular, is simply not the optimum reference point for
those who hope to harmonize human interests with principles governing
the conservation and management of biological resources. It may there-
fore be that the international law of biodiversity represents a more
promising source of guidance, and it is accordingly to that body of
norms that we must shortly turn.
As a preliminary to that exercise, however, it must be noted that the
parties to the Biodiversity Convention itself are required to "implement
[the] Convention with respect to the marine environment consistently
with the rights and obligations of States under the law of the sea,' , 692 and
it is therefore important to consider the effect of relevant norms of mari-
time law in order to establish whether any significant problems of
harmonization or prioritization are in fact likely to arise in the present
context.
690. See infra Part IV.B.3.b (offering further discussion of this point).
691. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra
note 352, art. 11; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the
Area of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 686, art. 12(2); Universal Declara-
tion on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition, supra note 689, 9.
692. CBD, supra note 120, art. 22(2).
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2. The Law of the Sea
Since the recognition by the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea
of the concept of the EEZ, there has been a significant general shift of
power toward coastal States at the expense of the distant water fishing
fleets of the major maritime powers, motivated largely by the belief that
this would prove advantageous to the cause of conservation. In reality, it
is far from clear that this expectation has as yet been borne out.693 Never-
theless, the recognized principle is that, within the EEZ, the coastal State
has "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, con-
serving and managing" these resources, and is authorized to determine
the allowable catch.694 It must, however, have due regard to the rights of
other States and is required to ensure through proper conservation and
management measures that the maintenance of living resources is not
endangered by over-exploitation. These measures must aim to maintain
or restore populations of harvested species at or to levels which can pro-
duce the maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant
environmental and economic factors, including the effects on associated
or dependent species.699 Without prejudice to these principles, the coastal
State is to promote the objective of optimum utilization and, if it does
not have the capacity to harvest the allowable catch, must arrange to give
696other States access to the surplus. Special provision is made for strad-
dling stocks and for anadromous, catadromous, sedentary, and highly
migratory species.697 On the high seas, all States have the fight to engage
in fishing, subject to a duty to cooperate in the adoption of measures
necessary for the conservation of living resources. 69' This cooperation
may entail the establishment of regional or sub-regional fisheries organi-
zations, and the measures adopted must conform to similar criteria as
those applicable in the EEZ.699
In the case of both the high seas and the EEZ,70 however, there is a
specific stipulation that none of these provisions restrict the right of
States, or the competence of international organizations, to regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly, or to prohibit it entirely,
and no criteria are specified to limit the exercise of this discretion. States
693. See, e.g., SANDS, supra note 320, at 560.
694. UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 56(I)(a), 61(1).
695. Id. art. 61(2)-(4); see also U.N. Conference on Env't and Dev., Rio de Janeiro, Bra.,
June 3-14, 1992, Earth Summit: Agenda 21: Programme of Action for Sustainable Develop-
ment, 17.46 [hereinafter Agenda 21].
696. UNCLOS, supra note 88, art. 62(2).
697. Id. arts. 63-64, 66-68.
698. Id. arts. 116-17.
699. Id. arts. 118-19.
700. See ICRW, supra note 1, art. 1(2) (explaining that the regulatory regime established
by the ICRW applies to "all waters in which whaling is prosecuted").
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are to cooperate with regard to conservation, and, in the case of cetace-
ans in particular, work through appropriate international organizations
for their conservation, management, and study '0 This general position
was fully endorsed at the U.N. Convention on the Environment and De-
velopment (UNCED), through Agenda 21, under which the
responsibilities of the IWC with regard to whaling were specifically rec-
ognized. It will be apparent that, far from calling for uniformity of
approach with regard to whales and fish, these provisions clearly recog-
nize potential justifications for diversity of treatment, and the need for
international cooperation to establish the precise ramifications of the
evolving regime.
Consequently, any notion that whales should be treated in accor-
dance with the same principles as those which govern fish must be
reasoned from first principles, and cannot be simply asserted or as-
sumed. Plainly, the case would be strengthened to some extent if the
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations could be shown to have
achieved an outstandingly successful record of husbandry. Given the
enormous utilitarian values of fishery resources, the universal recogni-
tion in principle of the need for effective conservation measures if they
are to be preserved, the unequivocal establishment of practical and theo-
retical principles to guide all international conservation efforts, and the
untrammeled opportunity for the cooperative development of specific
expertise in the technical aspects of fishery management, these arrange-
ments should by rights have emerged as shining examples of the very
best that human ingenuity, self-restraint, and organizational acumen
could achieve. The reality, unfortunately, has been depressingly at odds
with this expectation. Indeed, an eminently plausible assessment of the
traditional approach to fisheries management is that it "has tended to be
reactive to management problems only after they reached crisis levels."7 3
Almost twenty-five years ago, around the time of the adoption of the
Law of the Sea Convention, R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe pointed out
four key features of human activities in this area, namely:
a tendency for fish stocks to be fished above biologically opti-
mum levels; a tendency for more fishermen to engage in a
fishery than is economically justified; a likelihood of competi-
tion and conflict between different groups of fishermen; and the
701. UNCLOS, supra note 88, arts. 65, 120.
702. Agenda 21, supra note 695, 17.90.
703. David Freestone, International Fisheries Law Since Rio: the Continued Rise of the
Precautionary Principle, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 48, at 135, 160.
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necessity for any regulation of marine fisheries to have a sub-
stantial international component.'M
Yet, despite the emergence during the intervening years of numerous
institutional arrangements to incorporate this international dimension, it
is far from clear that the damaging propensities identified by these au-
thors have yet been significantly ameliorated. Many commentators have
concluded that fishery commissions and other regulatory systems have
enjoyed only "limited success,'70 and have proved to be "relatively inef-




Crucially, "fisheries within the new jurisdictional zones, whether on the
high seas or under national jurisdiction, have continued to decline and
are everywhere in trouble. 70 7 The FAO, while proclaiming the adoption
of innovative and progressive measures by many regional fishery bodies
(RFBs) in the course of a general post-UNCED transformation,7 8 coyly
concedes that such institutions "are constrained by the unwillingness of
Member States to delegate sufficient decision-making power and respon-
sibilities to RFBs, and their reluctance to implement decisions taken" by
them.7°9 These failures, of course, mirror those of the IWC itself in its
early years, when the fisheries paradigm predominated, and carry impor-
tant lessons which are to be borne in mind when its future is to be
programmed. They certainly do not offer great reassurance that follow-
ing the Regional Fisheries Management Organization route will
ultimately prove the wisest course.
Given, then, that the law of the sea appears to leave States a rela-
tively free hand to determine their policy in relation to the conservation
and exploitation of marine mammals, and that the example offered by
regional fisheries organizations is less than inspirational, it is appropriate
to turn to the regime governing the conservation and sustainable utiliza-
tion of wildlife generally in the search for principles that offer more
compelling guidance to ICRW parties.
704. CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 403, at 281.
705. SANDS, supra note 320, at 587.
706. Id. at 534 (citing G. Rose, International Fisheries Management Commissions, in
GLOBAL BIODIVERSITY: STATUS OF THE EARTH'S LIVING RESOURCES 528, 534 (Brian
Groombridge ed., 1992)).
707. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 290, at 684.
708. See FOOD & AGRIC. COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS [FAD], FISHERY DEP'T,
THE CHANGING ROLE OF REGIONAL FISHERY BODIES IN DECISION-MAKING pt. I (2004).
709. See id. pt. 3 at 103; see also id. pt. 2 at 86.
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3. Norms Concerning the Conservation and Sustainable
Use of Biological Diversity
As Part II again demonstrates, relevant norms of this kind may de-
rive from a variety of legal sources, of which the most prominent is the
Biodiversity Convention itself.
a. The Biodiversity Convention
As we have seen, the Biodiversity Convention is fully applicable to
activities carried out under the jurisdiction or control of States beyond
the limits of their national jurisdiction, and Article 5 of that treaty re-
quires its Contracting Parties, wherever possible, to enter into
cooperative arrangements for the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity in such areas. Where appropriate, this cooperation is
to be pursued through competent international organizations, and the
IWC, as noted above, has achieved global recognition as the established
forum for such cooperation in the case of the larger cetacean species.1
Furthermore, as the destructive effects of decades of past exploitation
make clear, whaling falls squarely within the category of activities in
respect of which regulatory and management strategies are called for
under Article 8(1). While the CBD is not intended ipso facto to prevail
over or replace earlier treaties such as the ICRW, it does take priority
over them where the exercise of rights and obligations under those trea-
ties would seriously damage or jeopardize biological diversity."'
Accordingly, there is a powerful case for harmonization of the ap-
proaches adopted under the two regimes, in order to avoid any risk that
the latter might undermine the conservation objectives of the former, and
thereby cause the legal validity of its own regulatory scheme. This is cer-
tainly the approach that has been adopted under other major
conservation treaty regimes.7 2
This point also appears to be accepted by the normalization docu-
ments themselves, which make specific reference to, and expressly
invoke, the sustainable use provisions of the CBD. Perhaps the propo-
nents specifically had in mind the exhortation to "[p]rotect and
encourage customary use of biological resources in accordance with tra-
ditional cultural practices that are compatible with conservation or
sustainable use requirements" 713 since this might be thought particularly
710. Since this cooperation is to be pursued "as far as possible," a global forum of all
interested parties would appear to be a necessary element.
711. CBD, supra note 120, art. 22(1).
712. See, e.g., CITES, Res. CONF 14.6 (June 3-15, 2007), available at http://www.cites.
org/eng/res/all/14/EI 4-06.pdf.
713. CBD, supra note 120, art. 10(c).
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apposite in relation to the traditional practices of coastal whaling.' 4 Self-
evidently, however, such provisions cannot be disentangled from those
concerning conservation, not least because Article 10(a) requires the in-
tegration of both elements into the decision-making process.
Consequently, the full range of measures envisaged by Article 8 of the
CBD must also be treated as potentially relevant, with some likely to
assume particular importance. These include the establishment of sys-
tems of protected areas and the management of important biological
resources both within and beyond their boundaries, and promotion of the
protection of ecosystems and the recovery of threatened species through
such devices as the development and implementation of management
plans and strategies.75
At the species-based level, comprehensive action plans of the kind
envisaged have, indeed, become one of the most widely utilized conser-
vation tools in recent years,716 largely as a result of the perceived lack of
success achieved by the more narrowly focused and impressionistically
constructed endeavors of earlier eras. Characteristically, these entail,
first, a comprehensive review of population status, distribution, and
ecology; secondly, an assessment of perceived threats and other limiting
factors; and, thirdly, an analysis of existing conservation measures and
their principal strengths and weaknesses.7 7 On the basis of such factors,
revised conservation needs and priorities can be reliably identified and
particular governments or other agencies charged with specific tasks that
are required to bring about a revival in the conservation status of the spe-
cies in question. Although such plans are directed specifically at
individual species, planning must of course involve a full appreciation of
the wider ecological context and the nature of interactions with other
species. Furthermore, the extent to which exploitation of the species in
question may be permitted will depend on a careful consideration of all
of the other elements in the plan. Sustainable utilization, in other words,
has very little meaning if divorced from the broader conservation con-
text.
This point is fully confirmed by the most authoritative current source
of guidance on the question of sustainable use of biological resources,
namely the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines on the Sustainable
714. See IWC, Resolution on Japanese Community-Based Whaling, TWC Res. 2004-2
(2004) (on file with 1WC).
715. See CBD, supra note 120, art. 8(a)-(f).
716. They are, for example, extensively employed, inter alia, under the Berne European
regional arrangement and the Bonn Convention. See Berne Convention, supra note 311; Bonn
Convention, supra note 205.
717. See generally B. HEREDIA ET AL., GLOBALLY THREATENED BIRDS IN EUROPE: Ac-
TION PLANS (1996).
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Use of Biodiversity, adopted at the Seventh Meeting of the CBD Confer-
ence of Parties in 2004.78 A number of Underlying Conditions for
Sustainable Use were identified, including the obvious point that the
availability of biological products is constrained by the intrinsic biologi-
cal characteristics of species and ecosystems, including their
productivity, resilience, and stability. Consequently, a precautionary ap-
proach to exploitation must be adopted, and uses favored that maximize
sustainable benefits while minimizing risk. Plainly, such considerations
will carry most weight where detailed knowledge of ecological condi-
tions is lacking. Equally, "governments, resource managers, and users
should take into account the need to accommodate change" in their ap-
proach to the utilization of resources. 7 " Although exploitation can
sometimes serve as a positive spur to conservation, this is specifically
acknowledged only in relation to terrestrial species, in "circumstances
where the risk of converting landscapes to other purposes is high. 72°
These Conditions are complemented by fourteen key Practical Prin-
ciples, which are in turn elucidated and elaborated by accompanying
Operational Guidelines and indications of underlying rationale. As might
be expected, these guidelines recognize that the task of arriving at ap-
propriate policies and practices in this field requires a complex and
delicate balance to be struck between a number of varied, and often
competing, considerations.
On the one hand, there are various elements of the guidance which
favor the maintenance and possible extension of established forms of
exploitation. The Operational Guidelines to the third Practical Principle,
for example, call for the avoidance of unnecessary regulation which
might foreclose opportunities for the exploitation and sustainable use of
biological resources.722 The twelfth Practical Principle urges that the
needs of indigenous and local communities be taken into account in the
management process, while the second Practical Principle calls specifi-
cally for the empowerment of such users.723 The accompanying
Operational Guidelines recommend the protection and encouragement of
customary uses of biological resources that are sustainable, in accor-
dance with traditional and cultural practices.2
718. See ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 299.
719. Id. 7 8(b).
720. Id. 8(c).
721. Id. 111, 8.
722. Id. Practical Principle 3.
723. Id. Practical Principles 12, 2.
724. See id. Practical Principle 4 (recognizing the importance of traditional knowledge to
sustainable use generally).
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On the other hand, there are a great many other considerations to be
borne in mind. The tenth Practical Principle calls for the intrinsic and
other non-economic values of biodiversity to be taken into account,
which is scarcely surprising given the heavy emphasis on this point in
the preamble to the CBD itself. 2 5 This explicit recognition of the need to
protect other life-forms for their own sake, as well as for anthropocentric
reasons, inevitably generates other practical constraints on exploitation.
Thus, the Operational Guidelines to the eleventh Practical Principle call
for the promotion of more efficient, ethical, and humane use of the com-
ponents of biological diversity, while those accompanying the twelfth
Practical Principle suggest that one obvious way to bring utilization into
a framework of sustainability is to promote alternative non-consumptive
uses.2 6 In a similar vein, Agenda 21 called specifically for an expansion
of recreational and tourist activities based around marine living re-
sources, as a means of generating alternative sources of income. 727 In
addition, the third and thirteenth Addis Ababa Practical Principles call
for the elimination of perverse incentives that might, for example, con-
tribute to the incidence of illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing, and
of national subsidies that might mask the true costs of management. Ac-
cordingly, all costs generated by the requirements of management-
monitoring, inspection, reporting, etc.-should be internalized, and har-
vest levels and quotas set by reference to information provided by the
monitoring system, not the economic needs of the management sys-
tem.2 Finally, the ninth Practical Principle recognizes the need for an
inter-disciplinary approach to be adopted in relation to management,
given that social, cultural, political, and economic factors are no less im-
portant to sustainable utilization than biological parameters. 729 This point
is also reflected in Agenda 21, which, recognizing a damaging limitation
of focus which is often evident on the part of agencies currently engaged
in the management process, also urged the expansion of multidiscipli-
730nary education, training, and research on marine living resources.
Plainly, there is room for a considerable difference of opinion re-
garding the precise weight to be accorded to these various factors, and
the ultimate balance to be struck between them, in any particular context.
In the ordinary way, priorities for conservation and sustainable use are to
be determined by national agencies, through the adoption and implemen-
725. Id. Practical Principle 10.
726. Id. Practical Principles 11-12.
727. Agenda 21, supra note 695, 17.80.
728. ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 299, Practical Principles 3,
13.
729. Id. Practical Principle 9.
730. Agenda 21, supra note 695, 17.93.
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tation of their own biodiversity plans, programs and policies, although
the fact that the conservation of biological diversity is declared to be a
"common concern of mankind" means that even in that situation deci-
sions cannot be regarded as completely beyond the bounds of
international scrutiny. Compliance with international standards is essen-
tial, and it is clear that, in many cases, this will demand major changes
of attitude and life-style.
There is no doubt that these points have already been taken on board
by CBD parties in many cases. The case is particularly well made, for
example, in the Basic Environment Plan formulated by the Japanese
government shortly after its accession to the Biodiversity Convention.
The Basic Environment Plan noted that
there is a growing consensus regarding the urgent need to
change both our current lifestyles and the prevailing economic
system to construct a sustainable future with minimal environ-
mental loads, each member of society sharing a fair burden.
These beliefs are expressed on a principle of environmental eth-
ics for human beings living in a finite environment.
7 3
Furthermore, in order to achieve the CBD's goal of sustainable de-
velopment:
it is necessary for developed countries, including Japan, which
have been imposing great burdens on the earth's environment, to
review their behavioral patterns .... In Japan, people are realiz-
ing that their materialistic attitudes are resulting in an
environmental crisis and there is a popular movement demand-
ing modifications. It is not easy to change the norms of
socioeconomic systems or current lifestyles. It is, nonetheless,
732necessary.
In particular,
The soundness of the ecosystem, in all of the various regions,
must be restored and maintained through a wise use of the envi-
ronment. Everyday life, business activities, and leisure activities,
wherever they may be, must be an enriching experience for both
nature and humankind. Thus, harmonious co-existence between
nature and people will be attained. 33
731. Kanky6 kihon keikaku [Basic Environment Plan], Cabinet Decision of Dec. 16,
1994, pt. I, § II, available at http://www.env.go.jp/en/policy/planbasic/pt3c5.html.
732. Id. pt. II, § 1.
733. Id. pt. II, ch. II.
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This emphasis on "harmonious co-existence between nature and people"
also features prominently in the same government's National Biodiver-
sity Strategy, formulated in 2002, which calls for "a new way of
interacting with nature whereby humans contribute to nature," and looks
forward to a time "in which all citizens can enjoy daily interaction with a
wide variety of thriving life-forms. 734
It is, however, much easier to articulate such aspirations at a general
philosophical level than to implement them in a practical sense, and it is
here that scrupulous attention will have to be paid to the detailed stan-
dards and criteria that are being formulated at the international level.
This point is clearly recognized in the successive formulations of strat-
egy by the Japanese government noted above. Understandably,
however, the degree of progress individual governments have actually
achieved in this regard varies considerably. The Japanese government's
third national report to the CBD, for example, noted that it had not yet
initiated a process for application of the Addis Ababa Guidelines, which
were indeed still undergoing translation.736 Plainly, these standards will
have much to offer with regard to the more detailed ramifications of the
general principles of "harmonious co-existence," "enriching experience,"
and "daily interaction" noted above.
In the case of biological entities that inhabit or traverse areas beyond
national jurisdiction, additional considerations inevitably come into play.
Since whales inhabit the oceans, and undergo substantial migration jour-
neys, it is evident that this is a case in which international cooperation
and multinational decision-making will be required, as envisaged by the
eighth Practical Principle. Decisions over their conservation, manage-
ment, and protection have to be made in an appropriate forum, with
suitable representation of interests, and the Operational Guidelines to the
ninth Practical Principle accordingly call for the identification and par-
ticipation of all stakeholders in the planning and execution of
management activities, a task that was long ago performed by the
734. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL BIODIVERSITY STRATEGY OF JAPAN (2002),
http:www.biodic.go.jp/cbd/outline/rev-unedited.pdf (unedited tentative translation). This aspi-
ration, encapsulated in the Goals of the Strategy, is specifically related to the national land
areas of Japan, though there is no obvious reason why it should not in principle apply to mari-
time areas as well.
735. Kanky6 kihonh6 [Environment Basic Law], Law No. 91 of 1993, arts. 32-35, avail-
able at http://www.env.go.jp/en/laws/policy/basic/index.html; Kanky6 kihon keikaku [Basic
Environment Plan], Cabinet Decision of Dec. 16, 1994, ch. 5, available at http://
www.env.go.jp/en/policy/plan/basic/pt3c5.html.
736. See Third Written Report of Japan to the CBD, pt. C, art. 10, box 77 (2002), avail-
able at http://www.cbd.int/doc/world/jp/jp-nr-03-en.doc.
737. See ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 299, Practical Principle
8.
738. Id. Practical Principle 9.
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ICRW itself in recognizing the interest in this matter of all the nations of
the world, and making IWC membership open to all.73 In this context,
moreover, it is clear that, whatever justifications or excuses may be of-
fered by individual States in respect of their tardiness or uncertainty in
the implementation of internationally agreed standards, these are less
obviously available to international organizations, given the inevitable
opportunities within such fora for technical collaboration, the creation
and empowerment of subordinate institutions, the exchange of informa-
tion, and the development of best practice.
In view of the divergence of traditions and perspectives amongst
IWC members, the wide range of matters to be considered and the gen-
eral complexity of the issues involved, it is not to be expected that States
will necessarily agree on the appropriate policy outcomes with regard to
whaling, and there can certainly be no suggestion that bad faith is neces-
sarily involved in any failure to achieve unanimity on specific measures.
Obviously, opinions may legitimately differ regarding the precise weight
to be attached, for example, to intrinsic as opposed to anthropocentric
values; to related ethical questions concerning humane treatment; to so-
cial, political, and cultural, as opposed to purely biological,
considerations; and to the extent to which particular activities are being
subsidized or artificially sustained for undisclosed or unmeritorious rea-
sons. Much more problematic, however, would be any peremptory
attempt to foreclose debate entirely on any of the major issues outlined
above, or to refuse even to consider factors which have been authorita-
tively identified as relevant. Such an approach would appear to be
inherently incompatible with the universally recognized obligations to
implement treaties, and to endeavor to negotiate solutions to associated
environmental controversies, in good faith, in light of accepted norms
and by means of established procedures. 740 These duties would seem to
entail recognition of the broad array of principles referred to above, at
least on the part of those IWC Member States that are party to the CBD,
and, indeed, of others insofar as those same principles find reflection in
other treaties to which they are party or in customary international law
generally.
739. A further reflection may be found in the provision for the participation in IWC
meetings of non-governmental actors.
740. U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff. [DESA], Report of the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, Braz., Princs. 26-27, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/
confl 51/aconfl 5126-1 annex l.htm. These duties are, of course, no more than specific manifes-
tations of the principles and purposes embodied in the U.N. Charter.
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b. Other Conservation Treaties
As noted in Part II, it is not only conservation treaties of global ap-
plication which may have a bearing on the future of the whaling issue,
since regional arrangements have also to be considered. Of these, the
1979 Berne Convention, covering Europe, was identified as having the
greatest potential relevance."' Article 6 of the Berne Convention requires
both the prohibition of all deliberate killing of species listed in Appendix
II, which includes various cetacean species, and the adoption of meas-
ures to ensure their protection. 42 Plainly, these provisions may be
understood to require the parties to exercise jurisdiction over their na-
tionals even when they are operating beyond the limits of national
territory, for example, on the high seas, but may in addition extend well
beyond that.'" Since their duty is expressed in terms of taking "appropri-
ate and necessary legislative and administrative measures to ensure the
special protection" of all such species, it is strongly arguable that it re-
quires them to cast their votes in any international fora in such a way as
to achieve that goal.
Article 9 of the Berne Convention allows for the creation of excep-
tions to this regime of protection in defense of certain interests, but only
where "the exception will not be detrimental to the survival of the popu-
lation concerned" and "there is no other satisfactory solution."7" The
interests in question include the protection of flora and fauna, the con-
duct of research, or, of reintroduction and repopulation programs, the
prevention of serious damage to fisheries, etc., the protection of other
overriding public interests, and the selective and judicious exploitation
of small numbers of specimens. The use of such powers is subject to
close scrutiny by the Berne Convention's Standing Committee, to which
regular reports must be made. Even where Appendix II specimens may
be taken pursuant to these powers, the use of certain methods and de-
vices of an indiscriminate or otherwise objectionable nature is
prohibited.4  In relation to mammals, these include aircraft, electrical
devices capable of killing or stunning, (semi-)automatic weapons, or
explosives, although by virtue of a specific exclusion, the last of these is
rendered permissible in the context of whaling.'
4 6
741. See generally Peter G.G. Davies, The Legality of Norwegian Commercial Whaling
under the Whaling Convention and its Compatibility with EC Law, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
270 (1994) (exploring the implications of E.U. membership in the context of the whaling
convention).
742. Berne Convention, supra note 311, art. VI.
743. LYSTER, supra note 273, at 147-48.
744. Berne Convention, supra note 311, art. IX.
745. Id. art. VIII.
746. Id. app. IV.
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In addition to the deployment of exceptions, the Berne Convention
permits the formulation of reservations relating to particular protected
species, or proscribed devices in relation to particular species.747 These
reservations must be notified to the depositary upon signature, ratifica-
tion, or accession, 74 or by way of objection when new species are added
to the appendices.' 9 On the other hand, the Standing Committee of the
Berne Convention has strongly urged the parties to reconsider the need
for such exceptions, and some have been abandoned in consequence.7
°
Certain reservations have, however, been made and maintained by the
principal European whaling nations, Iceland and Norway.75' The Conven-
tion also permits the specification by States of the territories to which
their acceptance applies,75' and declarations have been made by some
excluding its application to certain of their territories which may be of
relevance in the present context.7 3
As the Berne Convention is increasingly seen as the regional mecha-
nism for implementation of the CBD, and as it now boasts a very
considerable number of parties,5  including several from beyond the
European region,755 it can itself be regarded as a valuable source of guid-
ance with regard to the application of contemporary conservation norms,
not least because it is a relatively sophisticated legal instrument in terms
of its elucidation and development through institutional activities and the
ongoing practice of its parties. At the very least, it may offer instructive
insights and examples of good practice with regard to issues that remain
unresolved within the IWC. There is a clear recognition, for example, of
the need to curtail or eliminate certain traditional practices of exploita-
tion, however firmly entrenched, where this is necessary to advance the
objectives of the Convention.756
In a similar way, although to a lesser extent, the 1940 Western Hemi-
sphere Convention may have a part to play in this context. Its primary
significance lies, perhaps, in the extent to which it has foreshadowed a
747. Id. arts. XVII(3), XXII.
748. Id. art. XXII.
749. Id. art. XVII(3).
750. Id. Recommendation 4.
751. Council of Europe, http://conventions.coe.int/ (follow "Reservations and Declara-
tions" hyperlink; then search for reservations by treaty or by State).
752. Berne Convention, supra note 311, art. XXI.
753. Denmark, for example, has excluded the application of the Convention to
Greenland and the Faroe Islands. See Council of Europe, supra note 751.
754. There are currently forty-five, including the European Community, with one addi-
tional signatory. See http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=104&
CL=ENG (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
755. Id. (including Burkina Faso, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia).
756. See Berne Convention, supra note 311, Recommendation 5 (providing information
on the hunting and trapping of birds).
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number of the basic conservation principles which have subsequently
been elaborated in, or pursuant to, the CBD. Prominent amongst these
are the recognition of the wide range of philosophical motivations for
conservation, including those of a non-utilitarian character, and of the
resulting practical implications, seen in terms of regimes of strict protec-
tion for certain species.7 " Given the non-participation of the United
States in the CBD, its endorsement of such principles through participa-
tion in the WHC-and indeed its crucial role in the original formulation
of that regime-helps to demonstrate that these represent norms of more
or less universal application.
4. Norms Concerning Animal Welfare and the Avoidance of Cruelty
The question concerning the protection and welfare of animals under
international law, though one that is frequently mentioned in passing (not
uncommonly in dismissive terms), has seldom been the subject of de-
tailed and informed analysis and is, as a result, poorly understood by the
international community generally. It is, in fact, too complex a topic to
form the subject of full consideration here, and the intention is therefore
to accord it separate treatment at a later stage. Suffice it to say for pre-
sent purposes that the necessity for humane treatment of wildlife
specimens is a natural corollary of the recognition, in the CBD and else-
where, of the intrinsic value of other life-forms,758 is specifically
mandated in the Addis Ababa Guidelines designed to give effect to the
duties of sustainable utilization created by that treaty and has been
widely recognized not only in diverse cultural traditions around the
world,75 9 but in countless instances of contemporary national legislation
757. For a discussion of these issues, see supra Part III.
758. See World Charter for Nature, pmbl., art. I, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7
(Nov. 9, 1982); see also THE WORLD CONSERVATION UNION ET AL., RESPECT AND CARE FOR
THE COMMUNITY OF LIFE 13-17 (rev. ed. 1991) (laying out foundational principles); Michael
Bowman, Biodiversity, Intrinsic Value, and the Definition and Valuation of Environmental
Harm, in ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 41 (Michael
Bowman & Alan Boyle eds., 2002) (offering further analysis); Michael Bowman, The Nature,
Development and Philosophical Foundations of the Biodiversity Concept in International
Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra
note 288, at 5 (providing further analysis).
759. RICHARD D. RYDER, ANIMAL REVOLUTION: CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARD SPECI-
ESISM 15-54 (2000); Arthur Hertzberg, Jewish Declaration on Religion and Nature, 17
ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 89 (1987); Abdullah 0. Nasif, The Muslim Declaration on Nature, 17
ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 1 (1987); Lungrig N. Rinpoche, Buddhist Declaration on Religion and
Nature, 17 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 87 (1987); Lanfranco Serrini, Christian Declaration on Relig-
ion and Nature, 17 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 88 (1987); Karan Singh, Hindu Declaration on
Religion and Nature, 17 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 89 (1987); see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL WEL-
FARE AND ANIMAL RIGHTS 196-203, 251-55, 283-300 (Marc Bekoff & Carron A. Meaney
eds., 1998).
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and in numerous formal instruments adopted at the international level.76 °
Accordingly, it is unquestionably legitimate, and arguably compulsory,
to afford it due consideration in the development of policy regarding the
exploitation of wild fauna of all descriptions.
The various categories of legal norms identified above accordingly
represent the principal external influences in accordance with which the
future development of the ICRW must be planned and crafted. Attention
must now turn to the mechanisms available within the ICRW for the ful-
fillment of this task.
C. Mechanisms for Normative Evolution Within the ICRW Itself
As noted in Part II, there are a number of mechanisms that may be
available within the confines of individual treaties to facilitate their pro-
gressive adaptation to change, and particularly changes mandated by the
evolving dictates of the broader legal system. The ICRW is clearly no
exception in that regard.
1. Evolutionary Interpretation of Open-Textured Terms
Most notably, the law of treaties, as explained and applied by the ICJ
in a series of high-profile cases, permits, and indeed commonly requires,
that the interpretation of "generic" or open-textured expressions in treaty
texts be undertaken in a flexible and evolutionary fashion. This is based,
moreover, on the presumed intentions of the parties themselves, and is
designed to ensure that the continuous pursuit of the object and purpose
of the treaty can be maintained over the course of time and in light of
ever-changing practical realities, social attitudes, and normative demands
of the wider legal system. The need for such an approach is, furthermore,
perceived to be especially strong in the case of treaties that establish in-
ternational organizations, the ongoing functional responsibilities of
which would render any alternative approach rapidly self-defeating. In
the case of the ICRW, there are a number of specific expressions in-
cluded in the text that positively clamor to be given an evolutionary
interpretation if the object and purpose of the ICRW is not to be de-
feated.
760. See generally THE WTO AND CONCERNS REGARDING ANIMALS AND NATURE (An-
ton Vedder ed., 2003); Bowman, supra note 484; Michael Bowman, Conflict or
Compatibility? The Trade, Conservation and Animal Welfare Dimensions of CITES, 1 J. INT'L
WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 9 (1998); Alexander Gillespie, Humane Killing: A Recognition of Uni-
versal Common Sense in International Law, 6 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 1 (2003); Stuart
R. Harrop, The Dynamics of Wild Animal Welfare Law, 9 J. ENVTL. L. 287 (1997).
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a. The Preamble and the Object and Purpose of the ICRW
The most obvious of these expressions open to evolutionary interpre-
tation occurs in the very first recital of the preamble, namely the phrase
"the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks."7 6 In eve-
ryday parlance, the term "resource," more usually expressed in the
plural, is intended to refer to anything that represents a means of support,
or of supplying a need or want,762 and has no doubt always been under-
stood in this sense. Thus, when the Biodiversity Convention defined
"biological resources" to include "genetic resources, organisms, or parts
thereof, populations or any other biotic components of ecosystems with
actual or potential use or value for humanity,,76 it did no more than reit-
erate this traditional conception of "resources," albeit in a deliberately
expansive manner. The crucial point at issue here is that the needs and
wants of humanity, despite remaining largely unchanging at the most
fundamental level, are unquestionably subject to continuous fluctuation
in a more superficial sense, just as the capacity of items found in our
environment to satisfy those evolving needs or wants will also vary, de-
pending in part on the comparative potential in that regard of other
materials that have been discovered or invented. Indeed, a key aspect of
the contemporary justification for conservation lies in the fact that one
cannot know at any given moment which uses or values particular biotic
entities may turn out to possess or exhibit, and that a precautionary ap-
proach to their conservation should therefore be adopted in order to
preserve and maximize all possible manifestations of utility.
76
4
This sense of continuously reconceptualized utility is only too ap-
parent in the case of whales, the resource potential of which has plainly
varied greatly over time and place. For example, whalebone once consti-
tuted an invaluable commodity until the greater virtues of plastics and
sprung steel became apparent and available for exploitation. In the same
way, the other uses to which whales and whale products have tradition-
ally been put have also shown considerable variation, and any viable
approach to interpretation of the ICRW must necessarily take account of
that fact. Let us suppose, purely for the sake of hypothesis, that all the
original IWC Member States had valued whales exclusively for their
oil-production capacity: it would plainly not have been legitimate to con-
clude on that account alone that the exploitation of whales for their meat
761. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
762. See, e.g., CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY 1219 (Judy Pearsall ed., 10th ed. 2002);
CHAMBERS' ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1251 (Sidney I. Landau et. al eds., 7th ed. 1990).
763. CBD, supra note 120, art. 2 (emphasis added).
764. See INT'L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT § 3 (1980).
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somehow undermined the ICRW, or fell outside its scope, simply be-
cause it had not been specifically envisaged as falling within its object
and purpose by the original negotiators.765
Such considerations only serve to confirm the fact that the term "re-
sources" represents a paradigmatic example of the kind of generic, open-
textured expression that the ICJ had in mind when laying down the re-
quirement of flexible and evolutionary interpretation, 6 since it would
plainly be counter-productive-indeed potentially absurd-to restrict the
understanding of the concept of "resources" for the purposes of a long-
running international agreement to uses that were no longer valued, rele-
vant, or possible, while at the same time excluding from its purview
forms of utility that were of the utmost contemporary significance. The
point is reinforced still further by the preamble of the ICRW, which
makes clear that its aim is to safeguard these resources "for future gen-
,,767taerations. With that particular objective in mind, what possible
motivation could there have been in 1946 for excluding from the scope
of prospective IWC regulation the forms of exploitation in which those
generations themselves might actually wish to engage, and shackling
them in perpetuity to those which, in light of evolving needs, aspirations,
and social attitudes, they might find impractical, obsolete, or distasteful?
Consequently, the precise sense in which cetaceans represent "re-
sources" must be subject to continuous review. When seeking to identify
and categorize the possible uses or values applicable to any particular
biological entity, moreover, no great feat of imagination or ingenuity is
required, since the Biodiversity Convention has conveniently catalogued
them for us, at least in general terms. A historical review of relevant
treaty provisions confirms that, over the course of the last 125 years or
so-the period during which the conservation and management of wild-
life have fallen within the scope of international regulation-these values
have progressively expanded from those reflected in a narrowly material-
istic and exploitative view of nature to those embraced by a more
sophisticated and eclectic perspective.168 They are now seen to include, as
765. In reality, this scenario is unlikely to have pertained, although it is certainly true
that whale oil was by far the most important product as far as most of the parties were con-
cerned, as evidenced by the adoption of the "blue whale unit" as the foundation of the
regulatory approach adopted.
766. This was specifically confirmed in relation to the term "natural resources" by the
WTO Appellate Body. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, $ 46-50, WT/DS58/AB/R (Nov. 6, 1998).
767. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
768. See supra notes 730-736 (providing recognition of this point in Japanese policy
documents); see also BOWMAN, supra note 288, at 9-10 (offering a more detailed analysis of
these developments); Gillespie, supra note 760, at 127-36; see, e.g., Michael Bowman, Biodi-
versity, Intrinsic Value and the Definition and Valuation of Environmental Harm, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 758, at 41
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the first preambular recital of the CBD makes clear, "ecological, genetic,
social, economic, scientific, educational, cultural, recreational, and aes-
thetic values."76 9 It goes without saying that individual life forms will
encapsulate these values in varying combinations and to different ex-
tents. In the case of whales, it seems clear that they exhibit virtually all
of these values simultaneously and to a high degree, and that, in the
modem context, the clearest possible recognition of this diversity of val-
ues is evident through the activity of whale-watching." The aesthetic
impact of whales is manifest initially in their undisputed physical mag-
nificence as the largest creatures that have ever inhabited the earth, and
extends to the fascination generated by their extraordinary behavioral
repertoire and remarkable adaptation over time to the demands of the
marine environment. The ability to experience these phenomena first-
hand represents a source of unrivaled recreational and educational
opportunity, while the knowledge that whales have (hopefully) been res-
cued by the international community from the brink of annihilation
following decades of unrestrained exploitation makes them cultural
icons of enormous significance. All of these factors have contributed to
the growth of a billion-dollar industry world-wide from which dozens of
countries now benefit economically, and consequently socially. In addi-
tion, their critical role in the marine food-web and aquatic behavioral
theatre unequivocally re-emphasizes their vital importance in an ecologi-
cal and scientific sense, which in turn serves to enhance still further their
appeal for the whale-watching public. Consequently, any attempt to re-
strict the sense in which they are currently treated as "resources" for the
international community to the narrow perceptions explicit in a regula-
tory agreement concluded in the immediate aftermath of a global conflict
from which that community has long ago moved on would appear to be
not only misguided in a practical sense, but contrary to established legal
principle.
This point is strongly reinforced by the fact that even whale-
watching, if pursued in a thoughtless or insensitive fashion, is capable of
inflicting significant damage on whales through the pollution of their
environment or the disruption of their breeding activities, migration pat-
(providing an indication of the impact of these provisions on the evolution of other areas of
international law); ILC, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transbound-
ary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instrumentslenglishdraft%20articles/9 102006.pdf.
769. CBD, supra note 120, pmbl.
770. See IWC, Whale-Watching: Recognition and Development of Whalewatching Is-
sues within the IWC, http://iwc.office.org/conservation/whalewatching.htm (last visited Aug.
29, 2008) (offering an introduction to whale-watching).
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terns; or other aspects of their behavioral repertoire."' In view of this
potential threat to the "proper conservation of whale stocks, '7 2 there
seems to be a strong case for bringing whale-watching within the scope
of mandatory regulation as soon as possible, and it is difficult to resist
the claims of the ICRW to be regarded as the most appropriate vehicle
for this task, given its substantial international membership, its long-
established involvement in the area of cetacean management, and its
formal recognition in numerous other legal instruments in the conserva-
tion field. The critical question is whether the ICRW has the inherent
capacity to take on this task in its current form, or whether this role nec-
essarily falls outside its remit as currently drafted. In the latter case, a
further question would arise regarding the prospects, both legal and po-
litical, of amendment of the treaty in order to address these aspects.
Naturally enough, the extent to which the ICRW inherently embod-
ies the adaptability required in order to address the needs and challenges
of the twenty-first century largely depends on the evolutionary, trans-
temporal dimension of other terms and expressions in the text. As it hap-
pens-and contrary, perhaps, to initial expectations-the ICRW's
potential in that regard appears to be quite considerable. This potential
begins with the very title to the ICRW, and, in particular, the concept of
"whaling"-the activity which it seeks to regulate. There is no doubt
whatsoever that this term would have been understood by those who
drafted the ICRW to refer to the removal of whales from the marine en-
vironment for the purposes of human consumption, and thereby to
represent a direct parallel to the notion of "fishing," a term that has long
been applied to the harvesting of piscine species. Yet this acknowledge-
ment conceals the fact that there is no conclusive etymological or
semantic reason why the word "whaling" should have to be restricted to
the particular type of exploitation that was most familiar in 1946, and
should not be applied instead to any form of tracking and pursuit of the
173larger cetacean species . Indeed, given the evident potential of unregu-
lated whale-watching to frustrate the ICRW's objectives of providing for
the proper conservation of whales, achieving the optimum level of stocks
and safeguarding the resources they represent for the benefit of future
771. See RANDALL R. REEVES ET AL., IUCN/SPECIES SURVIVAL COMMISSION CETACEAN
SPECIALIST GROUP, DOLPHINS, WHALES AND PORPOISES: 2002-2010 CONSERVATION ACTION
PLAN FOR THE WORLD'S CETACEANS 17-18 (2003), available at http://www.iucn.org/dbtw-
wpd/edocs/2003-009.pdf [hereinafter 2002-2010 Cetacean Action Plan] (providing an over-
view of the potentially harmful effects of whale-watching).
772. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl. (seventh recital).
773. In the English language, indeed, verbs formed from the names of animals are rou-
tinely employed to indicate a huge variety of actions or activities characteristically done either
by or to the animals in question. Consider, for example, the diverse and divergent connotations
of the verbs "to dog," "to rat," "to worm," "to gull," "to fish," "to badger," and "to squirrel."
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generations, there would seem to be every reason to adopt an extended,
evolutionary, and purposive interpretation of the concept of "whaling" so
as to embrace this recreational form of exploitation as well."'
As a matter of semantics, there is nothing very surprising or unusual
in such a transition, as it is one which has already been undergone by
other similar words, such as "birding."77 The original sense in which this
word was used, as evidenced by dictionaries first published in the late
nineteenth or early twentieth centuries, was to signify "the hunting,
shooting, snaring or catching of birds,' 776 or the robbing of their nests,777
but with the progressive legal restriction of such activities over the
course of time, the word has come to be more commonly employed to
denote the perennially legitimate, observational pursuit of birds. Indeed,
one current online dictionary offers "watch and study birds in their natu-
ral habitat" as its only definition of the verb "to bird. ' 778 In the case of
"whaling," it is unnecessary to take matters so far as to exclude the
original connotation of the word entirely. Rather, the term can quite le-
gitimately be understood, in full accordance with established principles
of evolutionary treaty interpretation, to refer to any activity involving the
pursuit and exploitation of whales, whether for consumptive or non-
consumptive purposes, or reasons of an alimentary, educational, or rec-
reational nature, with the further consequence that references to
"whaling operations" and the "whaling industry" should be understood
respectively to embrace all those activities and commercial entities
which are associated with any such form of exploitation 7 79 This interpre-
774. Shio Segi makes this very point, albeit obliquely and no doubt inadvertently, stat-
ing, "Operators don't base their whale-watching business around Taiji and its neighboring
areas on their love of cetaceans. For these whale-watching companies, whale watching is
nothing but a kind offishery and a more economically productive business than dolphin hunt-
ing." Segi, supra note 685, at 25 (emphasis added).
775. It is gratifying to note that this same point has also occurred to others, and as long
as twenty-five years ago. See Global Conference on the Non-Consumptive Utilization of Ceta-
cean Resources, Boston, Mass., June 7-11, 1983, Whales Alive: Report of Global Conference
on the Non-Consumptive Utilization of Cetacean Resources, reprinted in BiRNIE, supra note
386, at 1012-16.
776. CHAMBERS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (first published 1872, definition retained through
7th ed. 1988).
777. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (first published 1911, definition retained
through 5th ed. 1964).
778. WordWeb Online, http://www.wordwebonline.com/search.pl?w=bird (last visited
Feb. 5, 2008).
779. This possible interpretation already has been proposed by many commentators, and
is evident as far back as Birnie's work. See, e.g., BIRNIE, supra note 386, at 57-58. The author
would like to record his appreciation to Edward Bates, a former post-graduate student at the
University of Nottingham, for first drawing it to his attention in a seminar some years ago. At
the time, the author's response, to his discredit, was to doubt whether the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties permitted such an interpretation. However, prolonged subsequent re-
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tation is, indeed, further facilitated by the fact that the process that is
identified in the preamble as having precipitated the decline in whale
populations in the first place is not actually whaling as such but rather
(over-)fishing,780 and that it was this activity specifically from which all
whales were in the future to be protected.78' This represents almost an
open invitation to bring other-i.e., non-lethal and non-consumptive-
forms of "whaling" within the scope of IWC regulation, thereby creating
an opportunity for steering exploitation away from forms that have
proved unacceptably destructive in the past, should the parties decide
that to be necessary.
Some IWC insiders are evidently of the view that this proposed
transformation of the meaning of the concept of "whaling" and associ-
ated terms has already occurred,"' arguing that the Commission has for
some time asserted its jurisdiction and responsibility over non-lethal ex-
ploitation through the adoption of resolutions on the topic and the
establishment of a whale-watching study group.7 3 As a matter of strict
law, however, this conclusion seems premature, as the ICRW accords
various powers to the Commission with regard to "whales and whal-
ing,"7'8 and the developments referred to are readily explicable by
reference to their bearing on the former ("whales") without the need to
treat them as expanding the scope of the latter ("whaling"). The devel-
opments in question were in any event vigorously opposed by those
members committed to the resumption of commercial whaling, 8  dilut-
ing their claim to be regarded as "subsequent practice in the application
of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation. ' 786 Nevertheless, they certainly represent a significant
practical shift in the focus of the IWC, and can justly be seen as an im-
portant preliminary step toward what would be an unambiguous
flection has led the author to conclude that, to the contrary, the Convention positively requires
such an interpretation. The same conclusion is encountered in the modem literature.
780. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl. As far as the author is aware, this expression is still only
used to connote extractive harvesting activities (or the metaphorical equivalent).
781. Id.
782. In this vein, Jos6 Truda Palazzo, Jr., a member of the Brazilian delegation to many
IWC meetings, has suggested that "[d]espite the steady stream of acrimonious statements by
IWC parties who wish to harvest whales, it is quite clear that the IWC as a management body
has imbued the term 'whaling' with contemporaneous meaning and has taken responsibility
for ensuring that all uses of whales are sustainable." Palazzo, supra note 95, at 69, 78.
783. Id. at71.
784. See infra Part IV.B.3.a.ii (offering a brief discussion of these powers).
785. Palazzo conceded this point. Palazzo, supra note 95, at 70 (citing, in particular, a
paper submitted to the forty-eighth meeting of the International Whaling Commission by the
government of Japan, Robert L. Friedheim, The Executive Summary of the International Legal
Workshop, IWC/48/27 (1996), available at http:/luna.pos.to/whale/icr legal-sum.html).
786. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 31(3)(b).
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indicator of a revolutionary change, namely the bringing of whale-
watching within the scope of formal regulation under the terms of the
Schedule.
Although such a revolution might seem thusfar to be eminently de-
sirable, it would no doubt still be unwise to adopt these more progressive
interpretations of terms like "resources" and "whaling" if such an adop-
tion would undermine the overall coherence of the preamble or diminish
the prospects of achievement of the object and purpose of the treaty as
there expressed. Precisely such concerns were in fact articulated some
years ago by Professor W.T. Burke in Memorandum of Opinion on the
Legality of the Designation of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary, in which
he suggested that
[t]he difficulty with these and similar interpretations is that they
turn the terms of the ICRW completely upside down and defeat
the major purpose of the original agreement. Where the funda-
mental goal of the initial treaty was to conserve whales in order
to permit a sustainable harvest, the purpose would now be to
protect whales against any harvest. Optimum utilization, rea-
sonably understood by the parties to mean actual harvest at a
conservative level, would now mean no harvest ever.787
It may be doubted, however, whether this attempted reaffirmation of
the traditional fisheries perspective faithfully reflects the stated object
and purpose of the ICRW. There is, in reality, no clause in the preamble
that specifically declares the "harvesting," or even the "sustainable har-
vesting," of whales to number amongst the objectives of the agreement.
Rather, the objective was to afford whales some degree of protection
against the harvesting that it was taken for granted would occur, there
being no other form of utilization that was likely to have been in the con-
templation of the negotiators at the time. Had it ever been suggested to
the parties that alternative, recreational forms of exploitation, potentially
more beneficial to humans and significantly less threatening to the main-
tenance of cetacean population levels, might at some point emerge, it is
entirely possible (allowing even for their immediate concerns about
postwar food shortages), that they would have acquiesced in their incor-
poration within the scope of optimum utilization. Far from turning the
ICRW on its head, therefore, an evolutionary approach to interpretation
would actually set it on its feet, significantly enhancing its fitness to un-
dergo the long march from its 1946 origins into an unpredictable future,
and its capacity to serve a continuously useful purpose through every
stage of this journey.
787. Burke, supra note 532, at 323.
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The one clause that might at first glance seem to sit uneasily with
this argument, and thereby lend support to Burke's skepticism, is the
assertion in the third preambular recital that "increases in the size of
whale stocks will permit increases in the numbers of whales which may
be captured,' 78  since this clause might conceivably be read as restricting
the scope and intendment of the ICRW to traditional, fishing-style activi-
ties exclusively. On closer examination, however, it is clear that there is
little force in that argument, for a number of reasons. First, as noted al-
ready in Part III, even in this clause, the phraseology used actually
avoids characterizing the capture of an increased number of specimens
as an objective in the strict sense, still less as the sole or principal aim of
international regulation; rather, it is presented in the guise of an opportu-
nity generated by the ultimate achievement of what are actually declared
to be the objectives, namely the protection of whales from over-
harvesting so as to achieve an optimum level of stocks. No doubt this
was an opportunity that featured prominently in the motivations of many
of the negotiating States at the time, but that does not itself render it part
of the object and purpose of the treaty as such.
Secondly, and in any event, the fact that the harvesting of whales
was the particular form of exploitation originally envisaged by the treaty
in no way warrants the conclusion that it is the only one that can now be
construed to fall within its scope. Indeed, the very point of the evolution-
ary approach to interpretation of generic terms is to allow the extension
of their ambit to embrace content that may have been unforeseen at the
time of the treaty's adoption.
Thirdly, the incorporation of non-lethal methods of exploitation does
not itself lead to the automatic exclusion of this longer-established form
of utilization. It would be extremely difficult to argue, for example, that
all traditional harvesting activities now actually fall outside the scope of
the ICRW or are inherently incompatible with its object and purpose"
Rather, it would be for the parties themselves, through the decision-
making processes that the ICRW establishes, to decide the precise
balance to be struck between the different forms of exploitation at any
given time.
Finally, it is not to be overlooked that the third recital is itself capa-
ble of evolutionary interpretation, so that the word "captured" might be
construed to incorporate a figurative, as well as literal dimension. It is
common enough, after all, to speak of wildlife specimens as "captured"
788. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
789. Though naturally there may well be disagreement as to the extent, if any, to which it
should currently be permitted.
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on film or in the memory,7'9 and that is no doubt precisely the objective
of many participants of whale-watching expeditions. It may, indeed, be
arguable that the notion of "capture" has always been given an extended
meaning for the purposes of the ICRW. 9' In light of these considerations,
the very most that could reasonably be claimed is that the proposed rein-
terpretation of the concept of "whaling" produces a trace of mild
incongruity with the third recital-there is certainly no element of out-
right incompatibility or contradiction. The better view is that there is no
incongruity at all.
In all other respects, moreover, the formal absorption of whale-
watching within the agreed remit of the IWC greatly increases the co-
herence of the preamble and the prospects of successful attainment of its
objectives. The explanation of this conclusion lies in the fact that there
are a number of other key terms that also require flexible and progressive
interpretation if they are to accommodate contemporary needs, aspira-
tions, and external legal norms, and that in each case the potential of the
ICRW will be enhanced by a more inclusive approach toward the notion
of whaling. Perhaps the most important of these is "conservation," the
current ramifications of which have been explained in earlier sections of
this Part.
792
In point of fact, practice under the ICRW has throughout its history
been to accord an evolutionary meaning to the concept of "conserva-
tion," at least in terms of the means and mechanisms needed to render it
a practical reality. Thus, the IWC has conceived it successively by refer-
ence to the "blue whale unit" approach, to species-by-species and stock-
by-stock assessments, and then by reference to the New, and ultimately
the Revised Management Procedure (RMP).793 The RMP has, of course,
necessarily to be understood and applied within the context of a wider
Management Scheme, but even that may conceivably fall short of the
more integrative, holistic, and multi-disciplinary approaches required
under modern conservation thinking, as reflected in the Biodiversity
Convention and other contemporary instruments. Thus, the preamble to
the CBD makes clear that conservation theory is currently grounded not
merely in anthropocentric, utilitarian concerns, but in a moral recogni-
790. Thus, one definition of the word "capture" is "to succeed in representing (some-
thing ... elusive) in a fixed or permanent form." CHAMBERS ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note
419, at 253.
791. For an exploration of this point, which turns on the ICRW's own definition of the
concept of a "whale catcher" in Article U(3), see infra Part IV.C. .b.
792. See supra IV.B.2-3.a.
793. For information regarding the Revised Management Procedure (RMP), see IWC,
Revised Management Procedure, http://www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/rmp.htm (last visited
Aug. 29, 2008).
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tion of the intrinsic value of all living things.9 The Addis Ababa Guide-
lines confirm that this is a matter to be taken seriously, and one that finds
formal reflection, inter alia, in the requirement that consideration be
given to non-consumptive and non-lethal uses, as well as in the need for
the application of humane standards in exploitation.79 ' The potential con-
tribution of whale-watching in all of these respects is too obvious to
require explanation, and serves again to underline the extent to which its
exclusion from the formal purview of the ICRW has contributed to the
treaty's growing dysfunctionality.
Of particular importance in that context is the fact that the ICRW
calls not merely for "conservation," or even "effective conservation," but
for "proper and effective conservation, ' 79' and it is clear that the concept
of "propriety" is one that is not to be under-valued or ignored in this
process. It is, furthermore, plainly another element of the ICRW formula
that, in accordance with Article 31 (3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, has constantly to be revisited and reconceptualized so
as to keep abreast of modern thinking, insofar as the substantive provi-
sions of the ICRW plausibly allow for that possibility.797 In light of the
many values of whales identified in the discussion above, there can be
little doubt that the treatment of whale-watching as a variety of whaling
for the purposes of the ICRW would be likely to assist greatly in ensur-
ing due recognition of all relevant factors and full compliance with
contemporary conservation norms.
Finally, these same considerations provide support for the contention
that the "orderly development of the whaling industry, 798 might very well
lie in a movement away from the traditional, extractive/consumptive ex-
ploitation of whales-i.e., "fishing"-and toward other forms of whaling
activity in the wider sense. This impression is strongly reinforced by the
fact that the degree of opposition to lethal whaling is so strong in certain
quarters as to have given rise to attempts to physically prevent it, thereby
prejudicing the good order of maritime navigation, as IWC Resolutions
2006-2 and 2007-2 have recently confirmed. 799 "Orderly" development
can therefore best be achieved through activities that do not arouse such
intense antipathy, but that can at the same time avoid any risk of precipi-
tating "widespread economic or nutritional distress," as the preamble
794. CBD, supra note 120, pmbl.
795. ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 299, Practical Principles 6,
10, 11.
796. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl. (sixth recital). "Proper conservation" also appears, of
course, in the final recital. Id. pmbl. (seventh recital).
797. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 2 1, art. 31(3)(c).
798. ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
799. See IWC Res. 2006-2, supra note 660; IWC Res. 2007-2, supra note 660.
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demands.8°° Indeed, the financial-and hence social and nutritional-
benefits that flow, directly or indirectly, from whale-watching have the
potential to totally eclipse the returns obtainable from more traditional
forms of exploitation.
Furthermore, the relevance of whale-watching to the overall object
and purpose of the ICRW is far more obvious than is that of the practice
of "culling" whales, which the normalization documents appear to as-
sume without argument to fall within its scope.8' For, although culling
entails the physical removal of whales from the marine environment-an
activity clearly envisaged in a general sense within the overall scheme of
the ICRW-it has little or nothing to do with the original objectives of
the ICRW itself, being designed essentially to protect fish stocks, rather
than whale stocks. Thus, it could be argued that any quota allowed for
the purposes of culling should logically be determined on a quite differ-
ent scientific basis from that appropriate for ordinary harvesting.Y0 2 An
attempt was, no doubt, at one time made to establish a causal link be-
tween the ICRW objective of protecting all whale species and the
activity of culling those that might be regarded as over-abundant by
claiming that the proliferation of minke whales was a causal factor in the
failure of population recovery in larger cetacean species. This argument
appears effectively to have been torpedoed, however, by the revelation of
the massive undisclosed exploitation of these species by the Soviet fleet,
referred to in Part III, which provided a vastly more convincing explana-
tion. 03
Nevertheless, it is at least arguable that a progressive and evolution-
ary approach to the interpretation of expressions like the "proper
conservation of whale stocks" and the "orderly development of the whal-
ing industry" would, from a modem, holistic, and "ecosystem-based"
perspective, positively favor consideration of the impact of whale popu-
lations on conservation programs relating to other marine species.,
Consequently, it might be advantageous to treat culling as one particular
manifestation of the activity of "whaling." On the other hand, it should
obviously not actually be authorized until such time as a sufficiently co-
gent and coherent case could be advanced to persuade the requisite
majority of the parties that it was necessary to modify the Schedule to
800. See ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
801. See JWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2, pmbl. (seventh recital).
802. That is, the quota for any species would be determined not by reference to its im-
pact on population levels of that species itself, but rather by-or in addition to-its impact on
population levels of the fish species on which it preys.
803. See Debora MacKenzie, Whalers Change Tack on Southern Sanctuary, NEW SCI-
ENTIST, Mar. 5, 1994, at 4.
804. In fact, the IUCN has described the "concept of multi-species or ecosystem man-
agement" as "intuitively appealing." 2002-2010 Cetacean Action Plan, supra note 77 1, at 16.
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allow for it, and that all the essential attendant safeguards had been es-
tablished. 5 If, however, a plausible claim can be advanced for treating
the culling of whales as a form of whaling for the purposes of the ICRW,
the case for the recognition of whale-watching-which, though less
similar in practical terms to the activities that have been the traditional
focus of regulation under the ICRW, is in fact far more directly relevant
to the achievement of its objectives-begins to appear almost irresistible.
Yet, notwithstanding the force of all these considerations, it probably
still would be inappropriate to rely on a progressive and evolutionary
interpretation of the preamble as a means of normalizing the ICRW and
bringing it into line with contemporary conservation aspirations and
standards, unless assurance could be obtained that the substantive provi-
sions of the ICRW were equally capable of application in this revised
and revitalized sense. It is to this last question that we should now turn.
b. The Substantive Provisions of the Convention
As it happens, the ICRW also defies expectation in terms of the mal-
leability and adaptability of its substantive provisions to present
circumstances. In particular, many of its provisions, whether relating to
the conferral of powers on the Commission or the imposition of duties
on its Member States, are expressed in very generalized terms, readily
capable of flexible application to new forms of whaling activity. Under
Article IV(l), for example, the Commission is authorized to
(a) encourage, recommend, or if necessary, organize studies and
investigations relating to whales and whaling;
(b) collect and analyze statistical information concerning the cur-
rent condition and trend of the whale stocks and the effects of
whaling activities thereon;
(c) study, appraise, and disseminate information concerning
methods of maintaining and increasing the populations of
whale stocks.'06
By virtue of Article IV(2) of the ICRW, the IWC may publish "such
reports as it deems appropriate, as well as statistical, scientific, and other
pertinent information relating to whales and whaling," and under Article
VI it is empowered to "make recommendations to all or any Contracting
Governments which relate to whales and whaling and to the objectives
and purposes of this Convention. 8 7 Under Article 111(4), it may establish
805. See supra Part IV.B. L.c; see infra Part IV.C. L.b (offering a more in-depth discussion).
806. ICRW, supra note 1, art. IV.
807. Id. arts. IV(2), VI.
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"such committees as it considers desirable to perform such functions as
it may authorize."8 °8 There is nothing in the drafting of these provisions,
when read in light of an updated conception of the ICRW's overall ob-
ject and purpose, that would prevent the deployment of such powers in
relation to forms of whaling that the original negotiating States did not
specifically envisage. Indeed, they have, it would seem, already been
extensively used in that way. In a similar fashion, the various duties of
the parties themselves to collect and submit statistical and scientific in-
formation in order to ensure the application of the ICRW and the
punishment of infractions80 could equally readily be applied on this
broader front.
Yet these are, in a sense, relatively ancillary matters within the over-
all scheme of the ICRW, and all aspirations to normalize, or
,'modernize," the application of the Convention must first be scrutinized
in light of its preliminary provisions, which are designed specifically to
determine its functional ambit. Indeed, Article 1(2) might seem to pro-
vide a potentially formidable constraint in this regard. Article 1(2) states,
This Convention applies to factory ships, land stations and whale
catchers under the jurisdiction of the Contracting Governments,
and to all waters in which whaling is prosecuted by such factory
ships, land stations and whale catchers. 8 '
The fact that land stations and factory ships are both defined812 as places
where "whales are treated wholly or in part" clearly presupposes (with-
out placing any limitations on the precise purposes for which they are
being treated) the actual physical appropriation of the whales in ques-
tion, while this might also seem to be implicit in the notion of a "whale
catcher." From this perspective, forms of exploitation of cetaceans that
do not involve their physical removal from the water might seem at first
sight to fall outside the substantive purview of the Convention.
Such a conclusion would, however, ultimately be unwarranted in
light of Article 11(3), which defines a "whale catcher" very broadly as "a
ship used for the purpose of hunting, taking, towing, holding on to, or
scouting for whales."83 While opinions may differ as to the precise
808. Id. art. 111(4).
809. Consider, for example, the ICRW's use in connection with the conservation of small
cetaceans.
810. See ICRW, supra note 1, arts. VII, VII(3)-(4), IX.
811. Id. art. I(2).
812. See id. art. 1(1)-(2).
813. Id. art. 11(3). The 1956 Protocol extended the scope of this provision to include
helicopters and other aircraft as well. 1956 Protocol, supra note 193, art. I.
[Vol. 29:293
Spring 2008] "Normalizing" the International Convention 473
degree of flexibility implicit in the term "hunting" in this context, '4 it is
surely beyond dispute that no element of physical appropriation is im-
plicit in the activity of "scouting for" whales, and that this term is,
without any need for strained or artificial construction, readily applicable
to contemporary whale-watching operations. Undeniably, in the circum-
stances of 1946, there would have been little profit or purpose in
scouting for whales were it not with a view to their subsequent harvest-
ing, but in the changed environment of the twenty-first century, whales
are obviously sought out on a regular basis for a variety of reasons, many
of which respond essentially to educational or recreational motivations.
Accordingly, there is nothing in Articles I or II that precludes the adop-
tion of an expanded and modernized reading of the notion of "whaling"
or of the substantive scope of the Convention generally.
On the other hand, given that it is the ICRW's Schedule that consti-
tutes the device through which whaling activities are subjected to
ongoing functional regulation, there would still be little virtue in regard-
ing whale-watching as falling within the purview of the ICRW unless the
Schedule represents a viable mechanism for the regulation of this activ-
ity specifically. This in turn depends on the proper construction of
Article V, which lays down the principles governing amendment of the
Schedule, and hence of the elaboration of this regulatory scheme. 8'5 Al-
though this question properly falls within the ambit of the present
Section of this Part, being one which concerns the adaptability of the
substantive provisions of the ICRW in light of contemporary needs, it
will be convenient to postpone its consideration to the following Section
concerning amendment of the Schedule generally." 6 Before proceeding
to that discussion, it is desirable to consider briefly the possible applica-
bility of the ICRW to the separate question of cetacean conservation in
its broadest possible sense.
Hard as it is not to sympathize with the desire that may be felt in cer-
tain quarters to redirect the focus of the IWC toward the management
and conservation of cetaceans in a general sense, it is much less clear
that the ICRW as currently drafted represents a suitable vehicle for the
performance of such a task. Clearly, it is not entirely without potential in
that respect, as the general powers that it confers both on the Commis-
sion and on the parties concerning the collection and dissemination of
information regarding whales can readily be deployed to develop a
clearer and more comprehensive picture of the current status of whale
814. Thus, dictionary definitions certainly include within their ambit such activities as
"pursuing" or "searching for" something, which do not necessarily imply subsequent physical
appropriation.
815. ICRW, supia note 1, art. V.
816. See infra Part IV.C.2.
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stocks and the principal threats to which they are subject. Even under the
original conception of the treaty, such activities would have been highly
desirable, if not essential, since it would scarcely be possible to establish
appropriate and reliable quotas for the taking of protected species with-
out the fullest possible information on all aspects of their abundance,
distribution, behavior, and reproductive capacity. Furthermore, the very
widely drawn powers of the Commission, noted above, to make recom-
mendations on matters which relate to whales and whaling and to
establish committees for the performance of designated functions pro-
vide significant additional mechanisms for advancing these objectives in
whatever direction the IWC might see fit. These powers have, of course,
already been utilized-although not always without protest on the part of
certain members-to strengthen the general conservation agenda of the
IWC, most notably through Resolution 2003-1, concerning the Berlin
Initiative.. The law of treaties presents no impediment to the launching
of such developments, and would encourage them insofar as they can be
expected to advance the object and purpose of the ICRW as currently
conceived."8
Yet such developments fall a long way short of establishing a com-
prehensive conservation regime for cetaceans, and the prospects of doing
so within the current institutional framework do not appear especially
bright. Specifically, there is no warrant within the text of the ICRW as
presently drafted for the imposition of general conservation obligations
on the Member States. Furthermore, there must also be grave doubts as
to whether the existing mechanism for the generation of new duties-
i.e., amendment of the Schedule-is adequately geared to the undertak-
ing of such a task. Accordingly, if such developments were judged at any
time to be desirable, they would seem to require amendment or supple-
mentation of the ICRW by some means. Before considering that
possibility, however, it is appropriate to examine the question of amend-
ment of the Schedule in more detail.
2. Amendment of the Schedule
As noted above, the Schedule to the ICRW represents the principal
mechanism both for the imposition of detailed substantive obligations on
the Member States, and for the modification and refinement of these ob-
ligations over time. Accordingly, it represents a vital engine for the
817. IWC, The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the Inter-
national Whaling Commission, IWC Res. 2003-1 (2003) (on file with IWC).
818. Admittedly, this is a question on which opinions may legitimately differ. See Wil-
liam C.G. Bums, The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the
International Whaling Commission: Toward a New Era for Cetaceans?, 6 J. INT'L WILDLIFE
L. & POL'y 255 (2003) (offering further discussion).
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adaptation of the ICRW to emerging needs, and hence for the process of
normalization and revitalization of the entire regime. It is, indeed, in the
unwillingness of many member governments to set new quotas for the
harvesting of the more abundant cetacean species that the "dysfunction-
ality" of the ICRW is said by the pro-whaling nations to lie. In particular,
Resolution 2006-1 declares that the moratorium was intended only as a
temporary measure, and is no longer needed in view of the development
of a "risk-averse procedure," the RMP, which should in the future enable
viable quotas to be fixed with confidence.8 9 The clear implication is that
the refusal to do so represents a lack of good faith on the part of the
delegations in question.
The obvious difficulty with this view is that, as seen above, the full
range of matters to be considered under the rubric of the modem concep-
tions of conservation--especially the "proper and effective" variety-
and optimum utilization extend far beyond those embraced in the RMP,
and even, arguably, the wider Revised Management Scheme. Conse-
quently, it is well within the scope of a bona fide exercise of discretion
for IWC members to take the view that zero quotas are still required,
albeit for reasons subtly different from those that predominated at the
time the moratorium was established. In other words, even if the RMP
can be seen as a reasonably reliable mechanism for the determination of
sustainable harvesting levels, it does not help to resolve the more funda-
mental question of whether such consumptive use should be pursued at
all, in light of other forms of exploitation that are arguably in closer
harmony with the full range of factors that must now be taken into con-
sideration pursuant to the duties arising under the CBD. From that
perspective, the true source of dysfunction might seem to lie in the cur-
rent failure of the ICRW to embrace and address in parallel all modern
manifestations of whaling on a full and formal basis.
This view would undoubtedly be strengthened if it could be shown
that the ICRW is indeed capable in principle of addressing the regulation
of whale-watching in an effective fashion. Plainly, its potential in that
regard is delimited by the provisions of Article V, which establishes the
legal parameters for amendment of the Schedule. 80 The general princi-
ples to be applied for that purpose are set out in Article V(2)(a), and
require that they be "necessary" in order "to carry out the objectives and
purposes" of the ICRW and "to provide for the conservation, develop-
ment, and optimum utilization of whale resources."82 ' The first question
here concerns the precise implications of the word "necessary," which is
819. IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2, pmbl. (fifth recital).
820. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V.
821. Id. art. V(2)(a).
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plainly capable of interpretation in accordance with highly divergent
standards of strictness-i.e., to connote anything from "absolutely indis-
pensable" to "justifiable by reference to any bona fide assessment of
need." As might be expected, this is a term that occurs in a great many
international agreements, and it is true that, within the jurisprudence of
certain treaty bodies, it has been given an extremely strict interpretation.
Thus, Thomas Schoenbaum notes that the test traditionally applied by
the WTO Appellate Body to determine whether a unilateral trade meas-
ure can be justified as being "necessary to protect human, animal or
plant life or health" within the meaning of Article XX(b) 22 of the 1994
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is based on the insis-
tence that "no GATT-consistent alternative is available and provided it
entails the least degree of consistency with other GATT provisions." '823
Something of the flavor of this approach is perhaps evident in the
observation of Professor Burke in relation to the ICRW that "[t]he impli-
cation of a requirement that a [measure] is necessary to carry out
objectives is that other actions have been unable to achieve the conserva-
tion and development objectives set out in the ICRW preamble. 24
Yet, this argument is open to a number of serious objections. The
first is that, taken literally, it requires demonstration of the failure of ex-
isting conservation arrangements as a precondition to the introduction of
a new measure covering similar ground. A strict application of such an
interpretation would obviously risk the total defeat of the objectives of
the ICRW before revised measures aimed at securing them could be con-
templated. This is hardly an attractive or plausible proposition. Secondly,
the approach adopted under the WTO regime has itself encountered con-
siderable criticism, the gist of which is that it fails to strike an
appropriate balance between the various goals and interests contem-
plated by that treaty. 25 It is unquestionably the case that it differs
markedly from that adopted under certain other treaty regimes. The
822. GATT, supra note 508, art. XX(b). Note also the reference to measures "necessary
to protect public morals" in Article XX(a). Id. art. XX(a).
823. Thomas Schoenbaum, International Trade and Environmental Protection, in IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 290, at 698, 702 (citing Appellate
Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing
Products, 164-75, WT/DSI35/AB/R (Mar. 21, 2001)). Note, however, that this approach to
interpretation had been established in GAT" jurisprudence since at least 1989. See Report of
the Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (Nov. 7, 1989) GATT B.I.S.D.
(36th Supp.) at 345.
824. Burke, supra note 532, at 316.
825. See, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GAIT 40-46, 52-52, 225-37 (1994);
Anne-Marie de Brouwer, GATT Article XX's Environmental Exceptions Explored, in THE
WTO AND CONCERNS REGARDING ANIMALS AND NATURE, supra note 760, at 37-38, 48-49,
58-59; Stuart R. Harrop & David Bowles, Wildlife Management, the Multilateral Trade Re-
gime, Morals and the Welfare of Animals, I J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 64, 65-75 (1998).
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European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), for example, requires
that governmental interference with certain of the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed therein must be justified on the grounds that, inter alia, it is
"necessary in a democratic society" for the defense of specified inter-
ests.826 The European Court of Human Rights has held that the term
"'necessary," while going beyond what is merely "admissible," "useful,"
"reasonable," or "desirable," certainly is not synonymous with "indis-
pensable." Rather, it implies only that the measure in question must
"correspond to a pressing social need" and be "proportionate to the le-
gitimate aim pursued." Furthermore, States are to be allowed a certain
margin of appreciation, which varies in accordance with the subject-
matter of the restriction, in their application of these provisions. 827 This
clearly does not entail proving, as a matter of course, that alternative
measures have not, or could not have, sufficed. It is far from apparent,
therefore, why this requirement should be assumed to be appropriate
with respect to the ICRW. Indeed, the case for so doing is immeasurably
weaker than under the ECHR, under which it has already been implicitly
rejected, because in that instrument the standard of "necessity" is em-
ployed as the criterion of acceptability of unilateral action taken by
States in derogation or restriction of the ECHR's primary objectives,
which one would naturally expect to require the closest scrutiny. In the
ICRW, by contrast, the standard of necessity serves rather to condition
the power of the parties to take collective decisions in pursuit of the aims
and objectives of the treaty, where the justification for a strict interpreta-
tion is not clear at all. If anything, indeed, one would expect, on the
application of ordinary principles, that an expansive view of the Com-
mission's decision-making powers would be appropriate. At the very
826. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, supra note 124, arts. 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11(2); see also Wibren van der Burg, The WTO
and Public Morals: Inspiration from the ECHR, in THE WTO AND CONCERNS REGARDING
ANIMALS AND NATURE, supra note 760, at 101 (providing a fuller comparison of these two
regimes).
827. See, e.g., United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 121, 149
(1998); Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34, 46 (1994); Silver v. United
Kingdom, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 347, 376-79 (1983); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 737, 754-55 (1979). See generally HOWARD C. YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION
DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE (1996); The
European Court of Human Rights Seminar on the Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation
Under the European Convention on Human Rights: Its Legitimacy in Theory and Application
in Practice, 19 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1998). It is fair to point out that the Human Rights Commit-
tee, by contrast, does not currently implement the "margin of appreciation" approach in its
interpretation of the same expression in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. Lansmann v. Finland, Communication No. 671/1995, CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995 (1995).
It is unclear, however, that this has resulted in any significantly greater propensity to treat
governmental action as having failed to meet the criterion of necessity. See CASES AND MATE-
RIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 35, at 714-19 (offering a sample of cases).
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least, the IWC should be treated as the arbiter of its own powers, so that
action taken purportedly for the fulfillment of its objectives would nor-
mally be presumed to be intra vires.828 It is true that the ICRW allows for
such decisions to be taken by a three-fourths majority vote, but it also
allows for dissentient States to opt out of the effect of such decisions,
reducing still further the need to adopt an exaggeratedly strict interpreta-
tion of the constraints imposed by the notion of necessity" 9 The idea,
indeed, that a group of States would have solemnly established a system
that permitted the adoption only of measures that were absolutely indis-
pensable to fulfillment of the treaty's objectives, and then allowed all of
its participants to exempt themselves entirely from their effects, strains
credulity. Burke's failure overtly to address this issue of the context in
which the word "necessary" appears-a cardinal requirement of the Vi-
enna Convention, and indeed any credible regime of treaty
interpretation-accordingly represents a fatal weakness in his analysis.
Whatever view is taken on this particular question, it is plain that
certain of the other objections raised by him with specific reference to
the legality of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary can have no application in
the present context. That is, however plausible it may have been to claim
that the existence of the moratorium on commercial whaling cast doubt
on the "necessity" for creation of a sanctuary, such considerations have
no possible relevance to the desirability of incorporating within the
Schedule a range of controls on the conduct of non-consumptive forms
of exploitation, which are not currently the subject of formal regulation
at all. This is a matter to be considered from first principles, and by ref-
erence to the fundamental objectives of the ICRW, as viewed in light of
evolving theories of conservation. Given (i) the contemporary concep-
tion of conservation and sustainable utilization as reflected in the
Biodiversity Convention and related instruments; (ii) the need to "con-
temporize" the object and purpose and basic concepts of the ICRW in
accordance with established principles of treaty law; (iii) the current
scale of whale-watching and the likely expansion of this activity in the
future in view of its substantial revenue-earning potential; and (iv) its
manifest capacity for inflicting significant damage on whale populations
unless adequately regulated, the "necessity" of bringing it within the
scope of IWC regulation can scarcely be doubted. Furthermore, since
this is a form of exploitation that can, if properly controlled, actually
828. See, e.g., P.W. Birnie, Opinion on the Legality of the Designation of the Southern
Ocean Whale Sanctuary, IWC/47/41 (1995), available at http://www.highnorth.no/Library/
ManagementRegimes/IWC/op-on-th.htm (offering a contrasting opinion); see also Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 168 (July 20) (discussing
the legal principles on which this opinion was based).
829. ICRW, supra note 1, art. III.
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avoid direct depletion of numbers entirely while simultaneously fulfill-
ing a vital educational role with regard to conservation efforts in the
future, its claim to be treated as a practical manifestation of "optimum
utilization" is extremely strong.
As regards the other factors which condition the legitimacy of
amendments, they are no less appropriate to the regulation of whale-
watching, the permitted incidence of which should also be based on sci-
entific findings, 30 and take into consideration the interests of both
consumers and providers, as required by sub-paragraphs (b) and (d) of
Article V(2) of the ICRW.8 31 The conception of "science" in this context
is plainly also one which has to be given an evolutionary interpretation
in order to ensure that implementation of the ICRW may keep abreast of
current thinking. In that context, it is not at all clear that Resolution
2006-1, while correctly asserting the need for "science-based policy and
rule-making,83 2 has fully taken on board the need for continuous review
of the range of scientific expertise required to sustain the process of
"proper and effective conservation," which should now certainly extend
well beyond population dynamics to embrace all relevant aspects of ce-
tacean behavior and welfare. An even more significant deficiency of
Resolution 2006-1 is that it fails expressly to recognize that, alongside
science, "social, cultural, political, and economic factors are equally im-
portant"8 33 -a factor, by contrast, explicitly recognized in the ICRW
itself in its requirement that the interests of the industry and its consum-
ers be taken into consideration.8' 3
In addition to these general parameters for Schedule amendment, the
substantive focus of permissible adjustments to the conservation regime
is specified in some detail by the provisions of Article V(1). 835 The final
question, therefore, is whether these constraints are meaningfully appli-
cable to the process of whale-watching, as opposed to the more
traditional forms of exploitation for which they were essentially devised.
Fortunately, the resolution of this issue is greatly facilitated by the fact
that General Principles for the Managing of Whale-Watching were
830. That is, scientific findings in the expanded sense indicated in the text above.
831. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(2).
832. IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2.
833. ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 299, Practical Principle 9,
Rationale at 16.
834. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(2)(d). For the sake of completeness, it may be observed
that whale-watching poses no threat of incompatibility with sub-paragraph (c), concerning the
impermissibility of restrictions on the numbers of factory ships or land stations, since such
facilities are not required at all.
835. Id. art. V(1).
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agreed to by the IWC Scientific Committee in 1996.836 Consequently,
there is an existing body of norms that can be assessed for their suitabil-
ity for formal translation to the Schedule, if ever the parties should
consider this desirable. Once again, the substantive aspects of these
guidelines do for the most part seem to fall squarely within the range of
matters that, in accordance with Article V(1), may be the subject of regu-
lation for the purpose of "conservation and utilization of whale
resources."8 37 Of prime relevance in that regard is item (e), concerning
"time, methods and intensity of whaling," to which the bulk of the
whale-watching guidelines are currently devoted.838 There may, however,
also be relevance in the provision for fixing (a) protected and unpro-
tected species;839 (b) open and closed seasons;4 ° (c) open and closed
waters, including the designation of sanctuary areas;8 4' (d) size limits forS842
each species; (f) types and specifications of gear and apparatus and
appliances that may be used;
8 43 (h) statistical and biological records;8M
and (i) methods of inspection. 845
It should therefore be apparent that there is, in fact, a very close cor-
relation between the regulatory mechanisms established in this provision
836. IWC, General Principles for Whale-Watching (1996), available at http://
www.iwcoffice.org/conservation/wwguidelines.htm [hereinafter General Principles for
Whale- Watching].
837. ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(l).
838. The guidelines begin by referring to "measures to regulate platform numbers and
size, activity, frequency and length of exposure in encounters with ... whales," and almost all
of what follows could be construed to fall within this general rubric. General Principles for
Whale-Watching, supra note 836, art. 1.
839. The guidelines stress the importance both of "sound understanding of the behavior
of cetaceans" and recognition that "cetacean species may respond differently" to encounters.
When coupled with the exhortations for new operations to "start cautiously, moderating activ-
ity until sufficient information is available on which to base any further development" and for
all operators to "monitor the effectiveness of management provisions and modify them as
required to accommodate new information," this could conceivably lead to the designation of
certain species as unsuitable targets for whale-watching. Id. arts. 1-3.
840. The guidelines expressly provide for the creation of "closed seasons .... Id. art. 1.
841. Id. (stating ".... or areas where required").
842. Some guidelines deal specifically with the special requirements of calves and juve-
niles, of which size may be a key indicator. Id. art. 3.
843. Various provisions relate generally to the design and operation of "vessels, engines
and other equipment," while specific reference is made, for example, to the "shrouding of
propellers." Id. art. 2.
844. The guidelines specify as an ideal the undertaking of "an early assessment of the
numbers, distribution and other characteristics of the target population/s in an area" as well as
identifying a need for "scientific research and population monitoring and collection of infor-
mation on operations, target cetaceans and possible impacts, including those on the acoustic
environment, as an early and integral component of management." Id. art. 1.
845. This element was added by the 1956 Protocol but does not currently seem to be
reflected in the Guidelines governing whale-watching. Of course, a case for the institution of
some form of inspection over such activities could easily be made, though the need is plainly
far less acute than in the case of harvesting whales. 1956 Protocol, supra note 193.
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to govern traditional forms of whaling and those specified by the Scien-
tific Committee as necessary for the regulation of its modern recreational
counterpart. Consequently, there is unlikely to be any significant practi-
cal difficulty in the application of the ICRW regime to this contemporary
form of exploitation of cetacean resources. If, however, it should prove
to be the case that regulatory measures of a kind not currently specified
were required for the effective governance of whale-watching, the posi-
tion would not be completely clear. On the one hand, it might be claimed
that the necessary changes could simply be incorporated in the Schedule
regardless, since Article V(1) does not expressly declare the list of
mechanisms it identifies to be exhaustive. 46 On the other hand, it may be
that the parties have customarily regarded them as such, since when it
was desired to add a reference to inspection to the original list,87 it was
thought necessary formally to amend that provision to include it by
means of the 1956 Protocol. 48 However, the most that could be required
in the situation now envisaged would be the proposal and adoption of a
similar amendment.
One relatively minor point of incongruity which might require con-
sideration here concerns the fact that while the scope of the ICRW, as
amended by the 1956 Protocol, extends to both ships and aircraft used in
whaling, the IWC Scientific Committee's General Principles for Whale-
Watching are expressed rather to apply to "platforms." 49 To the extent
that this notion is itself defined to include both vessels (with or without
engines) and aircraft, the substantive scope of the two forms of regula-
tion would appear to be co-terminous, but a possible problem may arise
from the fact that a "platform" is also stated to include any "person in
the water" who is engaged in whale-watching.85 ° In all likelihood, any
such person will actually have entered the water from a ship or aircraft,
and therefore the overall activity in question will plainly still fall within
the scope of Articles I-II, but if it is the case that persons may feasibly
enter the water by other means--directly from the shore perhaps, or
from an offshore installation-then such situations might arguably, on a
strict interpretation, fall beyond the current purview of the ICRW.
Whether such considerations are of any practical significance must be
determined by those with direct experience of the activities in question.
It can therefore be seen that there should be very little legal impedi-
ment to the deployment of the procedures governing amendment of the
846. See ICRW, supra note 1, art. V(1).
847. That is, an item could be added to the list of mechanisms specified in Article V(1).
Id.
848. See 1956 Protocol, supra note 193.
849. See General Principles for Whale-Watching, supra note 836.
850. Id. at n.1.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Schedule so as to incorporate provision for the regulation of whale-
watching. A more controversial issue, however, concerns the political
prospects of utilizing them to that end. As to this question, little can use-
fully be said here. One group of IWC members is known to be favorably
disposed in principle toward the development of whale-watching as a
form of exploitation, though it does not necessarily follow that they
would support bringing the practice within the scope of formal IWC
regulation. The current existence of soft law guidelines, however, gives a
reasonably clear indication of the kind of measures that might be envis-
aged, and even if these were to be transformed into hard law, they would
be unlikely to impose obligations so rigorous as to impose intolerable
burdens on the States concerned. In any event, everyone concerned
should recognize the imperative need to ensure that such activities be
pursued in a sensitive and sustainable manner.
A second IWC faction has declared its support for the process of
normalization, though they equally may not see this as entailing a move
toward the incorporation of recreational activities within the ICRW re-
gime. In an ideal world, there would be agreement that a proper
application of the law of treaties points strongly in this direction, but it
would be naive to suppose that a consensus to that effect will be forth-
coming. Consequently, the matter would have to be put to the vote in
accordance with Article 111(2), which provides that amendments to the
Schedule require for their adoption a "three-fourths majority of those
members voting."85' The matter is only capable of resolution by IWC
members themselves, and the sole purpose of this Article has been to
ensure that the relevant legal issues have been canvassed fully in ad-
vance.
A further question revolves around the need to make separate provi-
sion in the Schedule for the process of culling. On the one hand, it might
be argued that this could be dealt with simply by reference to the fixing
of quotas in the ordinary way,852 but the counter-argument would be that
the case for culling rests on considerations that are quite distinct from
those that might justify the allocation of a quota for commercial or sub-
sistence harvesting. Possibly, therefore, a different regime might need to
be constructed. One significant factor here is that, whereas the impulse
to cull allegedly overabundant or "nuisance" species appears to have
been an almost automatic, reflex reaction amongst humans throughout
history, 3 truly effective solutions to such problems may well lie in en-
851. ICRW, supra note 1, art. I1(2).
852. See IWC Res. 2006-1, supra note 2, pmbl. (seventh recital).
853. Such an approach was a prominent feature of several early conservation treaties,
such as the 1900 Convention for the Preservation of Wild Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa,
and the 1902 Convention on the Protection of Birds useful to Agriculture, but was abandoned
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tirely different directions, some of which may prove to be profoundly
counter-intuitive.854 Thus, various experiments have confounded wide-
spread assumptions by revealing predators actually to be vital
guarantors of biological diversity within the ecosystems they inhabit
with the result that removing them is deleterious in that regard.855 In cer-
tain cases, indeed, experience suggests that the most effective way to
reduce apparently burgeoning populations of particular predators may be
856to ensure the reintroduction and conservation of still larger carnivores.
It has recently been suggested that predator-prey interactions in large
vertebrates generally have not as yet been the subject of sufficiently ex-
tensive research to produce precise prescriptions for action,857 and that
fishery management bodies have also made rather limited progress on
this topic. 858 It may be, for example, that it is the relative abundance of
prey which essentially determines the numbers of predators, rather than
the converse. In any event, culling obviously cannot be authorized sim-
ply on the basis of general observations concerning the quantity of fish
consumed by cetaceans, since, as various commentators have already
pointed out,859 the effect of such consumption could vary greatly. Some
cetaceans may predominantly consume fish that are not actively ex-
ploited by humans at all, or target species that actually prey on those that
are so exploited, which would render a policy of culling in such
or significantly attenuated in successor treaties. Thus the concept of "nuisance" species did
not feature in either the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
sources, supra note 302, or the International Convention for the Protection of Birds, supra
note 432. For discussion of this point, see LYSTER, supra note 273, at 65, 113.
854. Note in this regard the effects of the recent controlled experiment on the culling of
badgers in the United Kingdom, where the practice was found not to be cost-effective, and in
some cases actually exacerbated the problems it was intended to solve. See David Miliband,
Written Ministerial Statement on the Publication of the Report of the Independent Scientific
Group on Cattle TB (June 18, 2007), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/corporate/
ministers/statements/dm070618.htm.
855. EDWARD WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 176-82 (1992).
856. Consider, for example, the relationship between coyotes and wolves in the United
States, or otters and mink in the United Kingdom.
857. See, e.g., PEDRO BARBOSA & IGNACIO CASTELLANOS, ECOLOGY OF PREDATOR-PREY
INTERACTIONS (2005).
858. ECOSYSTEM PRINCIPLES ADVISORY PANEL, ECOSYSTEM-BASED FISHERY MANAGE-
MENT (1999); PAM L. GROMEN, TAKING THE BAIT-ARE AMERICA'S FISHERIES OUT-
COMPETING PREDATORS FOR THEIR PREY? (National Coalition for Marine Conservation 2006);
Dep't of Fisheries & Oceans, Canada, Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review (2001-2004), avail-
able at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/afpr-rppa/home-e.htm; see also Duncan E.J. Currie,
Ecosystem-Based Management in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (Mar. 1, 2007),
available at http://assets.panda.org/downloads/wwf-ecosystem-paper-final-wlogo.pdf.
859. See Jock W. Young, Do Large Whales Have an Impact on Commercial Fishing in
the South Pacific Ocean?, 3 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 253 (2000) (providing an overview
of the issues and reference to various technical studies); see also Erik J. Molenaar, Marine
Mammals: the Role of Ethics and Ecosystem Considerations, 3 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y
31 (2003); 2002-2010 Cetacean Action Plan, supra note 771.
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instances at best pointless and at worst counter-productive. And while
the culling of cetaceans may eliminate a number of live predators, will it
not also remove what in due course, in the posthumous form of their car-
casses, might have represented a bounteous resource capable of
providing sustenance for other marine species for decades?
8'6
Accordingly, while it might in theory be possible to develop such a
comprehensive understanding of the marine ecosystem as to permit the
determination of a harvesting quota for each and every species that was
appropriate for the preservation of an ideal ecological balance, there is
little reason to suppose that such a system is remotely achievable at pre-
sent. As the IUCN/SSC Cetacean Specialist Group has recently pointed
out with regard to the concept of multi-species or ecosystem manage-
ment, "the onerous data requirements, the inherent complexity and
dynamism of natural marine ecosystems, and the inadequacy of knowl-
edge about functional relationships among organisms, make such
management extremely difficult to achieve in practice. ' 6'
Thus, while the needs of food security must be taken seriously, there
is currently room for considerable skepticism as to whether the available
evidence justifies the conclusion that it is under threat from whales,
since there are so many complex factors at play in the ongoing mainte-
nance of marine biodiversity. It is, of course, hardly the place of lawyers
to dabble in such controversies, though it may be to them that the task
ultimately falls of establishing legal mechanisms or procedures in accor-
dance with which the relevant problems may be addressed. Since the
IWC does not appear to have developed a solution as yet, it may be that
the most profitable approach would be to consider those which have
been adopted under other treaties in the conservation field.
The Berne Convention, for example, does allow for derogations from
such protection "to prevent serious damage to ... fisheries ... ," pro-
vided that certain strict conditions are satisfied.8 62 These include close
monitoring of the action in question by the Berne Convention's Standing
Committee, together with demonstration in advance that it "will not be
detrimental to the survival of the population concerned" and that "there
860. Graham Lawson, The Deep: Long Dark Teatime of the Zombie Worms, NEW SCI-
ENTIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 50 ("For the nutrient-poor ocean floor, a dead whale is an absolute
bonanza, delivering a package of nutrients that would take up to 4000 years to accumulate at
background rates."); see, e.g., Thomas G. Dahlgren et al., Fauna of Whale Falls, 51 DEEP SEA
RES. 1 1873 (2004); Craig R. Smith & Amy R. Baco, Ecology of Whale Falls at the Deep-Sea
Floor, 41 OCEANOGRAPHY & MARINE BIOLOGY: ANN. REV. 311 (2003) (providing original
research).
861. 2002-2010 Cetacean Action Plan, supra note 771.
862. Berne Convention, supra note 311, art. IX. Note also that many IWC Member
States are parties to the Berne Convention, which, as seen above, requires them to extend strict
protection to various whale species included in its Appendix II. Id. app. II.
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is no other satisfactory solution., 863 This suggests that the onus of prov-
ing that such measures are in fact necessary should, in full accordance
with ordinary principles, fall on the proponents of culling. Again, it will
be for individual IWC members to determine, in the exercise of their
discretion in good faith, whether they find the arguments advanced suffi-
ciently convincing to warrant the establishment of a quota for this
purpose.
3. Amendment of the Convention
Although the potential for normalization and modernization of the
ICRW through the mechanisms of (i) a flexible and progressive approach
to the interpretation of its terms generally, and (ii) further amendment of
the Schedule, has been shown to be considerable, it is patently not
unlimited. Any additional changes that are considered desirable would
have to be effected through the more fundamental process of amendment
to the ICRW itself. Notwithstanding the lack of any specific provision
establishing a procedure for effecting such changes, the ICRW, like any
other treaty, is susceptible to revision by means of an amending protocol,
for which the one adopted in 1956 provides an obvious precedent . The
changes in question might range from a relatively minor adjustment of
the basis on which amendments to the Schedule might in the future be
made to a full-scale overhaul of the Convention's entire approach to con-
servation.
The precise nature of the substantive content of the amendment in
question would constitute a key determinant of the procedural rules that
would be needed to govern such matters as participation and entry into
force. Thus, if the amendment were designed to bear on the current
"core" business of the IWC-i.e., the regulation of direct exploitation of
cetaceans (whether consumptive or not)-it would almost certainly be
necessary to follow the precedent of the 1956 Protocol in requiring ac-
ceptance by all current ICRW parties to enable the Protocol to be
brought into force. 86' The practical difficulties involved in achieving such
a level of support should never be underestimated, however, as the annals
of international relations reveal numerous examples of well-intentioned
amending instruments that remain suspended in apparently permanent
limbo through failure to surmount such hurdles. Even when the amend-
ment in question commands widespread support in principle, the forces
of inertia are often such as to preclude the practical expression of such
863. See generally id. art. IX; Bonn Convention, supra note 205, art. 3(5)-(7) (providing
a similar scheme).
864. See 1956 Protocol, supra note 193.
865. See id. art. II1(2).
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support through the formal deposit of an instrument of acceptance.866
Consequently, it might be unwise to expect that such a change could eas-
ily or expeditiously be achieved. The process would naturally be far
more complex still if the proposed amendment was in any way contro-
versial, and it might, indeed, be unwise to expect that any such change
would ultimately be feasible at all. Of the range of matters within this
category that seem to be most urgently in need of reconsideration, five
come immediately to mind: they concern (i) the biological scope of the
ICRW, in terms of species covered; (ii) aboriginal whaling; (iii) scientific
whaling; (iv) the amendment procedures themselves, and specifically the
power to exclude their effect by registering an objection; and (v) the cur-
rent restriction of the substantive focus of the ICRW to direct
exploitation (even if the notion of "whaling" were henceforth to be in-
terpreted in the expansive fashion proposed in the earlier part of this
Part).
As to the first, relatively few problems of strictly legal significance
are apparent. Controversy currently revolves around the issue of whether
the regulatory competence of the IWC extends to all cetaceans or is re-
stricted to the larger species.867 This in turn depends on the meaning to be
attributed to the expression "whales" as employed throughout the Con-
vention. On the one hand, it is argued that the Annex of Nomenclature
attached to the Final Act of the Washington Conference should be treated
as definitive of the ICRW's intended scope.868 Since it included only the
names of certain species, which were, for the most part, the so-called
great whales, other, smaller, cetaceans necessarily fall outside the scope
of its jurisdiction.8 69 Traditionally, formal regulation has generally been
limited to the species identified in the Final Act (although the IWC has
recognized the importance in principle of protecting smaller whales,
dolphins, and porpoises and has formulated some recommendations in
that regard). The alternative view is that the term "whales" is neither
very precise scientifically nor defined in the ICRW, and that the Final
Act has no normative implications, being intended only as a guide to the
proper use of nomenclature. Consequently, it is open to the IWC to em-
brace small cetaceans within its regulatory powers.
Key points here are that although the Final Act is not itself a treaty, it
is capable of being regarded as, or as containing, an "agreement relating
to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connation with
866. See Bowman, supra note 196, pt. VI (exploring such issues in other contexts).
867. See Patricia W. Bimie, Small Cetaceans and the IWC, 10 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 23-24 (1997) (offering a more detailed discussion); Alexander Gillespie, Small Ceta-
ceans, International Law and the IWC, 2 MELB. J. INT'L L. 257, 267-79 (2001).
868. IWRC, supra note 1, annex (Nomenclature of Whales).
869. See id.
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the conclusion of the treaty" and therefore as forming part of the "con-
text" within which the terms of the treaty must be understood.870 Even on
this basis, however, the true purport of the Annex has still to be deter-
mined. Was it seeking to provide a definitive list of species to be covered
by the ICRW, or merely to provide a uniform scientific nomenclature to
avoid uncertainty over the identification of some of those that undoubt-
edly were? As intriguing a question as this may be on the theoretical
level, it has little practical significance in the present context for the sim-
ple reason that, if the political will were present to bring small cetaceans
within the ICRW's formal purview, precisely the same action would suf-
fice to achieve that result regardless of what view was taken regarding
the underlying legal question. That is, either (a) a consensus resolution
that small cetaceans should be regarded as "whales" for ICRW purposes,
or (b) an amendment to the Schedule simply introducing regulatory
measures in relation to such species, would be all that was required ei-
ther (i) to confirm that small cetaceans had been legitimate subjects of
regulation all along, or (ii) to revise the ICRW so as to render them such
for the future. Although the same result could undoubtedly be achieved
by formally amending the ICRW so as to include for the first time a
definition of the expression "whales," the practical difficulties likely to
be involved in making such a change would render this an unnecessarily
cumbersome approach. Since the modification in question is so very triv-
ial by comparison to the quite dramatic changes of course which have
been effected by resolution in other international institutions, there could
be no plausible impediment to proceeding here by the least complicated
and logistically burdensome route. Consequently, the only significant
dispute is one of policy rather than law.
As regards the question of aboriginal whaling, it has already been
noted that the exceptional establishment of quotas for the benefit of in-
digenous populations has long been a feature of the IWC system and,
despite the existence of some opposition in principle, is arguably justifi-
able in light of the special recognition accorded in international human
rights law to the members of such populations, and indeed of minorities
generally. 871 At the same time, the logic and fairness of the actual appli-
cation of the relevant principles under the ICRW has been called into
870. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 31(1), 31(2)(a); see
AUST, supra note 91, at 72-74, 188-91; ILC Commentary, supra note 84, at 221, T 13 (provid-
ing further discussion).
871. It is to be noted in this context that the retention of a power to create such quotas
would still require them to be voted on and approved in the ordinary way.
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question both by States and by independent commentators.872 Is there
truly, for example, a clear justification for the marked difference in
treatment accorded to, on the one hand, the Makah tribe of the United
States or the whaling communities of St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
and, on the other, the Japanese coastal communities of Abashiri, Ayu-
kawa, Wadaura, and Taiji? Given that the law of biodiversity, as reflected
in the Addis Ababa Guidelines, declines to draw any sharp distinction
between the interests of indigenous and local communities, urging in-
stead that regard be paid to both, 873 a strong case may be made for further
reflection on these issues, and possibly for the consideration of some
novel approach to categorization of the relevant activities-under the
more comprehensive rubric of artisanal whaling, for example, as has
been proposed in certain quarters . 74 The issues in question are such that
opinions as to the way in which they should properly be resolved may
well diverge widely, without necessarily impugning the good faith of the
participants in any way. Thus, even if the aboriginal whaling exemption
were to be broadened or reconceptualized in some way, it might still be
relevant to consider whether the primary motivation for exploitation was
essentially nutritional or cultural in nature, and whether-in the latter
case-a purely token quota might suffice. Furthermore, it would be ap-
propriate to consider in either case the extent to which the relevant need
could be satisfied through participation in the activity of whale-
watching, or receipt of a share in the profits thereby generated. The
crucial point for present purposes, however, is that since the current no-
menclature and classificatory system is not actually specified in the text
of the body of the ICRW, but in the Schedule, it will not require any
amendment of the ICRW itself to effect such changes as might be
thought desirable, and the matter need not be pursued further at this
juncture.
The situation is quite different in the case of the next two controver-
sial issues identified above, both of which are the subject of specific
provisions in the text.876 As regards the "scientific whaling" exemption,
the ICRW is by no means unique amongst species conservation agree-
872. See C. Baker, The Makah and Japan: Evaluating Cultural Rights to Whale in the
New Millennium (2007) (unpublished LL.M. dissertation, University of Nottingham) (on file
with author) (offering a current review of the literature and commentary on the issues).
873. ADDIS ABABA PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 299, Practical Principles 2,
4,6,9,12,14.
874. See Baker, supra note 872.
875. Thus, for example, the imposition of a levy on the activity of whale-watching might
be deployed in order to meet the nutritional needs of communities formerly dependent on
whaling.
876. See ICRW, supra note 1, arts. V, VIII.
[Vol. 29:293
Spring 2008] "Normalizing" the International Convention 489
ments in making such provisions,877 but is nonetheless fairly clearly out
of line with the generality of currently extant instruments in the degree
of latitude it allows to States Parties, as a result of the absence of speci-
fied restrictions of a substantive or procedural kind on the exercise of the
power in question. The Wadden Sea Seals Agreement, by contrast, limits
the scope of such authorizations to designated institutions performing
research into the conservation of the population in question and to situa-
tions in which the information sought "cannot be obtained in any other
way,, 878 while the Bonn Convention requires that any exception allowed
be "precise as to content and limited as to space and time," and that any
such taking "should not operate to the disadvantage of the species con-
cerned. '879 The Berne Convention not only requires that such exceptions
be restricted to situations in which they "will not be detrimental to the
survival of the population concerned" and "there is no other satisfactory
solution," but imposes strict reporting obligations in all such cases so
that their utilization may be closely monitored.880 Even the 1950 Interna-
tional Convention for the Protection of Birds required that "all necessary
precautions" be taken to prevent abuses.88' By simply adopting, almost
verbatim, a provision from the 1937 Regulation of Whaling Agree-
ment,882 and maintaining it unchanged for sixty years, the ICRW has
certainly created a potentially damaging loophole in its own conserva-
tion regime.
It would nevertheless be mistaken to assume, however (as some
commentators appear to do),883 that the absence both of specific restric-
tions on the ability to issue permits for scientific research, and of any
express regulatory powers on the part of the Commission itself,8 leaves
877. Cf African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, su-
pra note 302, art. 8(1); Western Hemisphere Convention, supra note 300, arts. 4, 5(1);
International Convention for the Protection of Birds, supra note 432, art. 7; Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Seals art. 4(1)(b), June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T. 441, 11 I.L.M. 251;
Berne Convention, supra note 311, art. IX; Bonn Convention, supra note 205, art. 3(5)(a);
Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea art. 6(2), Oct. 16, 1990, available
at http://www.cms.int/species/wadden-seals/seatext.htm; Agreement on the Conservation of
Population of European Bats art. 3(1), Dec. 4, 1991, available at http://www.eurobats.org/
documents/agreement text.htm [hereinafter EUROBATS].
878. See Agreement on the Conservation of Seals in the Wadden Sea, supra note 877.
879. Bonn Convention, supra note 205, art. nI(5).
880. Berne Convention, supra note 311, art. IX.
881. International Convention for the Protection of Birds, supra note 432, art. 7.
882. Regulation of Whaling Agreement, supra note 435, art. 10.
883. See BURKE, supra note 10, at 297; Sumi, supra note 12, at 317, 336-40.
884. Article VIII(I) requires each party making use of such powers "to report at once to
the Commission all such authorizations which it has granted." ICRW, supra note 1, art.
VIII(l); see CHERFAS, supra note 386, at 176-89; Alexander Gillespie, Whaling under a Sci-
entific Auspice: The Ethics of Scientific Research Whaling Operations, 3 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L.
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IWC members with a completely free hand to authorize the taking of
whales under this provision. In reality, there are a number of norms that
must be complied with in this context.885 First, the powers in question are
only available "for purposes of scientific research," and it is beyond dis-
pute that this phrase, like any other, must be interpreted and applied in
good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the words as
seen in light of the overall object and purpose of the ICRW. In view of
the many doubts that have been raised regarding the current Japanese
research program, for example, there can be no guarantee that this test
will necessarily be satisfied in its case. The fact that meat from whales
harvested under this power commonly finds its way into Japanese restau-
rants is not in itself indicative of bad faith, since Article VIII(2) requires
that they be processed and disposed of in accordance with the directions
of the government in question,886 and there has been a long tradition
within the whaling community of requiring that the fullest possible use
8817be made of all whales taken. Nevertheless, should the matter ever fall
for determination by an international court or tribunal, it would certainly
be relevant to take account of this factor when identifying the dominant
motive of the State concerned and determining whether any abuse of
right had occurred. A separate, albeit related, ground for review would be
based on the extent, if any, to which the authorization tended to under-
mine the overall object and purpose of the ICRW-i.e., the proper and
effective conservation of whale stocks and the need to maintain good
order in the development of the whaling industry. Again, these are ques-
tions the answers to which cannot be predicted with absolute confidence.
However, in view of the fact that Article VIII is plainly intended to create
an exception to the overall conservation regime-and one of a poten-
tially devastating character-it would be no surprise to see it given the
narrowest possible interpretation.888 Certainly, it would be relevant to
consider the extent to which the taking in question complied with any
principles or procedures laid down by the Commission governing the
exercise of such powers generally, and whether it was consistent with
& POL'Y 1, 34-40 (2000); Sumi, supra note 12, at 336-40 (discussing IWC attempts to estab-
lish a regulatory scheme).
885. See Gillespie, supra note 884, at 34-36; Peter H. Sand, Japan's "Research Whal-
ing" in the Antarctic Southern Ocean and the North Pacific Ocean in the Face of the
Endangered Species Convention (CITES), 17 REv. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 56
(2008); Triggs, supra note 380, at 46.
886. ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIlI(2).
887. See Convention Between the United States of America and Other Governments
Respecting Whaling, supra note 414, art. 11.
888. The recognition of a principle concerning the narrow interpretation of exceptions is
evident from the practice and jurisprudence of bodies as diverse as CITES, the WTO, and the
European Court of Human Rights.
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any relevant norms emerging from other sources governing the taking of
protected species for scientific reasons. It is certainly conceivable, in
light of norms emerging from conservation treaties generally, that a
primafacie case of necessity might have to be made out before a permit
could be regarded as having been validly issued "for purposes of scien-
tific research. 889 In any event, an exercise of such power under the
ICRW will only maintain consistency with the CBD to the extent that it
causes no risk or harm to biological diversity, and its application to en-
dangered or vulnerable species must therefore automatically be open to
question.
For these reasons, it is clear that Article VIII as currently drafted
represents a source of great uncertainty and controversy within the
ICRW regime, and must be regarded as a major cause of its dysfunc-
tional nature. It is therefore ripe for amendment with a view to
eliminating these deficiencies. The precise nature of the safeguards to be
incorporated would obviously have to be the subject of negotiation, al-
though, as noted above, there are a number of existing precedents from
which ideas may be drawn. The majority of species covered by those
instruments are, however, essentially terrestrial in character and many
are not necessarily even migratory. Given the fact that whales represent a
truly international resource and that an international institution, the IWC,
has been created and dedicated to their conservation, a strong case could
be made in principle for total removal of the unilateral power to under-
take lethal research, and for entrusting the responsibility for authorizing
and supervising any such projects as were deemed necessary to a suit-
able organ of the IWC itself. Non-lethal research might be permitted
subject to appraisal of its potential intrusiveness and harm to individuals
and to the maintenance of cetacean populations.
Naturally enough, an insuperable obstacle to the implementation of
such a reform is likely to lie in the absence of the political will to
achieve it, although if presented as part of some kind of package deal
involving a number of substantive changes, it is just conceivable that
agreement might be forthcoming. Even then, however, the practical diffi-
culties entailed in securing the deposit of instruments of ratification or
approval by over seventy States must be regarded, on the basis of avail-
able evidence of state practice, as formidable. It would be possible to
circumvent these difficulties through the adoption of an instrument for
the purposes of which consent to be bound could be expressed by signa-
ture alone, but this, too, would be dependent on the availability of
unanimous support for such an approach.
889. See ICRW, supra note 1, art. VIII.
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Many of these difficulties are also evident with regard to the power
to register objections to Schedule amendments, the dysfunctional ten-
dency of which is also considerable. The risks inherent in the creation of
this power were, of course, specifically the subject of adverse comment
by certain States during the Washington Conference, and fully apparent
in the decision-making processes within the Commission during its trou-
blesome early years. 90 On the other hand, the judgment that, without this
power, certain key players might not have been willing to participate in
the ICRW at all may well have been correct. It is, furthermore, certainly
not possible to claim that such a provision is significantly out of line
with comparable treaties, however widely or narrowly the notion of
comparability is conceived. In other areas in which it has become com-
mon to establish regulatory commissions to manage natural resources-
fisheries or freshwater supplies, for example-the allocation to them of
powers of conclusive decision is sufficiently unusual to attract the spe-
cific attention of commentators, 89' while even treaties which relate to
"wildlife" as popularly understood quite frequently allow for the exclu-
sion of conservation obligations in relation to particular species.892 In all
such cases, the deployment of such powers naturally serves to weaken
the effectiveness of the operation of the agreement in question to some
extent, and, for that reason, States are requested to review the need for
such exceptions from time to time. Nevertheless, this diminution in ef-
fectiveness, however regrettable in itself, is generally regarded as a price
worth paying to secure the participation of the States in question.
In the situation in which the ICRW currently finds itself, however,
when the moratorium has seen the establishment of zero quotas for
commercial operations generally, the opt-out power may simply create
an unwelcome dimension of uncertainty which could serve as an addi-
tional disincentive to change. In particular, the adoption of any
harvesting quota in the future might run the risk of triggering a fresh se-
ries of objections from States that thought it unduly low, in which case
the legal consequences of such actions would have to be considered. Un-
der the general law of treaties, any State that declines to accept an
amendment to an agreement normally remains bound by that agreement
in the form in which it existed prior to that amendment, i.e., in its origi-
nal form, as modified by any earlier amendments that have been
890. See supra Part 111.
891. See INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 290 (providing
information on the International Joint Commission created by the 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty between Canada and the United States).
892. See CITES, supra note 209, arts. 15(3), 16(2), 23; Berne Convention, supra note
311, arts. 17(3), 22(l) (precluding the making of general reservations).
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accepted by that State. 93 The application of this rule would duly result in
any IWC member that objected to a new quota remaining bound by the
pre-existing quota of zero. However, the rule itself-like most rules un-
der the Vienna Convention-is residual only, and yields to a clear
contrary intention. 94 In the case of the ICRW, it might just be arguable
that the logic of a scheme that involves the elaboration of the minutiae of
regulation in a Schedule, and the convening of annual meetings to review
its contents and reconsider quotas, is indeed indicative of a contrary in-
tent, to the effect that the force of each successive version of the
Schedule is completely spent as soon as a revised version comes into
effect. From that perspective, the objecting States would not be bound by
any restriction. This would plainly be a very worrying outcome, and a
major disincentive to change of any kind. Consequently, if this latter ap-
proach is not regarded as the correct one, it might be desirable for that
point to be clarified as soon as possible.
Even if the Vienna Convention approach is applicable, however, cer-
tain problems remain. In particular, if a quota was at any time
established that was shown on the basis of subsequent experience to be
unreasonably high, the power to object might still be employed in such a
way as to defeat any later attempt to bring harvesting levels down again.
This possibility also tends to militate in favor of preserving the status
quo. In that sense, the opt-out provision may lead to a paralysis that
really serves the interests of no one, with the possible exception of any
State that currently maintains a valid objection to the moratorium.9 It
would, however, doubtless be unwise to assume that this would necessar-
ily lead to the emergence of general support for the idea of amending the
Convention so as to remove the power of objection, as the instinct to pre-
serve individual sovereignty over such matters as a matter of principle is
extremely strong. In any event, the formidable practical obstacles in-
volved in securing the adoption and entry into force of such an
amendment amongst so many States would still have to be overcome.
Paradoxically, if it were desired to effect some rather more radical
transformation of the international regime governing the conservation of
large cetaceans, with a view to addressing the many threats to their well-
being and prospects of survival apart from direct exploitation, this might
prove, by comparison, rather more straightforward in practical terms.
893. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 40(4).
894. Id. art. 40(1) (emphasis added) (stating that "[u]nless the treaty otherwise provides,
the amendment of multilateral treaties shall be governed by the following paragraphs").
895. That is, Norway and the Russian Federation. The position of Iceland must be re-
garded as controversial. Whether such States would be prepared to trade in the power of
objection in return for the possibility of some above-zero quotas being set in the future re-
mains unknown.
Spring 2008]
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The reason is that, provided such a development did not in any way un-
dermine the existing ICRW regime, but merely represented a supplement
to it in the sense of establishing novel duties of protection against threats
of a different sort, it could be concluded and brought into force solely
amongst those States that were minded to subscribe to such a regime.
Under Article 41(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention, even the existing pro-
visions of a multilateral convention may be modified amongst a subset
of the parties provided that
the modification in question is not prohibited by the treaty and:
(i) does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their
rights under the treaty or the performance of their obligations;
(ii) does not relate to a provision derogation from which is in-
compatible with the effective execution of the object and
purpose of the treaty as a whole.8 96
Consequently, the mere imposition of additional obligations that, in fact,
served to advance the ICRW objective of proper and effective conserva-
tion of cetaceans should be free of serious legal impediment.
The precise scope and content of any such agreement would be very
much at large, although many of the more significant threats to cetaceans
have already been catalogued in the relevant literature.89 Alongside di-
rect exploitation and whale-watching, they include incidental mortality
in fisheries, the indirect effects of industrial fisheries, competition and
culling, live capture for research or entertainment, disturbance from mili-
tary or industrial operations, chemical pollution, disease and exposure to
biotoxins, and climate change and ozone depletion" A number of in-
struments have already been noted that have an impact on such matters,
most notably the recent SPREP Memorandum of Understanding con-
cerning the Conservation of Cetaceans and their Habitats in the Pacific
Islands Region, 89  although this is not of a legally binding character. The
Berne Convention, by contrast, plainly does import hard law obligations,
and it is also the case that these overlap with those of the ICRW in the
sense that they address the harvesting of cetaceans along with other
threats to their security.9 While not of themselves incompatible with the
ICRW regime, these duties regarding direct exploitation arguably do im-
pose certain constraints on the exercise of voting discretion within the
896. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 41 (1)(b).
897. RANDALL R. REEVES ET AL., DOLPHINS, WHALES AND PORPOISES: 2002-2010
CONSERVATION ACTION PLAN FOR THE WORLD'S CETACEANS (IUCN/SSC Cetacean Specialist
Group 2003).
898. Id. (especially ch. 2).
899. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
900. See Berne Convention, supra note 311.
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IWC by Berne Convention parties, although seemingly in a fashion that
enables them to maintain consistency with contemporary attitudes to
conservation, rather than the converse.
There could certainly be no legitimate objection or legal impediment
to the creation of further regional conventions for the conservation of
cetaceans, or indeed to the adoption of an instrument of potentially
global application. Such an instrument might, moreover, assume any one
of a variety of forms and stand in almost any kind of legal relationship to
the ICRW itself, and to other existing treaties. It could, for example, be
adopted under the aegis of the Bonn Migratory Species Convention, ei-
ther as an AGREEMENT under Article 4(3) thereof, or alternatively as
either a legally binding treaty or a less formal Memorandum of Under-
standing under Article 4(4).9°' Ideally, perhaps, the first of these options
would be preferable, as the treaty in question has much in common with
existing instruments in that category.9 Alternatively, it might be con-
cluded as a protocol to the ICRW itself, although the attractions of this
approach are undoubtedly weakened by the obvious incongruity of creat-
ing an instrument designed to address such a wide spectrum of
conservation issues in the form of an appendage to one narrowly focused
on particular aspects of the human exploitation of cetacean species.
More logically, the ICRW would henceforth operate as a protocol to the
proposed convention, although the practical difficulties involved in re-
constituting an existing treaty so as to bring it within the umbrella of a
newly adopted instrument are probably so formidable as to preclude this
option from the outset.903 Perhaps, then, the optimum solution would be
to designate any novel conservation instrument as a treaty supplementary
to the ICRW, or indeed to create it as a completely independent entity.
The choice between these various approaches might ultimately depend
on the extent to which it appeared desirable to rely on the existing insti-
tutional capacity and long experience of the IWC itself.
4. Other Mechanisms of Adjustment
In the previous Section, attention was repeatedly drawn to the often
under-estimated practical difficulties involved in securing the adoption
and entry into force of formal instruments of amendment to existing
901. Bonn Convention, supra note 205, art. 4(3)-(4).
902. See Agreement for the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds,
June 16, 1995, reprinted in 6 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 306, 907 (1995); EUROBATS, supra note
877.
903. It will be remembered that such a possibility was considered, but rapidly aban-
doned, in relation to the Biodiversity Convention. See Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lefkowitz,
supra note 288; D6sir6e M. McGraw, The CBD-Key Characteristics and Implications for
Implementation, II REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L. 17 (2002).
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treaties. On the other hand, other less cumbersome mechanisms may be
available, and are very widely utilized by treaty bodies operating in the
environmental field or elsewhere. In particular, the adoption of resolu-
tions concerning the interpretation and implementation of treaty
provisions is ubiquitous, and such measures are commonly treated as
having decisive effect for the purposes of the law of treaties without
close attention being paid to whether they should properly be regarded as
subsequent practice or agreement as to the interpretation of the treaty, or
actual amendments of it by virtue of practice. It might well be that any
desired modification of the approach to aboriginal whaling or small ce-
taceans, for example, could be achieved by this means.
It should also not be overlooked that there may be other mechanisms
available within the law of treaties, or international law generally, that
could be pressed into service to facilitate the achievement of objectives
that might emerge from the normalization process. For example, even
though States might not be prepared to forgo for all time the ability to
issue scientific permits or object to Schedule amendments, it might be
that they would be willing to refrain from the exercise of such powers on
a temporary basis. Thus, even without formal amendment of the ICRW,
it should be possible to make the establishment of any particular harvest-
ing quota conditional on an undertaking by some or all IWC Member
States to refrain from the exercise of such powers, either totally or to a
specified extent, during the currency of that quota. The notion that a
purely unilateral undertaking by a State, if given due publicity and os-
tensibly intended to be binding, may be enforceable against it is
supported by the highest judicial authority,9 ' and where it is clearly in-
tended to be relied on, and particularly if it is given in return for some
advantage or concession, 95 any lingering doubts as to its binding charac-
ter can surely be dispelled. Where the undertaking is to refrain from the
exercise of certain treaty powers, it could conceivably be rendered ines-
capable by a variety of legal mechanisms, including the notions of
904. See, e.g., Nuclear Tests Case (Austi. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 267 (Dec. 20); SHAW,
supra note 35, at 114-15.
905. See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
53 (Apr. 5).
906. Most of these notions might be regarded as particular illustrations of a more general
principle of international law to the effect that no State may be permitted to benefit from its
own inconsistencies (allegans contraria non audiendus est), which is itself an application of
the still broader principle of good faith. See Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.),
1962 I.C.J. 6, 23-32 (June 15); Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on 23 December
1906 (Hond. v. Nicar.), 1960 I.C.J. 192, 213-14 (Nov. 18); ILC Commentary, supra note 84,
at 239; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, art. 45.
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waiver, estoppel, the establishment of "a series of bilateral engage-
ments," 907 or the selective suspension of treaty provisions.
90 8
Of course, the decision as to whether any particular quota should in
fact be established would remain dependent on all the other considera-
tions that have been outlined above, and there is no guarantee that the
necessary majority could be mustered in support of any particular pro-
posal at any particular time. The suggestion here is only that appropriate
means could almost certainly be found to counter some of the possible
adverse effects of adopting any quota that might at some point seem ac-
ceptable in principle.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The above discussion suggests that the "normalization" of the Whal-
ing Convention in light of current economic, social, and cultural
circumstances, evolving conservation policy and contemporary legal
norms will require a great deal more than simply the abandonment of the
moratorium on commercial whaling and the reestablishment of harvest-
ing quotas. Indeed, it may well lead in another direction entirely. The
array of factors that must be taken into consideration is, in fact, so broad
and diverse that opinions as to the proper course to follow may well di-
verge sharply. Consequently, allegations of bad faith on the part of States
that decline to follow a course of action favored by another faction will
not easily be sustained.
From the outside, the failure of the IWC to assume full responsibil-
ity for the regulation of all contemporary manifestations of cetacean
exploitation appears to be the major cause of its current dysfunction,
coupled with a marked tendency to pay insufficient regard to strictly le-
gal, as opposed to purely political, considerations. In particular, the
imperative of adopting a dynamic, evolutionary approach to treaty inter-
pretation, with a clear eye on the vital need to preserve the overall
integrity of the international legal system, would appear to be para-
mount. It may be that consumptive and non-consumptive exploitation
can co-exist in the future, but it might equally be concluded that success-
ful pursuit of the latter depends in no small measure on preserving the
iconic status of whales, which may be undermined by a resumption of
commercial harvesting. Furthermore, the lack of any clear current neces-
sity for the killing of whales, and the almost inevitable infliction of
907. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Jurisdiction and Admissibility Phase) (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 418 (Nov. 26).
908. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 21, arts. 44, 57, 58 (of-
fering guidance on the question of suspension).
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suffering involved in the process, may legitimately lead to a determina-
tion in good faith that the interests of proper conservation and orderly
development of the industry militate against any such resumption.O
APPENDIX
International Whaling Commission-Resolution 2006-1
St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration
June 2006
EMPHASISING that the use of cetaceans in many parts of the world
including the Caribbean contributes to sustainable livelihoods, food se-
curity and poverty reduction and that placing the use of whales outside
the context of the globally accepted norm of science-based management
and rule-making for emotional reasons would set a bad precedent that
risks our use of fisheries and other renewable resources;
FURTHER EMPHASISING that the use of marine resources as an
integral part of development options is critically important at this time
for a number of countries experiencing the need to diversify their agri-
culture;
UNDERSTANDING that the purpose of the 1946 International Con-
vention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) is to "provide for the
proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly
development of the whaling industry" (quoted from the Preamble to the
Convention) and that the International Whaling Commission is therefore
about managing whaling to ensure whale stocks are not over-harvested
rather than protecting all whales irrespective of their abundance;
NOTING that in 1982, the IWC adopted a moratorium on commer-
cial whaling (paragraph 10 e of the Schedule to the ICRW) without
advice from the Commission's Scientific Committee that such measure
was required for conservation purposes;
FURTHER NOTING that the moratorium which was clearly in-
tended as a temporary measure is no longer necessary, that the
Commission adopted a robust and risk-averse procedure (RMP) for cal-
culating quotas for abundant stocks of baleen whales in 1994 and that
909. See ICRW, supra note 1, pmbl.
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the IWC's own Scientific Committee has agreed that many species and
stocks of whales are abundant and that sustainable whaling is possible;
CONCERNED that after 14 years of discussion and negotiation, the
IWC has failed to complete and implement a management regime to
regulate commercial whaling;
ACCEPTING that scientific research has shown that whales con-
sume huge quantities of fish making the issue a matter of food security
for coastal nations and requiring that the issue of management of whale
stocks must be considered in a broader context of ecosystem manage-
ment since ecosystem management has now become an international
standard;
REJECTING as unacceptable that a number of international NGOs
with self-interest campaigns should use threats in an attempt to direct
government policy on matters of sovereign rights related to the use of
food security for national development;
NOTING that the position of some members that are opposed to the
resumption of commercial whaling on a sustainable basis is contrary to
the object and purpose of the International Convention for the Regula-
tion of Whaling;
UNDERSTANDING that the IWC can be saved from collapse only
by implementing conservation and management measures which will
allow controlled and sustainable whaling which would not mean a return
to historic over-harvesting and that continuing failure to do so serves
neither the interests of whale conservation nor management;
NOW THEREFORE:
COMMISSIONERS express their concern that the IWC has failed to
meet its obligations under the terms of the ICRW and,
DECLARE our commitment to normalising the functions of the
IWC based upon the terms of the ICRW and other relevant international
law, respect for cultural diversity and traditions of coastal peoples and
the fundamental principles of sustainable use of resources, and the need
for science-based policy and rulemaking that are accepted as the world
standard for the management of marine resources.
